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I. INTRODUCTION
Unlike many other crimes involving wealth transfers,
such as theft or fraud, there is no consensus on the morality
of antitrust offenses. Some opine that antitrust offenses are:
(i) immoral,1 (ii) amoral (being mala prohibitum rather than
1

Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540

U.S. 398, 408 (2004) (Scalia, J.) (characterizing collusion as "supreme evil
of antitrust"); United States v. Alton Box Bd. Co., No. 76 CR 199, 1977 WL
1374, at *4 (N.D. Ill. March 4, 1977) (noting the Department of Justice
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mala in se),2 or (iii) moral and consistent with natural
human behavior so it is the federal antitrust laws that are
immoral.' But these differing viewpoints have not sparked
any debate over the morality of antitrust violations. Under
the continued influence of the Chicago-school's neoclassical
economic theories, antitrust analysis is primarily concerned

view that the price-fixing violation before the court "represents immoral,
antisocial, and calculated conduct that should be punished as such");
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Antitrust Div. and The
Immigration and Naturalization Serv. (May 15, 1996) ("Whereas INS
considers criminal violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1,
to be crimes involving moral turpitude, which may subject an alien to
exclusion or deportation from the United States"), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/criminal/9951.htm; R. Hewitt Pate, Acting
Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., Speech Before the British
Institute of International and Comparative Law:
Anti-Cartel
Enforcement: The Core Antitrust Mission (May 16, 2003) [hereinafter
2003 Pate Speech] ("Since 1890, the Sherman Act has reflected the United
States' 'abiding faith that the elimination of competition [is] morally and
economically wrong.'") (quoting THURMAN ARNOLD, FAIR FIGHTS AND FOUL:
A DISSENTING LAWYER'S LIFE, 121 (1951)), (transcript available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/201199.htm).
2 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 345
(D. Mass. 1953) ("The violation with which United is now charged depends
not on moral considerations, but on solely economic considerations."), affd
per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); United States v. Safeway Stores, 20
F.R.D. 451, 454-55 (N.D.Tex. 1957) (noting that in many situations the
antitrust offense is considered malum prohibitum rather than malum in
se); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Violations in Securities Markets, 28
IOWA J. CORP. L. 607, 609 (2003) ("[A]ntitrust has no moral content and is
unconcerned about the distribution of wealth").
' Jeffrey Tucker, Controversy: Are Antitrust Laws Immoral?, 1 J.
MARKETS & MORALITY 75, 79-80 (1998). Others question the need for
antitrust laws, arguing "a paucity of empirical evidence that more than a
century of antitrust enforcement has provided benefits to U.S. consumers."
Robert W. Crandall & Clifford Winston, The Breakdown of 'Breakup',
WALL ST. J. March 9, 2006, at A14; see also Robert W. Crandall & Clifford
Winston, Does Antitrust Improve Consumer Welfare? Assessing the
Evidence, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 3-26 (2003). Others have questioned
Crandall & Winston's conclusion and the studies they relied upon. See
John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, How High Do Cartels Raise Prices?
Implicationsfor Optimal Cartel Fines, 80 TuL. L. REV. 513, 526-29 (2005).
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with economic efficiency.' Since terms like "morality" and
"evil" are judgmental, not descriptive, they are deemed
outside the discourse of economic theory's self-described
positivism.
Reducing antitrust to normative morality
judgments would represent, for Richard Posner and others,
antitrust's descent into "a weak field, a field in disarray, a
field in which consensus is impossible to achieve in our
society."5
But antitrust analysis is not beyond the judgmental.
Behind allocative efficiency's faqade of positivism lie such
moral issues as:
" Is economic efficiency the just outcome?
" What is a competitive market system, and is a
competitive market an end or the means to a
higher end?
" Is a vibrant market economy antagonistic or
conducive to society's moral progress, as measured
by its tolerance, support of the poor, etc.?6

4

ROBERT

H.

BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX:

A

POLICY AT WAR WITH

ITSELF 91-92 (1993); Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice And The
Antitrust Laws, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1982); Richard A. Posner, The

Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 928 (1979).
Maximizing economic efficiency, which is the maximization of aggregate
consumer and producer surplus, requires the maximization of both (i)
allocative (Pareto) efficiency-allocating resources to their highest valued
use, such that it is not possible to make anyone better off without making
someone worse off-and (ii) productive (technological) efficiencyproducing the products or services at the lowest possible cost.
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Glossary of
Industrial Organisation Economics and Competition Law 41, 65 (1993),
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/61/2376087.pdf
[hereinafter
OECD
Glossary]; Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, Rhetoric and Reality in
the Merger Standards of the United States, Canada, and the European
Union, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 423, 428 (2005).
' Richard A. Posner, Law and Economics Is Moral, 24 VAL. U. L. REV.
163, 166 (1990).
6 Benjamin M. Friedman, for example, outlines how economic growth
renders a society more inclined toward many of the Enlightenment's
conception of moral progress, through greater openness, tolerance,
mobility and democracy.
BENJAMIN M. FRIEDMAN, THE MORAL
CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH

(Alfred A. Knopf 2005).
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Is the market's socio-political function to minimize
"the necessity of resorting to internal ethical
constraints on human behavior and/or external
legal-governmental-political restrictions?"7
" Is there a "social mortgage" on private property, in
that the very existence of the institution of private
property is to ensure that the basic needs of every
individual are met and sustained? 8
" Is charging supracompetitive prices immoral?
" Is wealth maximization descriptive or normative,
and what role should the government play in
fostering wealth maximization?
One may question the need to address these moral issues.
By focusing antitrust analysis on allocative efficiency, an
economist may reach the same conclusion as a moralist,
without the baggage of these normative judgments. Even if
different conclusions are reached, the economist may argue
that Congress can deal more effectively with these normative
judgments than enforcers or the courts.9
"

7 James M. Buchanan, Good Economics-Bad Law, 60 VA. L. REV.
483, 486 (1974).
8 Letter presenting the Holy See's position concerning the
pharmaceutical industry's obligation to offer medicines at affordable prices
in Ethics Cannot Justify Fixing the Highest Prices for Medicine,
L'OSSERVATORE
ROMANO,
July
11,
2001,
available
at
http://www.catholicculture.org/docs/doc-view.cfm?recnum=3966&amp;long
desc.
' See, e.g., Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice, supra note 4, at 2 n.12,
noting an antitrust commentator's argument that:
Before one becomes an absolute skeptic about the morality
of an antitrust policy of encouraging efficiency, however, it
is important to note that in antitrust one can avoid the
question of the fairness of the starting point simply by
asserting that areas of law other than antitrust are better
designed to take care of distributive questions of fairness
or justness. That is, it is quite plausible that antitrust
policy ought to take the existing distribution of wealth as a
given and seek to improve allocative efficiency from that
starting point, and to leave to other areas of law such as
taxation, civil rights, or labor law the task of adjusting
wealth distributions according to some notion of fairness.
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If indeed the field of antitrust was limited to civil
remedies, and promoting efficiency was the singular goal of
antitrust law, then avoiding such moral issues might have
merit. But over the past thirty years, while antitrust's civil
remedies have remained relatively unchanged, the criminal
penalties for price fixing, bid rigging, and other Sherman Act
antitrust violations have soared-from a misdemeanor to a
felony punishable by up to ten years imprisonment. 10 If the
criminal laws reflect society's moral judgments, then
antitrust and morality ultimately are intertwined. Even if a
utilitarian sought to divorce morality from antitrust, in
asserting that antitrust's criminal penalties have increased
to ensure optimal deterrence, morality resurfaces in
addressing the means of deterring such behavior and the
degree to which criminal sanctions are employed.
Although the Sherman Act was enacted over a century
ago, antitrust enforcers, policy makers, and scholars have
largely circumvented the morality of antitrust crimes. Its
absence is remarkable given the vigorous debate over the
appropriate civil and criminal penalties for antitrust
violations. In this article, Part I provides a background of
antitrust violations and the economic theory of optimal
deterrence that has played a critical role in shaping the
criminal sanctions for Sherman Act violations.
The
assumption underlying the optimal deterrence theory is that
"rational" profit maximizers will weigh the magnitude of the
likely penalty and the probability of being detected against
the gain from the violation.
Part I next describes the
escalation of antitrust's criminal penalties in the United
States, prodded by the belief that the existing criminal
penalties were suboptimal in deterring profit maximizers
from violating the antitrust laws, and so only by increasing
the criminal sanctions will such cartel behavior be generally
deterred. Despite the escalation in criminal penalties, there
is no clear evidence that optimal deterrence has been
achieved. Although optimal deterrence is generally accepted
10 Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004,

Pub. L. No. 108-237, § 215, 118 Stat. 665, 668 (2004).
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policy for determining the appropriate antitrust penalties,
Part I concludes with the many shortcomings of this
economic theory.
Part II introduces morality and asks what role morality
could play in the field of antitrust, if optimal deterrence
alone is insufficient to effectively deter violations. After
examining under a three-part standard whether antitrust
crimes can indeed be deemed immoral, Part III weighs some
of the benefits and risks of supplementing antitrust crimes
with a moral component and the risks of the current
course-namely, ignoring morality.
Inevitably moral issues will surface as the Sherman Act's
criminal penalties continue to escalate.
A broader
implication is that antitrust policy, to borrow Robert Bork's
phrase, may be at war with itself." If policy makers assume
that the federal antitrust laws are concerned solely with
allocative efficiency and are essentially amoral, then efforts
to deter such conduct through criminal sanctions may be
self-defeating. Criminal law, as many legal scholars have
argued, reveals society's moral opprobrium to certain
conduct. That moral component (through internalizing the
standard of conduct and the attendant guilt or fear of shame)
can be effective in deterring socially unacceptable conduct.
But to harness that moral component, antitrust policy
makers should re-examine certain policies underlying
antitrust law. To date, antitrust policymakers, enforcers,
and scholars have largely encamped in utilitarianism and
the economic theory of optimal deterrence, whereby general
deterrence is achieved through the right mixture of financial
penalty and incarceration to offset the profit-maximizer's
expected cartel gains. But it is unclear whether that alone
will effectively deter cartel behavior. Instead, fostering a
moral component to antitrust crimes may more effectively
deter these violations at a lower social cost, encourage other
nations to increase their prosecution of cartel behavior, and
prevent antitrust from slipping into irrelevancy.

11 BORK, supra note

4.
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IL BACKGROUND
A. Hard-Core Cartels
Most antitrust violations fall under Sections 1 or 2 of the
Sherman Act and by the terms of the statute can be
prosecuted civilly or criminally. 12
The Sherman Act,
however, does not delineate which conduct could or should be
criminally or civilly prosecuted, and this has been left to the
discretion of the United States Department of Justice.13
Many business activities potentially may be procompetitive or competitively neutral, such as mergers or
joint ventures, which the Department of Justice civilly
investigates under a rule of reason standard. Certain
antitrust offenses involving "hard-core cartels," so labeled
because of their "pernicious effect on competition and lack of
any redeeming virtue," are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable and therefore illegal. 4 Hard-core cartels,
which are often characterized as "naked" restraints on
competition, involve an agreement among competitors to fix
prices, 5 restrict output," allocate customers or markets, 7 or
12

Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004), outlaws every

unreasonable "contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade." Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2004), makes it
unlawful for a company to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize" trade or
commerce.
" See Donald I. Baker, To Indict or Not to Indict-Prosecutorial
Discretionin Sherman Act Enforcement, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 405 (1978), for
background on the role of prosecutorial discretion in deciding which
antitrust offenses to pursue criminally. Prosecuting crimes is an executive
function; hence, only the Department of Justice can bring federal criminal
actions. The Federal Trade Commission can bring civil or administrative
proceedings, not criminal. Private parties, including states on behalf of
their citizens, also can bring only civil actions under the federal antitrust
laws. Many states, however, can bring criminal actions under their state
laws.
14 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
16 Price fixing is an agreement or mutual understanding between two
or more competitors to fix, control, raise, lower, maintain, or stabilize the
prices charged or to be charged for products or services, and can include
agreements to fix a minimum price, to eliminate discounts, or to adopt a
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rig bids. 8 The Department of Justice often, but not always,
prosecutes such "hard-core cartels" criminally. These cartels
are generally condemned as per se illegal, namely "without
elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused[,]
the business excuse for their use"19 (such as to avoid "ruinous
competition"), the fairness of the prices charged, or other
reasons for entering into the cartel."
At one time, the
Department of Justice criminally prosecuted other
anticompetitive behavior, such as resale price maintenance2 '
standard formula for fixing price.

INT'L COMPETITION NETWORK WORKING

GROUP ON CARTELS, DEFINING HARD-CORE CARTEL CONDUCT: EFFECTIVE

(2005) [hereinafter ICN Report],
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.orgbonn/CartelsWG/SG1._G
eneral Framework/EffectiveAnti-CartelRegimesBuildingBlocks.pdf,
see also United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940);
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927).
16 Output restrictions can involve agreements on production volumes,
sales volumes, or percentages of market growth. ICN Report, supra note
15, at 10.
17 See, e.g., United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645, 666-67 (7th Cir.
2000); United States v. Brown, 936 F.2d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Suntar Roofing, Inc., 897 F.2d 469, 473 (10th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Coop. Theatres of Ohio, Inc., 845 F.2d 1367, 1371 (6th Cir. 1988).
" ICN Report, supra note 15, at 2, 10; United States v. Hefferman, 43
F.3d 1144, 1145-46, 1149-50 (7th Cir. 1994).
INSTITUTIONS, EFFECTIVE PENALTIES 10

'9

20

N. Pac.Ry., 356 U.S. at 5.
See, e.g., Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 221-22 ("Congress has

not left with us the determination of whether or not particular price-fixing
schemes are wise or unwise, healthy or destructive. It has not permitted
the age-old cry of ruinous competition and competitive evils to be a defense
to price-fixing conspiracies. It has no more allowed genuine or fancied
competitive abuses as a legal justification for such schemes than it has the
good intentions of the members of the combination.").
The mere
coordination of decisions on price, output, customers, territories, and the
like then is not integration, and cost savings without integration are not a
basis for avoiding per se condemnation. U.S. Dep't of Justice & Federal
Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among
Competitors § 3.2 (2000), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines
.pdf.
21 Sanford M. Litvak, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., Speech
before the Annual Antitrust Institute: Antitrust Division Criminal
Enforcement Policy: The View from Washington (Nov. 7, 1980) (noting
that Department of Justice regarded resale price maintenance as criminal
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or egregious anticompetitive behavior by monopolists.2 2
Since the Reagan Administration, however, the Department
its criminal investigations to these
of Justice has limited
23
cartels.
hard-core

B. Difficulties in Detecting and Prosecuting Hard-Core
Cartels
The first difficulty in detecting and prosecuting hard-core
cartels is distinguishing between legal unilateral conduct
and illegal collusion, whereby the competitors agree to

violation), reprinted in II JAMES M. CLABAULT & MICHAEL K. BLOCK,
SHERMAN ACT INDICTMENTS: 1955-1980, at 635 (1981).
22 Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal
Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 429
(1963) (citing Statement of Antitrust Division's Assistant Attorney
General in Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm, Antitrust Rep. 350 (1955)) ("[There is
the policy of instituting] criminal prosecutions for Sherman Act violations
only where there is a per se violation, such as price fixing, a violation
accompanied by a specific intent to restrain competition or monopolize, the
use of predatory practices, or where defendant previously convicted of
Sherman Act violation."). For examples of earlier criminal monopolization
cases, see, e.g., American Tobacco v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946);
Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1957).
23 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, ch. III, §
C.5 (3d ed. 1998) [hereinafter ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL] ("In general,
current Division policy is to proceed by criminal investigation and
prosecution in cases involving horizontal, per se unlawful agreements such
as price fixing, bid rigging and horizontal customer and territorial
allocations."), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/foia/divisionmanual/
Moreover, even for antitrust offenses that courts have
ch3.htm#c5.
recognized as per se illegal, the Division would not prosecute the offense
criminally, if inappropriate.
These situations may include cases in which: (1) there is
confusion in the law; (2) there are truly novel issues of law
or fact presented; (3) confusion reasonably may have been
caused by past prosecutorial decisions; or (4) there is clear
evidence that the subjects of the investigation were not
aware of, or did not appreciate, the consequences of their
action.
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restrain competition.24 Few markets, if any, approach the
theoretical model of perfect competition.2 5 In many markets,
through branding
and
other product
or service
differentiation, companies can exercise a degree of market
power for their products or services.2 6
Consequently,
supracompetitive pricing is not a telltale sign of cartel
behavior, because higher prices may be the result of
imperfect, albeit lawful, competition.
Similarly, in
concentrated industries, parallel behavior by competitors is
not necessarily cartel behavior. On the contrary, it could be
the result of each company setting its price based on
strategic considerations regarding its competitors' behavior.27
For example, in a small town with two gasoline stations, the
owners, in considering the other's likely response to a price
increase or decrease, may settle on a supracompetitive price
without any actual discussion.
Each morning, because
Owner A is able to see what her competitor is charging, she
may unilaterally decide to follow Owner B's price increase or
decrease. As a result, Owner A and Owner B might set their
24

See, e.g., In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 117 (3d Cir.

1999) (stating that the existence of agreement is a "hallmark" of Section 1
claim, and finding no civil violation where evidence insufficient to show
conspiracy).
25 A model of perfect competition generally assumes homogenous
products, transparent prices, highly elastic demand curves, easy entry and
exit, and informed profit-maximizing producers and consumers. Price
equals marginal cost, and the market will produce the efficient level of
outputs with the most efficient techniques and using the minimum
quantity of inputs. PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NoRDHAus,
ECONOMICS 43 (13th ed. 1989); OECD Glossary, supra note 4, at 66.
26 The Department of Justice and FTC define market power for a
seller as the ability to profitably maintain prices above competitive levels
for a significant period of time. U.S. Dep't of Justice & Federal Trade
Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 0.1. (1992, revised 1997),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/publicguidelines/hmg.htm.
Moreover, sellers with market power also may also lessen competition on
dimensions other than price, such as product quality, service or
innovation. Id. at § 0.1 n.6.
27 See, e.g., Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478,
483-84 (1st Cir. 1988); ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD,
MICROECONOMICS 431 (2d ed. 1992).
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prices at "a profit-maximizing, supracompetitive level by
recognizing their shared economic interests and their
interdependence with respect to price and output
decisions."2 8 Even in competitive markets, this parallel
conduct may occur because all competitors are price-takers.2 9
Because the anticompetitive effects of supra-competitive
prices and deadweight welfare loss may occur absent an
illegal cartel and because cartels rarely formalize their
illegal agreement in writing, it is difficult for prosecutors to
uncover evidence of an illegal agreement.
A second difficulty in criminally prosecuting cartels is
that, unlike other victims of theft, cartel victims may not
know when, and to what degree, they are being victimized.
For example, cartel members may justify a price increase to
customers by citing capacity constraints or an increase in
costs. A cartel also may be highly successful with only
modest price increases. In a market with only a ten percent
profit margin, for example, a ten percent price increase may
double profits per sale. So an increase in price due to cartel
behavior is not necessarily visible to customers.
The third difficulty in prosecution is that collusion is
often hidden from view. The nature of an antitrust crime is
not as obvious as an armed bank robbery, where the
prosecutor can show the jury the weapons used and the
videotaped footage of the robbery. It is rare to obtain
videotaped footage of an international cartel in the act of
28 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.

209, 227 (1993) (citation omitted).
29 For example, bidders with similar cost structures for homogeneous

goods may submit identical bids. RICHARD A.

POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw

87

(2d ed. 2001). Both the Department of Justice's and American Bar
Association's recent amicus briefs state that such parallel conduct occurs
in competitive markets, and pleading that by itself (with a conclusory
allegation of conspiracy) is insufficient to state a claim under Section 1 of
the Sherman Act. See Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Neither Petitioners Nor Respondents, 2006 WL
2503551 (Aug. 25, 2006); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, 2006 WL 2482696 (Aug. 25, 2006), filed in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 126 S.Ct. 2965 (U.S. Jun 26, 2006) (No. 051126).
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fixing prices and carving up the worldwide market, as was
the case in the Lysine conspiracy. ° The wrongdoers often
take steps to conceal the existence of their collusion and
avoid creating incriminating documents. 3' One Department
of Justice official recently noted that due to the high stakes
of a criminal antitrust prosecution, there is "high incidence"
of document destruction, false statements, and witness
tampering by cartel participants. 32 The executives may meet
abroad (under the false impression that their foreign activity
is somehow sheltered from Sherman Act liability), or the
companies may be based abroad; in either case, obtaining
evidence in a foreign country presents additional issues.
Fourth, unlike other white-collar criminals, corporate
executives that violate the antitrust laws may not directly
pocket the ill-gotten proceeds from their collusion. For
30

For a description of this cartel, see Scott D. Hammond, Deputy

Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Caught in
the Act: Inside an International Cartel, Speech before OECD Competition
Committee, Working Party No. 3, Public Prosecutors Program (Oct. 18,
2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/212266.pdf.
Transcripts and copies of the undercover audio and video tapes recorded
by U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation agents with the help of a
cooperating witness are also available through the Freedom of Information
Act Unit of the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division, 325 7th Street,
NW, Suite 200, Washington, D.C. 20530.
31 For example, in one of the electrical equipment conspiracies, a
General Electric executive had retained some of the ground rules for the
cartel's meetings: "no breakfasting together, no registering at the hotel
with company names, no calls to the office, no papers to be left in hotelroom wastebaskets." Richard Austin Smith, The Incredible Electrical
Conspiracy (Part II) FORTUNE, May 1961, 161, at 210 [hereinafter
ElectricalConspiracy(PartII)].
" Speech by Scott D. Hammond, Ten Strategies for Winning the Fight
Against Hardcore Cartels, before OECD Competition Committee, Working
Party No. 3 Prosecutors Program Oct. 18, 2005, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/212270.pdf;
see also OECD,
Hard-Core Cartels: Third Report on the Implementation of the 1998
Recommendation 15 (2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
30/2/36600303.pdf [hereinafter OECD 3rd Report]; 2003 Pate Speech,
supra note 1, at 4 (describing how one conspirator provided its coconspirator with scripted answers with false information for upcoming
interview with Department of Justice).
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example, a thieving bank teller acts in a manner contrary to
the bank's interests, and the bank, through its internal
policing functions, has every interest to deter such behavior.
In contrast, corporate executives collude to increase
corporate profits, the goal of any profit-maximizing firm.
The executives may benefit indirectly, through higher
bonuses and promotions, while their employers benefit
directly, and in the short term. The end of price-fixing is
highly desirable from the perspective of the corporationnamely, increased profitability-but it is only when the
means are exposed that the interests of the corporation may
conflict with those of its executives.
A fifth difficulty is that the executives are often not the
downtrodden souls upon whom society readily turns its back,
but the leaders of the business world. Getting executives to
inform on their corporate family and risk being ostracized
from the industry can be very difficult. Moreover, the federal
courts historically have been reluctant to incarcerate the
individual wrongdoers who have the earmarks of respectable
business executives.3 4

' Of course, senior corporate executives may state that even in the
short-term such hard-core behavior is against corporate interests, as it
dulls the incentive to innovate and compete, hampers relations with
consumers, and harms the corporation's public image. Senior General
Electric executives in the 1950s propagated this message, but collusion,
nonetheless, was rampant. See Richard Austin Smith, The Incredible
Electrical Conspiracy (Part I), FORTUNE, Apr. 1961, 132 [hereinafter
Electrical Conspiracy (Part I)]; Smith, Electrical Conspiracy (Part II),
supra note 31; Gilbert Geis, The Heavy Electrical Equipment Antitrust
Cases of 1961, in MARSHALL B. CLINARD & RicHARD QUINNEY, CRIMINAL
BEHAVIOR SYSTEMS

(1967).

Speech by Assistant Attorney Gen. Stanley N. Barnes, Promoting
Competition: Current Antitrust Problems and Policies, delivered before
the Metropolitan Economic Association, New York (Oct. 25, 1954)
[hereinafter 1954 Barnes Speech]; see, e.g., Charles B. Renfrew, The Paper
Label Sentences: An Evaluation, 86 YALE L.J. 590, 592 (1977) (describing
how one judge finds it "extremely difficult" to sentence antitrust offenders
who were "community leaders of previously unsullied reputation"); Alton
Box Board, 1977 WL 1374 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 1977).
One of the
Westinghouse executives convicted in the notorious electrical equipment
price-fixing conspiracy, for example, was a vestryman of the local
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Given the difficulties in detecting and prosecuting cartels,
there is no reliable estimate of the number of illegal cartels
that have existed or currently exist today. The number of
cartels prosecuted annually could represent ten percent of all
cartels operating today or ninety percent-nobody knows.35

C. Assumption that Goal of Prosecuting Cartels is
Deterrence
However, once prosecutors detect and prosecute cartels,
they have an arsenal of weapons at their disposal, including
civil remedies (e.g., structural and injunctive relief,3 6
forfeiture of property,3 7 trebled monetary damages that the
government as a purchaser may have suffered") and
criminal remedies (e.g., fines against the individuals and/or
corporation, and incarceration). As an additional deterrent,

Episcopal Church. Smith, Electrical Conspiracy (PartI), supra note 33, at
132-33.
" The former Assistant Attorney General Douglas Ginsburg
estimated that antitrust enforcers detected no more than ten percent of all
cartels. Sentencing Options: HearingBefore the United States Sentencing
Commission (July 15, 1986), available in United States Sentencing
Commission: Unpublished Public Hearings 1986, at 15 (1988). Other
estimates are one in six or seven cartels are detected and prosecuted.
OECD Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs,
Competition Committee, Report on the Nature and Impact of Hard Core
Cartels and Sanctions Against Cartels Under National Competition Laws
3, 13 (Apr. 9, 2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
16/20/2081831.pdf [hereinafter OECD Cartel Report] (citing Peter G.
Bryant & E. Woodrow Eckard, Price Fixing: The Probability of Getting
Caught, 73 REV. OF ECON. & STAT. 531 (1991)).
36 Under Section 4 of the Sherman Act and Section 15 of the Clayton
Act, the Department of Justice, in addition to injunctive relief, can seek
broad equitable relief, including contract reformation, dissolution,
recession, and notice to victims. See, e.g., Final Judgments entered in
United States v. Kentucky Real Estate Comm'n, Civ. Act. No. 3:05-cv-188S (W.D. Ky. 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f210100/
210142.htm; United States v. Village Voice Media, Civ. Act. No. 1:03-CV0164 (N.D. Oh. 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f201100/
201100.htm.
37 15 U.S.C. § 6 (2001).
' 15 U.S.C. § 15a (2001).
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a cartel member faces a trebled damages claim by direct
purchasers, 39 damages claims by indirect purchasers in
certain states,4 ° equitable relief, and civil and criminal
actions by the various state attorneys general.
Given the difficulties in detecting hard-core cartels, the
stated aim of antitrust's criminal penalties is promoting
general deterrence.4 1 Consequently, the "generally accepted
approach"42 today is that companies and their executives
behave as "rational" profit maximizers 4 in conducting "a
cost-benefit analysis in order to see if the benefit is worth
taking the risk of being caught and punished.""
The
executives weigh "the expected gains from the cartel times

9 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2001).
40

Seventeen states have statutes that allow indirect purchasers to

recover in state courts for federal price-fixing violations. Donald I. Baker,
The Use of Criminal Law Remedies to Deter and Punish Cartels and BidRigging, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 693, 703 n.51 (2001).
41 ICN Report, supra note 15, at 51-53; Testimony of Deputy Assistant
Attorney General Scott Hammond, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div.,
before the Antitrust Modernization Commission, Nov. 3, 2005, at 37-38
("The singular goal is general deterrence.") [hereinafter 2005 Hammond
AMC Testimony]; Written Statement of Scott D. Hammond on Behalf of
the United States Department of Justice before the Antitrust
Modernization Commission Hearings on Criminal Remedies, Nov. 3, 2005,
at 6-7 ("controlling factor underlying the [Sentencing Commission's]
antitrust guideline is general deterrence.") [hereinafter 2005 Hammond
Written Statement], both available at http://www.amc.gov/commissionhearings/criminalremedies.htm.
42 Connor & Lande, supra note 3, at 516.
Harry S. Gerla, A Micro-MicroeconomicApproach To Antitrust Law:
Games Managers Play, 86 MICH. L. REV. 892, 893 (1988) ("[Tlhe essential
reasoning of modern microeconomics. . . begins with the assumptions that
firms have as their prime goal the maximization of profits and that they
will act rationally in pursuit of that goal.").
" ICN Report, supra note 15, at 51-52; see also Steven Shavell, Law
Versus Morality as Regulators of Conduct, in THE ORIGINS OF LAW &
ECONOMICS: ESSAYS BY THE FOUNDING FATHERS 398 (Francesco Parisi &
Charles K. Rowley eds., 2005); see also Org. for Econ. Co-operation and
Dev.'s Directorate for Fin., Fiscal and Enter. Affairs, Competition Comm.,
Cartels: Sanctions Against Individuals 19 (Jan. 10, 2005) [hereinafter
OECD Cartel Sanction Report].
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the probability of cartel detection."45 To achieve optimal
deterrence, the total penalty (which includes civil damages
and criminal penalties) levied against a cartel should equal
the violation's expected net harm to others (plus enforcement
costs) divided by the probability of detection and proof of the
violation.4 6
As a Department of Justice official told the U.S.
Sentencing Commission, setting the antitrust fine at this
formula's optimal level (damages caused by the cartel
divided by probability of conviction) "would result in the
socially optimal, i.e., zero level of price-fixing."4 7
The
Department of Justice official estimated that the probability
of detection was less than ten percent and that price fixing
typically results in price increases of at least ten percent,
which the Sentencing Commission adopted in deriving its
fine levels. 4 The Sentencing Commission recognized the
underlying principle of optimal deterrence theory that the
" ICN Report, supra note 15, at 53.
46 For example, if the net harm (plus enforcement costs) is $1,000 and
the probability of detection is fifty percent, the optimal fine would be
$2,000. William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50

U. CHI. L. REV. 652, 656, 666-68 (1983); see also Connor & Lande, supra
note 3, at 516-17 (noting that both Chicago and post-Chicago schools of
antitrust have adopted optimal deterrence theory); see also Bruce H.
Kobayashi, Antitrust, Agency, and Amnesty: An Economic Analysis of the
Criminal Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws Against Corporations,69 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 715, 731 (2001) (observing that "optimal-penalties theory"

requires fines to be large enough to force violators to fully internalize all
the costs of their crimes); Isaac Ehrlich, Crime, Punishment, and the
Market for Offenses, 10 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 43, 46 (1996) (discussing more
complex variations of this formula, which include an individual's taste (or
distaste) for crime, which includes the individual's moral values, proclivity
for violence, and preference for risk).
" Mark A. Cohen & David T. Scheffman, The Antitrust Sentencing
Guideline: Is the Punishment Worth the Costs?, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 331,
342 (1989) (quoting U.S. Sentencing Comm'n: Hearing on Sentencing

Options 14 (July 15, 1986) (statement of Douglas H. Ginsburg, Assistant
Att'y Gen., Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div.)).
' Cohen & Scheffman, supra note 47, at 342 (quoting Ginsburg). The
empirical basis for these estimates has been later questioned, and one
survey of cartel overcharges has found ten percent as too low. Connor &
Lande, supra note 3.
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fine should be based on considerations of the gains to, and
losses caused by, the antitrust violators.4 9 But since it is
"difficult and time consuming to establish"50 the damages
caused, or profits made, by the cartel members and to "avoid
the time and expense that would be required for the court to
determine the actual gain or loss,"5 the Sentencing
Commission instead adopted the following shorthand for
calculating the optimal fine: the base corporate fine level for
antitrust violations is generally set at twenty percent of the
volume of affected commerce, which is then adjusted based
on other mitigating factors.52
Basing the fine on a
percentage of affected commerce represented "an acceptable
53
and more readily measurable substitute."
D.

Optimal Deterrence Theory at Work-Escalation of
Antitrust's Criminal Penalties

Over the past fifty years, Congress has increased the
maximum monetary fines and term of incarceration for
criminal violations of the Sherman Act.
From a
misdemeanor, the criminal penalties now stand as a felony
with up to ten years imprisonment and a fine up to $100
million for corporations and $1 million for individuals. 4
Underlying these amendments is the assumption that the
49 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 2R1.1, cmt. n.3 (2004).
'0 Id., cmt. background ("The offense levels are not based directly on
the damage caused or profit made by the defendant because damages are
difficult and time consuming to establish. The volume of commerce is an
acceptable and more readily measurable substitute.").
Id., cmt. n.3.
52 Id. at (d)(1).
United States v. Hayter Oil Co., 51 F.3d 1265, 1276 (6th Cir. 1995)
(quoting U.S.S.G. §2R1.1 commentary). For a further discussion on how
the Sentencing Commission arrived at the 20% figure, and the
shortcomings of this percentage to optimally deter price fixing, see Connor
& Lande, supra note 3.
Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108-237, § 215, 118 Stat. 665, 668 (2004). The maximum fines
could be even larger under 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2000) (providing
alternative fine of twice the loss suffered by victims or twice the gain
realized by the offender).
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prevailing criminal penalties were sub-optimal in generally
deterring such hard-core
antitrust crimes, thereby
necessitating greater penalties.5
When the Sherman Act was enacted in 1890, violations
were misdemeanors with a maximum fine of $5,000 and up
to one year incarceration." Other than socialists and union
officials, not many antitrust offenders were criminally
prosecuted.5 7 "[Ilt has been found in practice," one early
antitrust commentator observed, "that it is a very difficult
thing to secure a criminal conviction from a jury for an
offense so general, so abstract, so little tainted with a
general and customary imputation
of immorality as
'restraint of trade' or 'monopolizing.' 58
By 1954, the then head of Department of Justice's
Antitrust Division observed that "over the years a precedent
has been established:
almost never has anyone been

5"

ROBERT

E.

HAUBERG,

AMERICAN

BAR

ASSOCIATION,

GUIDELINES IN ANTITRUST: A PRACTITIONER'S HANDBOOK 9
56 Sherman Act, ch. 647, §§ 1-2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890).

SENTENCING

(1999).
Earlier versions

of the Sherman Act bill had higher penalties, namely, a $10,000 fine and
up to five years incarceration. PAUL E. HADLICK, CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
UNDER SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT 13-14 (1939) (citing 50 Cong. Rec., 1st
Sess. 7512-13).
" The government lost (or dismissed) twenty-three of the thirty-six
criminal antitrust cases brought between 1890 and 1910. Hadlick, supra
note 56, at 26. Hadlick also notes that the "first persons to serve jail
sentences resulting from the Sherman Act were Eugene V. Debs and
others, growing out of the Pullman strike of 1894." Id. at 140; see also
CCH, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS: WITH SUMMARY OF CASES INSTITUTED
BY THE U.S. 1890-1951, 459-60 (1952) (index of cases against unions).
' Allyn A. Young, The Sherman Act & the New Anti-trust Legislation,
23 J. POL. ECON. 201, 218 (1915). Finding that the Sherman Act provided
merely an indirect and uncertain way of penalizing unfair competition
methods, Young saw no reason why the statute's criminal remedies should
be retained. Id. at 219. Similarly, some Attorneys General opposed
criminal prosecutions of antitrust violations given their lack of sympathy
with the purpose of the Sherman Act, adverse decisions by the courts, and
lack of appropriations. Hadlick, supra note 56, at 23. For example,
Attorney General Richard Olney wrote in 1895 that he had "taken the
responsibility of not prosecuting under a law I believe to be no good." Id.
at 25-26.
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committed to jail for a Sherman Act offense.""9 The Sherman
Act's $5000 penalty represented "a very modest license fee
for most offenses under it." 6 ° But with federal antitrust
enforcement on the rise after World War II, the Sherman
Act's criminal penalties were amended in 1955 to increase
the maximum fine to $50,000.61
By the mid-1950s, the
federal judges also began sentencing a few corporate
executives to jail.62 After the imprisonment of several high-

" 1954 Barnes Speech, supra note 34.
Id. Assistant Att'y Gen. Stanley Barnes was also at the time the co-

60

chairman of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the
Antitrust Laws. Two unidentified members of that 61-member Committee
believed that the criminalization of the antitrust laws was a "gross
injustice".
REPORT OF THE ATT'Y GEN.'S NAT'L COMM. TO STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAWS 352-53 (U.S. Government Printing Office 1955). They
cited the vagueness of the federal antitrust laws and the uncertainty as to
what business conduct would be deemed unlawful. Thus, to "impute
criminality in the face of such uncertainty is a violation of fundamental
principles of justice." Id. at 353. The two members recommended that the
law be amended so as to make criminal only "acts of clear, certain and
predatory violations of law, and that the balance be left to civil relief,
governmental and private." Id. The majority of Committee members,
however, did not endorse this view and recommended that the maximum
criminal fine be increased from $5000 to $10,000. Id. at 352.
61 Pub. L. No. 135, 69 Stat. 282, (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 1
(1958)). The average fine imposed under the Sherman Act between 1946
and 1953 was reportedly $2600. Victor H. Kramer, Comment, Criminal
Prosecutionsfor Violations of the Sherman Act: In Search of A Policy, 48
GEO. L. J. 530, 532 n.9 (1960).
62 Kramer, Comment, supra note 61, at 530 n. 1-2 (citing United
States v. McDonough Co., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1959 Cas.) 69,482 (Four
corporate executives sentenced to ninety days in jail); Las Vegas Merchant
Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1954)). For
instances of jail sentences for Sherman Act violations between 1890 and
1946, see STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, 79TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
UNITED STATES VERSUS ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND MONOPOLY, STAFF
REPORT TO THE MONOPOLY SUBCOMMITEE, PURSUANT TO H. RES. 64 257

(Committee Print 1946). In United States v. McDonough Co., 1959 Trade
Cas.
75,882 (S.D. Ohio), several executives of a small garden tool
manufacturing company argued against a jail sentence, noting that during
the then fifty-nine-year life of the Sherman Act, no jail sentences were
imposed upon executives who entered pleas of nolo contendere. The court
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ranking officials in the infamous electrical equipment
conspiracy, a Department of Justice official optimistically
predicted that "similar sentences in a few cases each decade
would almost completely cleanse our economy of the cancer
of collusive price fixing and the mere prospect of such
sentences is itself the strongest available deterrent to such
activities."63
By the 80th anniversary of the Sherman Act in 1970,
however, "only 19 individuals were actually sentenced to jail
for pure antitrust offenses (not involving labor or violence)
for a total of only twenty-eight months." 64
With no
significant abatement in cartel behavior, Congress in 1974
made Sherman Act violations felonies with prison terms of
up to three years and increased the maximum criminal fines
to $1,000,000 for corporations and $100,000 for individuals.6 5
But antitrust violators still spent little time in jail. For
fiscal 1976, the total sum of incarceration for all seventy-five
defendants convicted solely of antitrust violations was two
and a half months (compared to the average sentence per
defendant of 45.7 months for securities fraud, 22.6 months
for bank embezzlement, and 15.4 months for tax fraud).6 6
The head of Department of Justice's Antitrust Division in
1976 observed that a higher percentage of persons convicted
of violating the migratory bird laws were sentenced to

rejected the defendants' argument, sentencing the executives to 90-day jail
sentences.
Spivack quoted in DONALD R. CRESSEY & DAVID A. WARD,
DELINQUENCY, CRIME, AND SOCIAL PROCESS 210 (1969).
Joe Sims, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Dep't of Justice, Antitrust
Div., Speech before the Reg'l Conference on White Collar Crime: Price
Fixing-Felony or Formality? Sentencing in Criminal Antitrust Cases
(Feb. 15, 1977), in II CLABAULT & BLOCK, supra note 21, at 569. Despite
the notoriety of the electrical equipment price fixing conspiracy, no one
convicted of antitrust violations in the seven years thereafter (1962-68)
received prison sentences. Donald I. Baker & Barbara A. Reeves, The
PaperLabel Sentences: Critiques, 86 YALE L.J. 619, 623 n.16 (1977).
' Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-528,
§ 3, 88 Stat. 1706, 1708 (1974).
' See Baker, supra note 13, at 532; see also Alan B. Morrison,
Sentencing in CriminalAntitrust Cases, 46 ANTITRUST L.J. 528, 530 (1977).
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prison, and for longer terms, than antitrust offenders.6 7
Despite the newly created felony, hard-core cartels were still
not deterred: "As we look harder for criminal antitrust
violations, we find more and more."68
In 1977, to combat the rising number of price fixing
cartels detected, the Department of Justice issued policy
directives
to
its
attorneys
regarding
sentencing
recommendations for such hard-core cartel behavior: "Fines
are usually poor alternatives to prison sentences and should
be used and viewed only as a second choice. Accordingly, we
would prefer to recommend a fine only in those
circumstances where we conclude that a prison sentence is
not appropriate."69 These policy guidelines were "an effort to
increase the risks for price-fixing. They make clear to pricefixers that the Antitrust Division will move against them
individually (and not just against their corporations) and
that the Division will recommend stiff prison sentences upon
securing convictions." 7° But, as one former Department of
Justice official observed, "federal judges were reluctant to
sentence price fixers to jail and tended to attempt to come up
with alternative 'public service' type sentences. 7 '
The
former Assistant Attorney General believed the reason for
this reluctance was "that antitrust price fixers were often
pillars of the community, supporters of charity, and posed no
2
physical danger to other members of society."
In its fiscal year of 1980, the Department of Justice's
Antitrust Division filed fifty-five criminal cases (about four

67
6
69

Baker, supra note 13, at 532.
Id. at 530.
Memorandum from U.S. Dep't of Justice Guidelines for Sentencing

Recommendations in Felony Cases Under the Sherman Act (Feb. 24, 1977)
(reprinted in II CLABAULT & BLOCK, supra note 21, at 563).
70 Att'y Gen. Griffin B. Bell, Address at the Harvard Law Review
Annual Banquet (Mar. 19, 1977), in 806 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA), at F-1 (Mar. 22, 1977).
71 Baker, Use of CriminalLaw Remedies, supra note 40, at 706.
72

Id.
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times the 1972 level, and the highest since World War II),
73
with the average jail sentence now up to three months.
In 1984, the Criminal Fine Enforcement Act and
Sentencing Reform Act raised fines for all federal crimes,
thereby increasing the maximum fine for individuals
convicted of an antitrust violation to $250,000. Congress, in
the Criminal Fine Enforcement Act, also created an
alternative for the agencies to calculate the maximum fine
for corporations or individuals as twice the loss suffered by
victims or twice the gain realized by the offender.74 The
purpose of increasing the fine levels was to make criminal
fines a significant and more severe punishment and thereby
to foster fines as an alternative or supplement to
incarceration. 5
In 1987, the U.S. Sentencing Commission noted when its
Guidelines went into effect that antitrust crimes would be
treated more severely. Under the pre-Guidelines practice,
only thirty-nine percent of individual antitrust offenders
were incarcerated, and the average length of incarceration
was only forty-five days.7 6 The Commission believed at the
time that the most effective means to deter individuals from
committing antitrust crimes was "through imposing short
prison sentences coupled with large fines. " "
By 1990, some antitrust commentators argued that the
prevailing exposure under the Sentencing Guidelines for
antitrust violations along with other legal and marketplace
sanctions was "likely to be so large that it will cause a
" Sanford M. Litvak, Asst. Att'y Gen., Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div.,
Speech before the Annual Antitrust Institute: Antitrust Division Criminal
Enforcement Policy: The View from Washington (Nov. 7, 1980), in II
CLABAULT & BLOCK, supra note 21, at 632.
"' Criminal Fine Enforcement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-596, 98 Stat.
3143, reenacted in Criminal Fine Improvements Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-185, 100 Stat. 1279 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d)
(2000)).
" SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN ANTITRUST, supra note 55, at 10 (citing
H.R. REP. No. 98-906 (1984)).
76 Id. at 13 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2R1.1, cmt.
(1987)).
17 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2R1.1,
cmt. (1987).

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2006

serious overdeterrence problem."78 Congress disagreed. Still
finding the prevailing criminal fine provisions inadequate to
deter price fixing, Congress increased the maximum criminal
fines to $10 million for corporations and $350,000 for
individuals.79 Despite the Department of Justice's efforts to
improve its criminal antitrust record, Congress felt that this
emphasis had "done little to stem the tide of illegal price
fixing, procurement fraud, and bid rigging conspiracies."80
Fine levels were too low to effectively deter these
conspiracies, and Congress felt that courts were "reluctant to
impose maximum fines, even for willful [antitrust]
violations."81 This proposed tenfold increase in corporate
fines was meant to "signal to businesses and courts that
penalties imposed should be higher in order to improve
compliance with the antitrust laws."8 2
Convinced in 1991 that imprisonment was a more
effective deterrent than fines, the Sentencing Commission
increased the potential incarceration range for antitrust
offenders while reducing the fine range for individuals in its
sentencing guidelines for antitrust violations.8 3 Calculating
fines for corporate offenders underwent a "dramatic
departure" from the 1987 Guidelines as it became more
complicated, with a "resulting fine [that could] be much
higher than under the 1987 Guidelines." 4 Before 1995 the
largest criminal fine imposed against a criminal antitrust
defendant was $6 million; for corporations sentenced for
antitrust violations in fiscal years 1997, 1998, and 1999, the

71

Cohen & Scheffman, supra note 47, at 334.

7" Antitrust Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-588, § 4, 104
Stat. 2879, 2880 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§1-3 (2004)); see also
S. REP. No. 101-287, as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4108 (May 14,
1990).
80 S. Rep. No. 101-287 (1990), as reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4108,
4111.
81 Id.
82

Id.

83 SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN ANTITRUST, supra note 55, at 31 (citing

U.S.S.G., Amendment 377).
84 Id. at 41.
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average criminal fine far exceeded $6 million.85 The fines
imposed on corporate antitrust offenders in 1997 and 1998
were virtually identical to the total fines that the
Department of Justice imposed in the twenty year period
between 1976 and 1995.8

In the 1990s, the average jail time

for antitrust offenders also increased to eight months.87 In
1999, the Department of Justice secured an antitrust fine of
$500 million against F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., which
represented "the largest criminal fine ever imposed in the
United States under any federal criminal statute."88
Between 2000 and 2004, more than "80 years of
imprisonment [were] imposed on antitrust offenders, with
more than 30 defendants receiving jail sentences of one year
or longer."89 In 2002, courts sentenced antitrust offenders
prosecuted by the Department of Justice "to a record number
of jail days, more than 10,000 in all."90 The average jail
sentence for antitrust offenders increased to eighteen
months in 200291 and reached a then record of twenty-one
months in 2003.92

But feeling that the criminal penalties were still suboptimal, in 2004 Congress again increased the maximum
" Bruce H. Kobayashi, Antitrust, Agency, and Amnesty: An Economic
Analysis of the Criminal Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws Against
Corporations,69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 715, 715 (2001).
86 Id.
87 2005 Hammond AMC Testimony, supra note 41, at 54.

Id. at 68-69.
89

U.S.

OVERVIEW

DEP'T
OF

OF

RECENT

JUSTICE,
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DEVELOPMENTS

IN

Div.,
THE

STATUS

REPORT:

ANTITRUST

AN

DIVISION'S

CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM 3 (2004) [hereinafter ANTITRUST STATUS
REPORT],
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/

202531.htm.
" Id. One issue is that the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division
can prosecute other crimes when they occur in connection with an
anticompetitive scheme, such as mail fraud, or "affect the integrity of the
investigatory process" (such as obstruction of justice). ANTITRUST DIVISION
MANUAL, supra note 23, at ch. III, § F.12. Thus, it may be that the terms
of incarceration cited herein include sentences for these other related
criminal offenses.
"' 2005 Hammond AMC Testimony, supra note 41, at 54.
92 ANTITRUST STATUS REPORT, supra note 89,

at 1.
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Sherman Act fines for corporations tenfold, from $10 million
to $100 million and increased the maximum fine for
individuals from $350,000 to $1 million.9 3 Congress also
more than tripled the maximum incarceration period from
three years to ten years.9 4 Congress intended to signal
through these increased penalties that "criminal antitrust
violations are serious white collar crimes that should be
punished in a manner commensurate with other felonies. "
The Sentencing Commission thereafter amended its
antitrust guidelines in three significant ways by:
" raising the base offense level for individual
defendants two levels, such that an executive (with
no or minimal prior criminal history) convicted of
an antitrust offense would face a sentence of ten to
sixteen months imprisonment before other
mitigating or aggravating factors are taken into
account;
"

96

amending the commentary accompanying the
Guidelines "to ensure that courts consider a
defendant's particular role in the antitrust
offense";97 and

" amending the "volume of commerce" table, which
increased the fine levels.
This was done in
93 Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004,

Pub. L. No. 108-237, § 215, 118 Stat. 665, 668 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (2006)).
94 Id.

" 150 Cong Rec. H3654, 3658 (daily ed. June 2, 2004) (supplemental
legislative history by Reps. Sensenbrenner and Conyers).
9
U.S.S.G. § 2R1.1(a); Written Statement of the U.S. Sentencing
Commission before the Antitrust Modernization Commission, Nov. 3,
2005, at 5-6, available at http://www.amc.gov/commission hearings/
criminalremedies.htm.
" Id. at 6. One example is a four level enhancement if a sales
manager organizes or leads the price-fixing activity of five or more
participants to reflect her or his role in the offense. Id. The commentary
also suggests that when setting a fine under the antitrust guidelines,
"courts consider the extent of the defendant's participation in the offense,
the defendant's role in the offense, and the degree to which the defendant
personally profited from the offense (including salary, bonuses, and career
enhancement)." Id. at 6-7.
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response to data indicating that the financial
magnitude of antitrust offenses has increased
significantly and to provide "greater deterrence for
large-scale price-fixing crimes."9 8
In its 2004-2005 fiscal year, the Department of Justice
secured sentences for antitrust convictions of over 13,000 jail
days, with the average jail sentence being twenty-four
months, both of which were records in the history of the
Department of Justice's Antitrust Division.9 9 The eleven
longest jail sentences in the Antitrust Division's history were
imposed in the past six years. 10 The United States today is
by far the worldwide leader in imposing jail sentences for
antitrust crimes. 0 1
As one Department of Justice official recently told the
Antitrust Modernization Commission, "[wie expect these
changes to induce more cartel participants to break the code
of silence and come forward, and ultimately to make more
potential violators think twice before forming cartels."" 2 On
the other hand, when asked about further raising the
maximum fine levels to $200 million, another Department of
Justice official responded that he "wouldn't have any
0 3
problem with that."

98 U.S.S.G. § 2R1.1(b)(2); Written Statement of the U.S. Sentencing
Commission before the Antitrust Modernization Commission, supra note
96, at 6.
2005 Hammond AMC Testimony, supranote 41, at 53.
100 2005 Hammond Written Statement, supra note 41, at 1.
101 OECD Cartel Report, supra note 35, at 4, 11 (noting that only the
United States and Canada imposed sentences of imprisonment for
antitrust crimes during OECD survey period of 1996-2000; Canada
reported three such sentences, while the United States reported twentyeight sentences in 1999 alone).
102 International Antitrust Issues: Hearing Before
the Antitrust
Modernization Commission, 3 (Feb. 15, 2006) (statement of Gerald F.
Masoudi), available at http://www.amc.gov/commission-hearings/pdf/
StatementMasoudi.pdf.
" 2005 Hammond AMC Testimony, supra note 41, at 78. The
Division, as Hammond noted, under the Alternative Fine Statute, had
secured fines in excess of $200 million on several occasions.
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No Clear Evidence that Optimal Deterrence Has
Been Achieved

It is unknown, however, whether the significant increases
in maximum fines and terms of incarceration have
significantly reduced the number of illegal cartels. 14 Given
the difficulty in detecting cartel behavior, it is impossible to
give any accurate accounting of the number of hard-core
cartels. Also, besides the deterrent effects of criminal and
civil penalties, other factors, such as industry conditions
(high entry barriers, market demand, and capacity restraints
on fringe participants) and the active antitrust enforcement
of anticompetitive mergers (to prevent the increased
likelihood of tacit or express collusion) may deter a cartel's
formation and success. Thus, it may be difficult to measure
what impact, if any, the prevailing criminal and civil
penalties have had in deterring cartel behavior.
One could point to some anecdotal evidence that cartel
members are reluctant to meet in the United States for fear
of criminal prosecution. 5 But this does not necessarily
mean that the U.S. penalties have effectively deterred the
cartel's formation, only that the venue for the illicit meeting
has changed.' 6 More promising, as the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD") noted,
are some recent examples where cartels carved out the

1o4

As Kahan and others have observed, the national crime rate rose in

the 1960s and persisted at this level through the early 1990s, even though
society's reliance on incarceration increased during the 1980s.
The
economic theory of optimal deterrence cannot explain why this increase in
expected punishment did not successfully reduce crime rates to their
earlier levels. Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and
Deterrence,83 VA. L. REv. 349, 361 (1997).
105 See, e.g., Telephone Call from ADM Headquarters (July 13, 1993),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/4489-2.pdf.
"o6 This mistaken assumption that fixing prices outside the United
States offers a shield from antitrust prosecution also draws into question
how rational these rational profit-maximizers are.
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United States from 7 their operations to avoid the risk of
10
criminal sanctions.
The annual number of criminal antitrust cases has not
changed dramatically. Between 1947 and 1962, the number
of criminal antitrust cases fluctuated between six and thirtyfour. 108 Between 1996 and 2005, the number fluctuated
between twenty-three and fifty-seven. 10 9 Reliance on the
annual number of criminal antitrust prosecutions, however,
can be misleading. Different administrations may have
different antitrust priorities. During the 1980s under the
Reagan and Bush Administrations, for example, the
Department of Justice filed 623 criminal antitrust cases,
which is significantly more than in any other decade since
the Sherman Act's enactment."10 But during this time, the
Department of Justice's Antitrust Division lost nearly half
its attorneys, and the balance prosecuted mostly localized
bid-rigging cartels."' Since the mid-1990s, the Department
107

OECD 3rd Report, supra note 32, at 27.

The OECD does not

elaborate on the number of these cartels or the amount of commerce in the
United States relative to the rest of the world. Another promising study
found that the vitamin cartels raised prices more in those Asian, Western
European, and Latin American economies that do not have active cartel
enforcement regimes than in nations with strong enforcement regimes.
Julian L. Clarke & Simon J. Evenett, The Deterrent Effects of National
Anticartel Laws:
Evidence from the International Vitamins Cartel,
ANTITRUST BULLETIN

689, 718 (2003).

Note, The Frequency of Price Fixing: An Indication, 57 Nw. U. L.
REV. 151, 154 (1963).
109 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DISION WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY
1996-2005, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/workstats.pdf.
o POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 29, at 36.
"'
The number of Department of Justice attorneys in the Antitrust
Division declined from 456 in fiscal year 1980 to 229 in 1989. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Antitrust Div., Opening Markets and Protecting Competition for
America's Businesses And Consumers 38 (Apr. 7, 1995), available at
DOJ
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/publiddiv-stats/0172.htm
[hereinafter
Opening Markets Report]. Of the 521 restraint of trade cases brought by
the Department of Justice between fiscal years 1982 and 1988, 245
involved price fixing or bid rigging in road construction and forty-three
involved government procurement. U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., Report
to the Chairman, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the
Judiciary, Justice Department: Changes in Antitrust Enforcement Policies
108

472
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of Justice has focused more on prosecuting international
cartels, which, though fewer in number, involve a greater
amount of commerce."' Moreover, the Department of Justice
at times may devote more resources to investigating other
civil antitrust violations, such as monopolistic anticompetitive practices. One cannot simply conclude then that
because 416 criminal antitrust cases were prosecuted in the
1990s, as opposed to 623 cases in the 1980s, that price-fixing
is being effectively deterred, as 416 is still much higher than
in any other decade since the 1890s. 13 Likewise, a survey of
& Activities, GAO/GGD-91-2 43, Oct. 29, 1990 at 43. On the other hand,
between 1981 and 1988, the federal antitrust agencies initiated three
Section 2 cases to target anticompetitive monopolistic practices, the lowest
in any eight-year period since 1900. Moreover, the number of antitrust
cases involving Fortune 500 firms dwindled, leaving some to argue that
the Reagan administration pursued an "aggressive campaign to collar a
hapless, economically trivial parade of asphalt suppliers, lawyers for
indigent criminal defendants, moving and storage firms, bakeries,
individual physicians, obscure trade associations and a host of other
commercial pygmies." William E. Kovacic, Steady Reliever at Antitrust,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 1989, at A18.
112 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATUS REPORT: INTERNATIONAL CARTEL
ENFORCEMENT (2001), available at http://149.101.1.32/atr/public/criminal/

8279.pdf. See also Gary R. Spratling, Detection and Deterrence:Rewarding
Informants for Reporting Violations, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 798 (2001)
(examining the ways in which the Department of Justice enforces
antitrust regulations against international cartels). Since its fiscal year
1997, the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division has obtained nearly
$3 billion in criminal fines, of which over ninety percent was in connection
with the prosecution of international cartel activity. 2005 Hammond AMC
Statement, supra note 41, at 1.
" Moreover, the 416 cases prosecuted in the 1990s, which occurred
after antitrust violations became felonies, are a significantly higher tally
than for any decade between the 1890 and 1970, when such violations
were misdemeanors. See POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 29, at 36.
Numbers alone, however, may be misleading for several reasons. First,
the total number of criminal cases brought by the Department of Justice's
Antitrust Division is typically greater than the number of criminal cases
in which primarily a Section 1 violation is alleged. At times, for example,
prosecutors may elect to charge mail fraud rather than an antitrust
violation. For example, according to its ten year workload statistics, fiftytwo of sixty-three of the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division
criminal cases filed in 2000 involved a Section 1 claim; the eleven other
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cartel overcharges does not demonstrate that cartel activity
has been significantly deterred.'14
Although antitrust officials in the past believed that
increasing the criminal penalties would significantly deter
cartel behavior, there is reason to believe that optimal
deterrence is still elusive. Despite the sharp increase in
penalties over the past three decades, many cartels involving
multinational corporations are still being detected. The
Department of Justice's Antitrust Division has far more
attorneys now than it did when antitrust violations were
misdemeanors, and each year these attorneys are busily
prosecuting as many, if not more, cartels. 5
criminal cases charged primarily other federal crimes, such as perjury,
mail fraud, contempt, obstruction of justice, or false statements. U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 1996-2005
7-8, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/publid/workstats.pdf. Second, all
the cartel members can be prosecuted in one case, with all the firms and
executives indicted together, or separately, as individuals and corporations
are picked off in plea agreements or separate prosecutions. Third, for
comparisons in numbers to be meaningful, the probability of conviction,
which is not readily quantifiable, would have to remain relatively
constant. If the probability of conviction increases, then the number of
convictions may increase (if the overall number of hard-core cartels
remains constant) or decrease (if the overall number of cartels decreases
as cartels members are more concerned about being caught). Similarly, if
probability of conviction decreases (for example, due to a change in
enforcement priorities), then the number of convictions may decline (if the
overall number of cartels remain constant) or increase (as total cartel
activity rapidly increases given that administration's lax antitrust
enforcement).
Thus, a low (or high) number of antitrust criminal
prosecutions could reflect in theory either aggressive or lax antitrust
enforcement.
14 Connor and Lande looked at 845 estimates of cartel overcharges
from 1780 onward found in nearly 200 publications. See Connor & Lande,
supra note 3, at 535. These surveys, primarily published peer reviewed
studies by economists, showed overall no strong trend in cartel markups
over time. Id. at 540-41. For example, the estimated median average
cartel markup between 1946 and 1973 (which was before antitrust
violations were felonies) was fifteen percent compared to twenty-four
percent for the periods of 1974-1990 and 1991-2004. Id. at 543.
"1' The number of Antitrust Division attorneys at the end of its 1970
fiscal year was 291 versus 364 in 2004. DOJ Opening Markets Report,
supra note 111, at 40; Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev.'s Directorate
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The predictable response under optimal deterrence theory
would be to either: (i) increase the probability of detection
(which is difficult given the nature of these hard-core cartels
and the implementation of a generous corporate leniency
program to attract cartel members to implicate their coconspirators'16 ) or (ii) increase the criminal (and/or civil)
penalties, as they are presumably sub-optimal in deterring
hard-core cartels." 7 Threatening price fixers with even more
severe punishments, in theory, should reduce enforcement
expenditures and deter such cartel activity." 8 Taking this
idea to the extreme, society could lower its antitrust
enforcement expenditures by hanging a price fixer now and

then. 119
for Fin., Fiscal and Enter. Affairs, Competition Comm., Annual Report of
Competition Policy Developments in the United States 2003-2004 6 (May
25, 2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/51/41/35111334.pdf
versus 323 in 1994; see also 2003 Pate Speech, supra note 1, at 3 (noting
that with one hundred grand juries investigating suspected cartel activity,
"[tioday, all aspects of our enforcement program against cartels are
robust"). Moreover, the rate of amnesty applications in the first six
months of fiscal year 2003 was three per month, "an all time high." Id.
Under the Corporate Leniency (or Amnesty) Program, as revised in 1993,
amnesty is automatic if there is no pre-existing investigation, and may be
available if the company cooperates after the investigation is underway,
and all officers, directors, and employees of a corporation qualifying for
automatic amnesty are protected from criminal prosecution. U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, STATUS REPORT:
CORPORATE LENIENCY PROGRAM 1 (2001),
http://149.101.1.32/atr/public/criminal/8278.pdf; Spratling, supra note 112,
at 800. More information about the Department of Justice's leniency
program is available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/publidguidelines/
0091.htm. Similarly, the European Commission, which launched its
leniency program in 2002, reportedly received 167 cartel confessions in the
past three years. Alan Riley, What Price a Jail Sentence?, THE TIMES,
Sept. 5, 2006, at 6.
116 For information on the Department of Justice's leniency program,
see supra note 115.
117 Michael K. Block & Joseph Gregory Sidak, The Cost of Antitrust
Deterrence: Why Not Hang a Price Fixer Now and Then?, 68 GEO. L.J.
1131, 1131-32 (1980).
118 Id. at 1132.
119 Id. In fairness to the authors, they made this point only in jest and
argued that in reality the "harshest feasible antitrust sanction would be a
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F. Problems with Optimal Deterrence Theory
1. Difficulty in Empirically Measuring Deterrence
It can be difficult to measure deterrence empirically
because there is "no reliable way to determine the causes of
things that have not happened." 120 The OECD has addressed
this difficulty:
Anecdotal evidence exists that criminal sanctions
against individuals can have deterrent effects. There
is, however, no systematic empirical evidence
available to prove such effects, and to assess whether
the marginal benefit of introducing sanctions against
individuals (in the form of less harm from cartel
activity) exceeds the additional costs that in
particular a system of criminal sanctions entails
(including the costs of prosecution as well as of
administering a prison system). There appears to be
agreement that it would be
virtually impossible to
121
generate the relevant data.
Thus, while there is reason to believe that criminal
sanctions have had a deterrent effect in the area of antitrust
law, it is difficult to confirm this hypothesis with empirical
evidence.
fine or damage award large enough to confiscate the offender's entire
wealth." Id. at 1132 n.9. However, a former head of the Antitrust
Division reported how seven merchants were charged with over pricing
and attempting to create a scarcity in Ethiopia's grain and peppers
market. After these merchants were summarily executed by Ethiopian
military rulers, prices for these commodities in the following three weeks
dropped by nearly sixty percent. Donald I. Baker, Assistant Att'y Gen.,
Antitrust Div., Dep't of Justice, To Make the Penalty Fit the Crime: How
to Sentence Antitrust Felons, Remarks before the Tenth New England
Antitrust Conference (Nov. 20, 1977), in 2 JAMES M. CLABAULT & MICHAEL
K. BLOCK, SHERMAN ACT INDICTMENTS, 1955-1980 537 [hereinafter Baker
Speech] (citing WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 1976, at A21).
120 OECD Cartel Sanction Report, supra note 44, at 105.
121 Id. at 7. See also OECD 3rd Report, supra note 32, at 27 (arguing

that individual sanctions can be a valuable complement to corporate fines,
which are rarely severe enough to impose an optimal deterrent).
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2. Theory's Difficulties in Application
As the ICN 12 2 has reported, this "theoretically ideal way of
setting a deterrent fine is somewhat difficult to apply in
practice, since it is not easy to assess and prove the benefits
derived from cartel activities and almost impossible to
determine the probability of detection."'23 There is no
uniformity across cartels in the amount of (i) overcharges, (ii)
unlawful gains to cartels and to each cartel member in
profits, or (iii) benefits that the individual participants
obtained as a result of the cartel (such as salary increases,
etc.). Nor is there any uniformity across cartels of the
likelihood of being detected. As a result, none of the
countries surveyed by the ICN can actually apply the
optimal deterrent formula in practice. 2 4 Each cartel, under
this economic formula, could have its own optimally
deterring fine, which may fall above or below the average (or
maximum) antitrust fines.
The optimal deterrence formula also raises an interesting
issue of the net harm from a cartel. The scope of social costs
that cartels impose is unclear. Since such hard-core cartel
behavior is per se illegal, the Department of Justice, when
122

Formed in 2001 by antitrust agencies from fourteen jurisdictions,

the International Competition Network ("ICN"), according to its website, is
an "international body devoted exclusively to competition law
enforcement." International Competition Network, http://international
competitionnetwork.org/aboutus.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2006). Its
membership is "open to any national or multinational competition
authority entrusted with the enforcement of antitrust laws." Id. It
currently has ninety-eight competition agency members, including the
U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, from
eighty-five
jurisdictions.
International
Competition
Network,
http://internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/icn-membership-list.pdf
(last
visited October 19, 2006).
" ICN Report, supra note 15, at 3, 59. The ICN reported that only
two of the eighteen surveyed countries have used multiples of illegal gains
to calculate the maximum fines. Id. at 59. In just fourteen (less than four
percent of the total) cases brought between 2001 and 2003 did the
antitrust enforcers take into account the estimates of the proceeds of the
cartel. Id.
124 ICN Report, supra note 15, at 3, 55.
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prosecuting antitrust crimes, unlike other white collar
federal offenses, need not prove the cartel's net harm to
others. 2 ' The Chicago school of antitrust views a cartel's net
126
harm narrowly-typically, its deadweight welfare loss.
Although others may view the wealth transfer from the
consumers to the cartel members as theft, the Chicago school
adherents view it agnostically as it does not lessen total
wealth, so any inequities of such wealth transfers should be
addressed by the legislature.'2 7 But the net harm from a
12

Private plaintiffs and the United States (when seeking civil

damages for overcharges under section 4A of the Clayton Act) must prove
their damages. But because most private actions settle, final verdicts
where the fact-finder actually calculated the cartel's overcharge are, as
Connor and Lande found, "surprisingly rare." Connor & Lande, supra note
3, at 552, 556 (of all federal antitrust cases, authors found only twenty-five
final verdicts in a collusion case where overcharge was calculated).
Moreover, if the Guidelines fine is too low, the Department of Justice can
seek twice the loss suffered by victims or twice the gain realized by the
offender under 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d), which it has done but mostly in the
context of a mutually agreed-upon fines negotiated with defendants in a
plea agreement.
...Deadweight loss refers to the triangular area under a downwardsloping demand curve representing the purchases foregone as a result of
the supracompetitive pricing. See BORK, supra note 4, at 111.
127 BORK, supra note 4, at 111. See also Landes, supra note 46, at 653
(noting that the "standard economic rationale for making a cartel illegal is
not that it charges too high a price or that it redistributes income from
consumers to cartel members, but that it restricts output, causing a
deadweight or efficiency loss ... a loss to consumers without an offsetting
gain to producers."); OECD Cartel Report, supra note 35, at 6 (noting
economists' agnosticism about whether society is made worse off by a mere
wealth transfer from consumers to cartel members). But a wealth transfer
may not be costless. If I rob your home, for example, that may impose
additional costs on you and your neighbors, such as in repairing the
broken window, higher insurance premiums, cost of new alarm systems,
more police, etc. Thus, aside from depriving those with a higher marginal
utility of that extra dollar of consumer surplus, the wealth transfer may
impose other costs. If the poor have to spend a higher percentage of their
budget on a cartel's or monopolist's product, that might impose other costs,
such as the increased use of federal aid and subsidies. Bork replies that
these types of questions arguably veer antitrust toward social and policy
issues, better left to the legislature. See BORK, supra note 4, at 114-15.
But if one takes a total welfare approach, how accurate is it, and what
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cartel may likely exceed this deadweight welfare loss and
wealth transfer. A cartel can impose other social costs, such
as poorer quality, fewer choices for consumers, and less
innovation.12
Moreover, the legislative history of the
Sherman Act references other non-economic concerns about
uncurbed market power, such as foreclosing opportunities to
enter markets and the dangers to American democracy if
such power were concentrated in the hands of the few.129 As
the Supreme Court wrote twenty-one years after the passage
of the Sherman Act:
[The debates] conclusively show, however,
cause which led to the legislation was the
was required by the economic condition of
is, the vast accumulation of wealth in

that the main
thought that it
the times, that
the hands of

basis exists to consider only certain costs (such as deadweight loss) while
excluding others?
128
OECD Cartel Report, supra note 35, at 6 (noting that sheltering
cartel members from "full exposure of market forces" may reduce pressure
to control costs and innovate).
29 Republican Senator John Sherman identified the inequality of
condition, wealth, and opportunity as the greatest threat in disturbing
social order: this inequality "has grown within a single generation out of
the concentration of capital into vast combinations to control production
and trade and to break down competition." 21 CONG. REC. 2460 (1890).
The increasing threat was not government-bestowed monopolies (although
some expressed concern about import tariffs sheltering domestic trusts),
but the emergence of the modern-day corporation and its offspring of
monopolies and trusts. U.S. corporations, "which should be the carefully
restrained creatures of the law and the servants of the people, are fast
becoming the people's masters." Fourth Annual Message of President
Grover Cleveland, dated Dec. 3, 1888, reprinted in 1 EARL W. KINTNER,
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws AND RELATED
STATUTES 58 (1978). If Congress did not heed this appeal, "there will soon
be a trust for every production and a master to fix the price for every
necessity of life." 21 CONG. REC. 2460 (1890). For further discussion of the
Sherman Act legislative history, including Bork's interpretation and the
criticisms thereto, see Daniel R. Ernst, The New Antitrust History, 35
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 879 (1990); Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers As The
OriginalAnd Primary Concern Of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation
Challenged, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 871 (1999). For the political dimensions of
the Sherman Act, see Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust,
127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979); Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes,
Antitrust and the Marketplace of Ideas, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 249 (2001).
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corporations and individuals, the enormous development of
corporate organization, the facility for combination which
such organizations afforded, the fact that the facility was
being used, and that combinations known as trusts were
being multiplied, and the widespread impression that their
power had been and would be exerted
to oppress
13 0
individuals and injure the public generally.

130

Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50

(1911). Justice Harlan further expanded upon the public sentiment:
All who recall the condition of the country in 1890 will
remember that there was everywhere, among the people
generally, a deep feeling of unrest. The Nation had been rid
of human slavery,-fortunately, as all now feel,-but the
conviction was universal that the country was in real
danger from another kind of slavery sought to be fastened
on the American people, namely, the slavery that would
result from aggregations of capital in the hands of a few
individuals and corporations controlling, for their own
profit and advantage exclusively, the entire business of the
country, including the production and sale of the
necessaries of life. Such a danger was thought to be then
imminent, and all felt that it must be met firmly and by
such statutory regulations as would adequately protect the
people against oppression and wrong .... Guided by these
considerations, and to the end that the people, so far as
interstate commerce was concerned, might not be
dominated by vast combinations and monopolies, having
power to advance their own selfish ends, regardless of the
general interests and welfare, Congress passed the antitrust act of 1890 ....
Id. at 83-84 (concurring and dissenting in part); see also United States v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553-54 (1944) (arguing
that trusts and monopolies "were the terror of the period. Their power to
fix prices, to restrict production, to crush small independent traders, and
to concentrate large power in the few to the detriment of the many, were
but some of numerous evils ascribed to them."). Among the trusts
Congress noted were the Beef Trust, the Standard Oil Trust, the Steel
Trust, the Barbed Fence Wire Trust, the Steel Trust, the Cordage Trust,
the Cotton-Seed Oil Trust, and the Whiskey Trust, and these trusts had
assumed an importance and had acquired a power which were dangerous
to the whole country, and that their existence was directly antagonistic to
its peace and prosperity. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n,
166 U.S. 290, 319 (1897).
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Even if economic efficiency was a proper goal of antitrust,
the harms from cartels could encompass rent-seeking
behavior. 131 Consequently, to apply the optimal deterrence
theory, one must accurately assess the net harm, which
under Oliver Williamson's famous trade-off calculus for
weighing the effects on total welfare, would include, to the
extent quantifiable: (i) the cost from slower (or the lack of)
technological progress once a monopolist or cartel lays claims
to a national market, or (ii) the other social costs imposed (or
incurred) by the monopolist or cartel, such as the political
over wealth, which are a matter for
implications of control
"serious" concern. 132
3. Need Global Fine to Deter Global Harm
Even if the Department of Justice and federal courts
calculated the cartel's net harm, the criminal fine is likely
tied to the cartel's commerce in the United States. If a
significant percentage of the cartel's sales are outside the
United States, then as Connor and Lande noted, the foreign
antitrust penalties coupled with the United States penalties
are still likely to fall below the optimal deterrence level.'33
This is because cartel violations in Asia, Africa and South
America have "gone virtually unpunished,"'3 4 and in Western
Europe and Canada, the fines tend to be smaller than the
U.S. fines for comparable situations. 3 5 Thus, to achieve
optimal deterrence, the economic penalty must, at a
minimum, capture the total global supracompetitive profits
accrued to the cartel members, which is unlikely today. As
131

Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation,

83 J. POL. ECON. 807 (1975).
132

Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The

Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968). With a powerful
producer, for example, the government may be swayed to
protectionist measures. Id. at 28. The political implications
beyond quantification, but as Williamson recognized, the
nevertheless important, and cannot be ignored. Id.
3' Connor & Lande, supra note 3, at 521.
134

Id.

135

Id.

domestic
erecting
may be
issue is
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the OECD reported, there is "ample empirical evidence that
corporate sanctions in the form of fines are almost never
sufficiently high to be an optimal deterrent, and in most
cases are substantially below that level."'3 6

4. Anticompetitive Consequences
Even if the statutory maximum fines reached the optimal
deterrence level, it is unclear whether these maximum fines
could be uniformly implemented. A fine set too high may
cripple the corporation competitively, causing it to reduce
investments in innovation, and if it cannot absorb or
otherwise pass along the penalty, to reorganize under the
bankruptcy laws or exit the market.'3 7 So paradoxically,
even if the fine is below the optimal deterrent level, if it is
too large, a corporate fine conceivably could further harm
consumers with less innovation, and possibly fewer
meaningful competitors and higher prices.

136

OECD Cartel Sanction Report, supra note 44, at 7; see also OECD

Cartel Report, supra note 35, at 5 (identifying in a limited sample only
four cases where fines exceeded 100% of the cartel's estimated financial
gain, and no cases where the fine was two or three times the gain).
Although price-fixers also face a likely private class action for trebled
damages in the United States, it is unclear how effective such private
actions are in deterring hard-core cartels. Robert H. Lande, Five Myths
About Antitrust Damages, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 651 (2006) (arguing that
private damages in the United States are insufficient to deter cartel
behavior). Moreover, because civil damage cases are not common outside
the United States, a multinational cartel may still be able to avoid a
monetary sanction that exceeds its illegal gains. OECD Cartel Report,
supra note 35, at 15.
137 OECD Cartel Report, supra note 35 at 15; ICN Report, supra note
15, at 4. Thus, for example, in the graphite electrodes investigation, the
last cartel member to come forward paid a higher fine than its coconspirators, but below the maximum level under the Sentencing
Guidelines given its inability to pay the higher fine. Spratling, supra note
112, at 805. A related issue for antitrust enforcers is when government
agencies debar convicted bid riggers, and wind up with few bidders and
supracompetitive bids.
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5. Deterring Corporate Executives From
Engaging In Hard-Core Cartel Behavior
If only the corporation is fined, then the individual wrongdoers are not directly held accountable for their actions. The
conventional wisdom is that the company would invest in
such antitrust compliance up to the level where such
programs' marginal cost equals the marginal benefit. If too
low, the antitrust penalties provide insufficient incentives for
companies to monitor their agents.1 38

If too high, the

penalties, in theory, can deter socially beneficial behavior
and induce corporations to overspend on avoidance of these
penalties and detecting antitrust violations by their
executives." 9 Failure to invest in antitrust compliance
would, in theory, lead to shareholder revolt and management
turnover. But it is an unresolved issue as to whether, and to
what extent, such threats produce the optimal level of
corporate antitrust monitoring programs. The ability of
shareholders to effectively discipline corporate management
is questionable. 4 ° Ownership may be widely dispersed, and
the investments may be indirect and passive, such as
through an index fund.'
So, if the corporation alone were
138

OECD Cartel Sanction Report, supra note 44, at 7.

139 Kobayashi, supra note 46, at 732.
140

OECD Cartel Sanction Report, supra note 44, at 17. It is unclear

whether stockholders punish the firm by selling their shares. See
Kobayashi, supra note 46, at 737 (concluding that little evidence exists
that corporations suffer from stigma when convicted of antitrust crimes);
Cindy R. Alexander, On the Nature of the Reputational Penalty for
Corporate Crime: Evidence, 42 J.L. & ECON. 489, 498-99 (1999). An
earlier study found that the present value of a firm fell by about 6% when
that firm was accused of an antitrust violation, but the greater the firm's
financial resources (as indicated by a greater than average rate of return),
the less the negative impact of the antitrust suit. See Kenneth D.
Garbade, et al., Market Reaction to the Filing of Antitrust Suits: An
Aggregate and Cross-Sectional Analysis, 64 REv. ECON. & STAT. 686, 690
(1982).
14
OECD Cartel Sanction Report, supra note 44,at 17. Ironically,
federal government employees including those at the Department of
Justice may invest indirectly in companies criminally prosecuted for pricefixing. The federal government's Thrift Saving Program's popular C Fund,
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fined, it is unclear whether it could or would effectively
monitor and deter its employees from such price-fixing.
To achieve optimal deterrence then, personal liability
may be required.12 Few countries historically have imposed
antitrust fines on individual wrongdoers. Even if other
nations followed the United States' example and provided
such criminal fines against corporate executives, there
appears to be general agreement among the OECD member
countries surveyed that the threat of financial penalties
alone has little deterrent effects on individuals. 4 3
It is
difficult to prevent a corporation from reimbursing the
individual.'1 Even if such reimbursements were outlawed, a
corporation could circumvent this prohibition by (i) paying
the executives in advance a premium to compensate them for
the risk of a fine or (ii) reimbursing the executives through
pay increases or other mechanisms not specifically
prohibited.14 1 Moreover, financial penalties have varying
deterrent effects, given the differences in individuals' net
worth and the declining marginal utility of money.'46
for example, seeks to match the performance of the S&P 500 Index, which
includes some of the heaviest-fined antitrust offenders, such as Archer
Daniels Midland Co. (fined $100 million in 1996 for price fixing), Pfizer
Inc. (fined $20 million in 1999), and Eastman Chemical Co. (fined $11
million in 1998). Likewise, the Thrift Saving Program's I Fund, which
seeks to match the performance of the Morgan Stanley Capital
International EAFE index, includes heavily fined foreign antitrust
offenders such as BASF AG, which was fined $225 million in 1999.
142 The threat of individual sanctions (and prospect of amnesty) may
also encourage executives to reveal information about cartels and
cooperate in the investigation. See OECD 3rd Report, supra note 32, at
25-26.
OECD Cartel Sanction Report, supranote 44, at 8.
1
Id.; see also Renfrew, supra note 34, at 613 (quoting statement
from an unidentified "able and well-known district judge" criticizing
criminal fines as "meaningless" because individuals are ultimately
reimbursed by proceeds of wrongdoing or company).
11 OECD Cartel Sanction Report,
supra note 44, at 17.
146 John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?:
Reflections
on the DisappearingTort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L.
REv. 193, 224 (1991). For example, a fine of $1 million may be draconian
to a middle manager, with a net worth of $100,000, but insignificant to a
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Likewise, unlike embezzlers, who directly pocket the illgotten gains, it is not always clear that corporate executives
personally benefit dollar for dollar (or even from a fixed
percentage thereof) from the cartel's supracompetitive
As the OECD concluded, the executives'
profits.'4 7
compensation may not be calculated solely from the cartel's
ill-gotten profits but from otherwise good managerial
Thus, "it will typically be impossible to
performance.
determine how much an individual gained from cartel
activity." 4 ' Neither the United States nor the other eighteen
countries surveyed by the ICN have a system established for
calculating the maximum criminal penalty by using a
percentage of the executive's annual salary or private
149
property.
6. Theory Assumes That Corporate Actors Are
Rational Profit Maximizers That Can Readily
Weigh Crime's Likely Costs and Benefits
When none of the industrial nations, including the United
States, can readily estimate the probability of detection, the
net harm from the cartel, or how much the executive will
personally benefit from the price-fixing, how likely is it that
an executive can accurately make these estimations?
Although executives mty engage in some cost-benefit
analysis,15 ° these criminals may not be as "rational" as their

Others question the ability of a fine to express moral
billionaire.
condemnation, as it may simply reflect the price for engaging in the
unlawful conduct. Kahan, supranote 104, at 384.
Bid riggers at real estate
147 This is not always the case however.
auctions, for example, have agreed that one would buy the property at a
below-market price, and then the colluders later hold a private auction
where they sell the property at a higher price and divide the profits.
Similarly in the lysine conspiracy, the government informant, as it came to
light, both price fixed for, and embezzled from, his employer, ADM. See
KuRT EICHENWALD, THE INFORMANT (Broadway 2000).
1
OECD Cartel Sanction Report, supra note 44, at 20.
141 ICN Report, supra note 15, at 65.
1"0 For example, one former executive of a company convicted pricefixing gave a rough cost-benefit analysis:
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theoretical profit-maximizing counterparts.' 5 1 It is unknown
how many executives, before engaging in a price fixing
conspiracy, actually calculate their likely sentence under the
Sentencing Guidelines.'5 2 Moreover, the behavioral econ-

When you're doing $30 million a year and stand to gain $3
million by fixing prices, a $30,000 fine doesn't mean much.
• . Face it, most of us would be willing to spend 30 days in
jail to make a few extra million dollars. Maybe if I were
facing a year or more, I would think twice.
Baker Speech, supra note 119, at 531 (quoting Price Fixing: Crackdown
Underway, Bus. WEEK, June 2, 1975, at 48).
151 Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A
Behavioral Insight into Securities FraudLitigation, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 133,
177-78 (2000). For a broader survey of behavioral law and economics
literature and its questioning rational choice theory, see Robert A.
Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of Behavioral Law and
Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1663, 1666 n.7 (2003); Christine Jolls, Cass
R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law &
Economics, 50 STANFORD L. REv. 1471, 1487 (1998). For its application to
antitrust, see Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the Gate:
Antitrust in the 21st Century, 38 LoY. U. Cm. L.J. (forthcoming 2007).
152 In one study, 278 male inmates were asked, among other things,
"When you committed this crime, how likely did you think it was that you
would be caught?" and "When you committed the crime, did you know
what the likely punishment would be if you were caught?" Seventy-six
percent of active criminals and 89 percent of the most violent criminals, as
the study found, "either perceive no risk of apprehension or are
incognizant of the likely punishments for their crimes." David A.
Anderson, The Deterrence Hypothesis and Picking Pockets at the
Pickpocket's Hanging, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 295, 295 (2002). Similarly, as
one federal district judge commented, "I have people appear before me and
ask them, 'Well, did you know what the guidelines were before you
committed this offense?' They say, 'Heck, no.' They don't even know about
guidelines."
United States Sentencing Commission, Symposium on
Federal Sentencing Policy for Economic Crimes and New Technology
Offenses, The Nature and Severity of Punishment for Economic Crimes;
Determinants of Offense, Seriousness and Offender Culpability (Plenary
Session III) (Oct. 12, 2000) (Gilbert, J.), available at http://www.ussc.
gov/2000sympo/2000sympo.htm. One response is that the issue is not
whether each executive accurately calculates the probability of detection
and likely punishment, as some may over- or underestimate the likely
sentence; rather, the issue is whether executives in aggregate assess the
likely punishment. But this too is unknown and needs to be empirically
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omics literature questions whether individuals act uniformly
and predictably (as their profit-maximizing counterparts)
Corporate
solely in response to monetary penalties."' 3
behavior may also be shaped by various environmental,
internal and situational factors.'

tested. See, e.g., Control Risks Group Ltd. and Simmons & Simmons,
International Business Attitudes to Corruption 10 (2006) (finding that
approximately half of executives surveyed from 350 companies in Britain,
the United States, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Brazil and Hong
Kong claimed to be "totally ignorant" of their countries' laws on foreign
corruption),
available at http://www.crg.com/pdf/corruption-survey2006_V3.pdf.
153 For example, one interesting study examined whether financial
disincentives (in the form of a monetary fine) curbed unwanted behavior
(namely, parents who picked up their children late from certain private
day-care centers). Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, Incentives, Punishment,
and Behavior, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 573 (Colin F.
Camerer et al. eds., Princeton Univ. Press 2004). These private day-care
centers originally had no rule on what happens when parents picked up
their children after 4:00 p.m.; generally, a teacher had to wait with the
tardy parent's child. A fine on tardiness was thereafter introduced in
some of the day-care centers, which, under optimal deterrence theory,
should decrease the incidences of tardiness. Instead, the average number
of late-arriving parents increased for these day-care centers. Moreover,
after the fine was canceled, the average number of late-arriving parents
did not return to the pre-fine levels. For the control group, on the other
hand, where no fine was imposed, there was no significant shift of latearriving parents during this period, and fewer parents reported late in
these day-care centers than in the day-care centers with the fine. So why
did the monetary penalty increase the undesired behavior? Perhaps, as
the authors conclude, parents before were intrinsically motivated to pick
up their children on time. The introduction of the fine monetized that
lateness into an additional service, offered at a relatively low price. Id. at
581-86.
...Melissa S. Baucus & Janet P. Near, Can Illegal CorporateBehavior
Be Predicted? An Event History Analysis, 34 AcAD. OF MGMT. J. 9, 12
(1991) (examining FORTUNE 500 firms convicted between 1974 and 1983
for violations that the decision-makers knew (or should have known) were
illegal to determine whether illegal behavior was more likely under certain
conditions, such as firm size, affected industry, environmental
munificence); Anthony J. Daboub et al., Top Management Team
Characteristicsand CorporateIllegal Activity, 20 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 138
(1995).
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7. Judges May Reject Optimal Deterrence Theory
When Sentencing
Finally, courts historically have been reluctant to apply
optimal deterrence theory to individual antitrust offenders.' 55
It is unclear whether post-Booker courts will resort to this
theory to generally deter antitrust offenses by sentencing
antitrust offenders to longer sentences (and higher fines)
than other wealth transfer crimes, given the lower
probability of detecting antitrust crimes.
Participants in several studies, for example, were given
cases of wrongdoing and specific information about the
probability of detection.'56 Under optimal deterrence theory,
decreasing the likelihood of detection should increase the
severity of punishment (e.g., the fine for littering on a rural
road should be higher than littering in a police station).
Instead, these studies found that varying the probability of
detection had no effect on the punitive award, as the
participants evidently focused on the moral outrageousness
of the defendant's actions.'57 From these studies, it was clear
that the participants did not "spontaneously think in terms
of optimal deterrence"; indeed, they failed to do so even if
specifically requested to engage in that task.'
As Cass
Sunstein concluded, people's "moral intuitions are
inconsistent with the economic theory of deterrence."159

Interestingly, in an unrelated survey regarding perceptions
of white-collar crime, those surveyed likewise rejected the

"' See, e.g., United States v. Alton Box Board Co., No. 76 CR 199,
1977 WL 1374, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 1977) (cautioning that a sentencing
judge must use care in economic crime cases to "not get swept away in a
surge of mass hysteria and administer punishment that fails to relate
either to the defendant or to the actual injury to society that results from
his conduct").
1" Cass R. Sunstein, On the Psychology of Punishment, 11 SuP. CT.
ECON. REV. 171 (2004).
17 Id. at 174.

Id. at 175.

'5
159 Id.
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optimal deterrence theory. 160
Even when a study was
conducted on University of Chicago Law School students,
who were taught optimal deterrence theory, a majority
rejected applying this theory in setting enforcement policies
or the proper punitive damages. 6 As the authors concluded,
given that "optimal deterrence policies are rejected in both
the administrative and the judicial domains among a group
likely to be predisposed in their favor strongly suggests that
any effort to move in the direction of optimal deterrence
would encounter significant popular resistance."162
Consequently, Congress, as it has done in the past, may
be forced to continue to increase the criminal antitrust
penalties to signal to courts to set higher fines. Although the
antitrust community has generally accepted the optimal
deterrence theory in determining criminal penalties for
antitrust violations, given the economic theory's problems,
caution is required.
Moving antitrust law enforcement
policies along this economic theory's direction could be
widely perceived as unfair and wrong unless the government
can frame the policy so as to fit most comfortably with
society's moral intuitions.6 3 At a minimum, courts, antitrust
policy makers, and enforcers should not rely solely upon this
theory in determining the optimal sanctions to deter
antitrust violations, especially when morality, an older and
more powerful sanction, is available to supplement the
economic penalty.

160 Donald J. Rebovich et al., The National Public Survey
on White
Collar Crime 13 (National White Collar Crime Center, 2000). When asked
whom they thought was more likely to be caught: a robber or fraudster
who steals $1,000, seventy-four percent of those surveyed chose the robber
versus twenty-two percent for the fraudster. As to whom they thought will
be punished more severely, eighty-two percent thought the robber versus
sixteen percent for the fraudster. When asked who should be punished
more severely, thirty-eight percent responded that the punishments
should be equal, and thirty-one percent each chose the robber or fraudster.

"' Cass R. Sunstein, et al., Do People Want Optimal Deterrence?,29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 237, 246 (2000).
162

Id. at 248.

163

Id.
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III. MORALITY
Ultimately, as the ICN recognized, "there seems to be no
If the current
secret recipe for an effective penalty.""
criminal and civil sanctions by themselves do not generally
deter antitrust crimes, what role can morality play?
Moreover, if morality continues to play no role in antitrust
crimes, will further attempts to escalate antitrust penalties
lead to moral qualms underlying general deterrence?
A.

Morality Defined

For the purposes of this article, morality refers to rules of
conduct associated with certain distinctive psychological and
social attributes, such that a person complies with the
conduct to achieve virtue and avoid vices." 5 In addition to
the incentives or disincentives that the civil or criminal law
provides, morality adds the incentive to form good habits to
engender in individuals certain virtuous dispositions and to
avoid certain vices and extreme dispositions. Even if such
morals or virtues are properly internalized, the moral or
virtuous person still exercises rational choice and deliberates
as to the proper course of action in accord with what is moral
or virtuous. At her noblest level, a virtuous individual
exercises such behavior for its own sake, for spiritual
reasons, or to attain true happiness. On a lesser level, she
may exercise such moral behavior to seek praise and honor
from her peers and avoid shame. At a baser level, she
refrains from immoral acts to avoid legal punishments. At
the vilest level, she willingly commits immoral acts.
B.

Can Antitrust Violations Be Immoral?

One could first examine whether antitrust violations in
the past were viewed as mala prohibitum rather than mala
ICN Report, supra note 15, at 3.
165

This definition comes from Steven Shavell, Law Versus Morality as

Regulators of Conduct, in THE ORIGINS OF LAW & ECONOMICS: ESSAYS BY
THE FOUNDING FATHERS 396, 398 (Charles K. Rowley & Francesco Parisi
eds., Edward Elgar Publ'g 2005).
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in se."' But reliance on this historical distinction assumes
that a crime's morality or amorality remains fixed forever.'6 7
One aspect of criminal law is educational.'6 As the harms of
certain conduct are exposed or fully understood, society's
moral condemnation may increase. For example, over the
past forty years, environmental and civil rights crimes have
transitioned to immoral crimes. On the other hand, the
public's desire or acceptance of certain spectacles (e.g.,
gladiator shows in ancient Rome) may wane as later cultures
displace the prevailing views.'6 9 Acts once deemed immoral
(such as pre-marital or homosexual intercourse) may lose
their stigma in certain communities.
Moreover, later
societies' moral condemnation of some actions may not
diminish, but their view of an acceptable punishment may
change. 17 0
"' An action is malum in se when "it is inherently and essentially evil,
that is immoral in its nature and injurious in its consequences, without
any regard to the fact of its being noticed or punished by the law of the
state." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 959 (6th ed. 1990). An action, which is
deemed malum prohibitum "is not inherently immoral, but becomes so
because its commission is expressly forbidden by positive law." Id. at 960.
167 For a fuller explanation of the problems of relying on the malum in
se and malum prohibitum categories, see Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime
to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalizationand the Moral Content
of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1570-80 (1997).
16 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 200-202 (Roger Crisp ed. &
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2000); Johannes Andenaes, The Moral or
Educative Influence of CriminalLaw, 27 J. Soc. ISSUES 17, 26 (1971).
169 Although societal norms have evolved over time to condemn such
brutal killings, the blood lust from these gladiator shows tempted St.
Augustine's friend, St. Alypius, who succumbing to the crowd, became
"delighted with that guilty fight, and intoxicated with the bloody pastime"
such that he was no longer the man who entered the arena, but "one of the
throng." ST. AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONS CH. 6, AT 398 (Oxford Univ. Press
1991).
170 For example, the Old Testament proscribed numerous offenses
with death, such as:
murder (Gen 9:6, Ex 21:12, Numb 35:16-21);
physically abusing one's father or mother (Ex 21:15); cursing one's parents
(Ex 21:17); blasphemy against God (Lev 24:14-16, 23); profaning the
Sabbath (Ex 31:14, Numb 15:32-36); practicing magic (Ex 22:18); fortune
telling and practicing sorcery (Lev 20:27); religious people who mislead
others to fall away (Deut 13:1-5, 18:20); adultery and fornication (Lev
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A second approach is to assume that because antitrust
violations are criminalized, they must be immoral. If, as the
academic literature references, hundreds of thousands of
regulations are now punishable by criminal penalties, 7 ' then
one may assume that certain conduct today is criminalized
even though it carries little or no moral opprobrium.
Consequently,
neither
criminal/civil
nor
historical
distinctions between mala prohibitum and mala in se
provide a satisfactory answer.
Because the Sherman Act does not delineate what specific
anticompetitive conduct should be prosecuted criminally as
opposed to civilly, there isn't any specific legislative moral
opprobrium. But a good starting point is hard-core cartels,
which the Department of Justice currently prosecutes
criminally. A helpful framework in evaluating the moral
content of this criminalized conduct has three overlapping
and non-exclusive elements:'7 2 first, the actor's culpability or
blameworthiness, which is supplied by the actor's intent;
second, the moral wrongfulness of the action itself, which, as
Stuart Green described, is present if the conduct made
criminal is viewed by a consensus of society as immoral or in
violation of a moral norm; and third, the action's social
harmfulness. 7 3
1. Antitrust Offender's Culpability or
Blameworthiness
One could argue that it would be undesirable for courts
and antitrust enforcers to infer culpability given the
20:10-12, Deut 22:22); women having intercourse before marriage (Deut
22:20-21); intercourse when one is engaged (Deut 22:23-24); daughter of a
priest practicing prostitution (Lev 21:9); rape of someone who is engaged
(Deut 22:25); bestiality (Ex 22:19); worshipping idols (Ex 22:20, Lev 20:1-5,
Deut 17:2-7); intercourse with inlaws and incest (Lev 20:11-12, 14, 19-21);
homosexuality (Lev 20:13); kidnapping (Ex 21:16); bearing false testimony
at a trial (Deut 19:16, 19); and contempt of court (Deut 17:8-13).
171 Green, supra note 167, at 1544-46 n.18 & 25; Coffee, supra
note
146, at 216.
172 This helpful framework comes from Green, supra note 167, at 1537.
173 Id.
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Sherman Act's vague and open-ended prohibition on
restraints of trade. For example, a company could act with
pure malice against its competitor without violating the
174
antitrust laws (if there is no antitrust injury).
Alternatively, the company, acting without any malice, could
find itself liable for acts that subsequently proved to be
anticompetitive.
The fact that the Sherman Act is
sufficiently supple to keep apace with changing market
practices and economic theory suggests that it is more of a
civil regulatory statute than an unequivocal prohibition of
the kind typically found in the criminal law. 175
But even if the Sherman Act is supple, hard-core cartels,
the focus of the Department of Justice's criminal actions,
have been consistently condemned by conservative and
liberal judges, economists and antitrust lawyers throughout
the twentieth century.176 It is therefore doubtful that
generating strong moral condemnation of hard-core cartel
behavior will have "the dangerous potential of introducing a
rigidification of values too soon, of cutting off the debate, or
at least restricting the ease of movement to new positions
and a new consensus." 7 7
Moreover, antitrust is not a strict liability crime and
requires that the defendants have some level of intent before

Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209, 225 (1993) ("Even an act of pure malice by one business competitor
against another does not, without more, state a claim under the federal
antitrust laws."); A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881
F.2d 1396, 1402 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[Ilntent is not a basis of liability (or a
ground for inferring the existence of such a basis) in a predatory pricing
case," as "desire to extinguish one's rivals is entirely consistent with, often
is the motive behind, competition.").
17' Kadish, supra note 22, at 429.
171 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
U.S. 398, 407, 410 n.3 (2004); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273
U.S. 392, 397 (1927); BORK, supra note 4, 267-68; U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2R1.1, cmt. background (2005) ("[N]ear universal
agreement that restrictive agreements among competitors . . . can cause
serious economic harm.").
177 Kadish, supra note 22, at 446.
174
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criminal liability attaches.'
Lower courts have held that
when the challenged activity is per se illegal under the
antitrust laws, then the government need only prove the
existence of an agreement and that the defendant knowingly

178

In the context of verification of pricing information, which was not

a per se illegal antitrust offense, the Court required that defendants either
(i) intended a clearly illegal result, such as fixing prices, or (ii) acted with
knowledge that illegal results, which actually occurred, were "probable."
United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 444-46 (1978). With
regard to different mental states, the Court recognized that "mens rea is
not a unitary concept" and enumerated four possible levels of intent: (i)
purpose, (ii) knowledge, (iii) recklessness, and (iv) negligence:
In dealing with the kinds of business decisions upon which
the antitrust laws focus, the concepts of recklessness and
negligence have no place. Our question instead is whether
a criminal violation of the antitrust laws requires, in
addition to proof of anticompetitive effects, a demonstration that the disputed conduct was undertaken with
the "conscious object" of producing such effects, or whether
it is sufficient that the conduct is shown to have been
undertaken with knowledge that the proscribed effects
would most likely follow. While the difference between
these formulations is a narrow one, see ALI, Model Penal
Code, Comment on Section 2.02, p. 125 (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1955), we conclude that action undertaken with knowledge
of its probable 'consequences and having the requisite
anticompetitive effects can be a sufficient predicate for a
finding of criminal liability under the antitrust laws.
[Footnote omitted] In so holding, we do not mean to
suggest that conduct undertaken with the purpose of
producing anticompetitive effects would not also support
criminal liability, even if such effects did not come to pass.
Cf. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105 [ (1948).
We hold only that this elevated standard of intent need not
be established in cases where anticompetitive effects have
been demonstrated, instead, proof that the defendant's
conduct was undertaken with knowledge of its probable
consequences will satisfy the Government's burden.
Id. at 444. The Supreme Court viewed intent not strictly as indicia of
criminal culpability, but as a mechanism to mitigate overdeterrence,
namely, prosecuting conduct "which only after the fact is determined to
violate the statute because of antiticompetitive effects." Id. at 441.
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entered into the alleged agreement or conspiracy.179 As a
practical matter, even for such per se illegal antitrust
offenses, the Department of Justice indicated that it would
not prosecute the offense criminally if "there is clear
evidence that the subjects of the investigation were not
aware of, or did not appreciate, the consequences of their
action."'80
Often the antitrust crimes' defilement originates from
within, namely borne out of the executives' hearts to deceive,
steal, and cheat. The "unlawful act [is] consequent upon
such vicious will," not vice-versa. 8 Competition authorities
have noted the "ample evidence" that cartel participants are
not honest business people who inadvertently became
involved in unlawful conduct, but instead were fully aware of
their unlawful conduct, devising "sophisticated regimes" to
operate their cartels and sometimes going to great lengths to
hide the existence of their agreements. 2 For example, in
the electrical equipment conspiracy cases, the Department of
Justice's retained cryptographer was unable to find a cartel
pattern in the jumble of switchgear bids. The prosecutors
eventually discovered, from a co-conspirator's notes, that the
conspirators rotated bids according to the phases of the
moon. 8 3 Given the price-fixers' intent to subvert competition, the Court has been unsympathetic to the hapless but
harmless price-fixers, since they "have little moral standing
to demand proof of power or effect when the most they can
say for themselves is that they tried to harm the public but
were mistaken in their ability to do so."1
179

Sheryl A. Brown & Christopher Kim, Antitrust Violations, 43 AM.

CRIM. L. REV. 217, 227 (2006) (collecting cases).
180
181

ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, supra note 23, at ch. III, § C-5.
Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV.

55, 55 (1933) (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES, *21).
182 OECD 3rd Report, supra note 32, at 15; see also OECD Cartel
Report, supra note 35, at 8 (citing as examples of cartel members' efforts to

keep their activities secret, their burning bid files in bonfires and hiding
computer files in eaves of one employee's grandmother's house).
Smith, Electrical Conspiracy(PartII), supra note 31, at 164, 210.
184

FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 432 n.15

(1990) (quoting VII P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAw

1509, at 411 (1986)).
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2. Moral Wrongfulness of Hard-Core Cartels
Moral wrongfulness involves conduct that violates a
moral norm or standard. 18 5 Criminal sanctions cannot be
justified unless accompanied by the judgment of community

condemnation. 186
One could argue that such hard-core cartel conductabsent the sinister moniker-is nothing other than
"acceptable aggressive business behavior." 8' 7 Any moral
condemnation has to be questioned, since unlike other cases
of theft, the victims (and society overall) are often unaware
of being fleeced, and unlike those robbed, do not suffer
trepidation.'88
Nor do antitrust violators invade one's
privacy, as in identity theft, or threaten the victim's physical
health or safety. Given that many economists view wealth
transfers agnostically and that the harm from cartels
ultimately involves a "deadweight welfare loss," which few in
society understand and even fewer have successfully
calculated, any moral condemnation over cartel behavior is
not based on personal experience, but phobias of "big
business," homogenization of culture, and affluenza.
It may be that few people in society, if asked about pricefixing, would graph in their minds a triangle representing
the deadweight welfare loss. Antitrust for most is ultimately
grounded in the moral norm of fairness.'89 In surveys by the

Green, supranote 167, at 1551.
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 401 (1958); JEROME HALL, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW
157, 182 (1947 ed.) (only those actions "revolting to the moral sentiments
of society" should be criminalized) (quoting JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A
'
'

GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 3 (1863)).
' Kadish, supra note 22, at 425; see also Kramer, supra note 61, at
536 ("normal pattern of behavior of the majority of businessmen").
"s Kadish, supra note 22, at 436.
189 The Court noted, for example, the FTC Act's prohibition of unfair
competition and deceptive acts or practices, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1), overlaps
the scope of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, aimed at prohibiting restraint
of trade. FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454-55 (1986).
Indeed, the standard of "unfairness" under the FTC Act not only
encompasses the practices that violate the Sherman Act and the other
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behavioral economists, many respondents condemned as
unfair certain profit-seeking behavior that economists may
Respondents were "nearly
consider ethically neutral.
unanimous in condemning a store that raises prices when its
sole competitor in a community is temporarily forced to
close" 19 0-conduct which some economists might not only
consider "rational," but also normatively desirable in
allocating (temporarily) scarce goods to those who value
them the most. Even if a supermarket with no rivals sets
prices five percent higher, a "mild exploitation of monopoly
power," over three-quarters of the respondents reported this
as "unfair."'9 1 It should not be surprising then that some
antitrust laws, but can include additional practices that the FTC
determines are against public policy for other reasons. Id. at 454. The
legislative history of the FTC Act, as Lande notes, shows it was enacted to
better accomplish the goals of the Sherman Act, and to extend Sherman
Act principles to "unfair" or "immoral" business behavior. Robert H.
Lande, Wealth Transfers As The Original And Primary Concern Of
Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65,
The FTC Commissioners, however, later adopted the
107 (1982).
Unfairness Policy Statement in December of 1980, which stated that
"[unijustified consumer injury is the primary focus of the FTC Act" and
rejected the "immoral, unscrupulous, or unethical" test, reasoning that
such a test had never been relied upon as an independent basis for finding
unfairness. J. Howard Beales, III, Brightening The Lines: The Use Of
Policy Statements At The Federal Trade Commission, 72 ANTITRUST L.J.
1057, 1065 (2005). The Commission recently held, however, that a
defendant's deception and failure to act in good faith in the standardsetting process, could under certain circumstances qualify as anticompetitive conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Opinion of the
Commission in In the Matter of Rambus, Inc., FTC Docket No. 9302 (Aug.
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/060802
2006),
available at
2,
commissionopinion.pdf.
Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit
190 Daniel
Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS, supra note 153, at 261; see also RICHARD H. THALER, THE
WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES & ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 74-77
(Princeton Univ. Press 1992).
Constraint on Profit Seeking:
191 Kahneman et al., Fairness as a
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, supra
IN
Market,
in
ADVANCES
in
the
Entitlements
note 153, at 261. Consumers typically base a deal's "value" on the
deviation from an established reference point (for example, a sale of 20%
off the regular price). The majority surveyed indicated that a car dealer's
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successful private antitrust plaintiffs persuade juries to view
antitrust litigation "as a morality play devoid of

economics ."192
As in any competitive effort, winning is praised, if the
means are fair. If athletes, like bid riggers, agreed to rotate
who would prevail at each contest, public outrage would
ensue. But unlike athletic contests, the existence of which
depends on defined rules, some may assert that the free
market is unrestrained, and society tempers it only to
advance other ideals (such as protection of worker safety,
cleaner environment).
But this argument assumes that
market forces pre-exist (and exist independently of)
government forces. As R.H. Coase noted, the stock market,
the example often used of perfect or near-perfect
competition, is one of the more heavily regulated entities."'
elimination of a $200 discount off the list price for a popular vehicle was
acceptable, whereas 71 percent viewed selling the vehicle $200 above the
list price as unfair. Id. at 257. Both produce the same effect-a higher net
retail price-but the direction of the deviation to or from the established
reference point differed. Although the Sherman Act equally condemns
cartels that raise price or eliminate discounts (see Catalano v. Target
Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 648 (1980)), an interesting question is whether
the former would evoke greater moral outrage than the latter.
192 Hugh C. Hansen, Robinson-PatmanLaw: A Review And Analysis,
51 FORDHAM L. REV. 1113, 1184 n.359 (1983) (Elzinga commenting how
one plaintiff lawyer "candidly admitted that he preferred economists to
stay clear of private antitrust suits because such suits involved 'issues of
morality.'"). That plaintiffs antitrust attorney wrote:
I proceed on the premise that the jury's decision is not
reached by applying highly technical, sophisticated, legal
concepts to a relatively complex fact situation. It is, in my
judgment, made on the simple basis of morality. The
plaintiff wins because the jury, through the mysterious
chemistry that operates inside the jury room, has
determined that the plaintiff has been wronged or, in the
language of the street, has been kicked around by the
defendants and is thus entitled to some recompense.

Maxwell Blecher, The Plaintiffs Viewpoint, 38
(1968).
93

ANTITRUST L.J.

50, 52

R.H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM.

ECON. REV. 713, 718 (1992).
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Instead, the "legal system will have a profound effect on the
working of the economic system and may in certain respects
be said to control it."'94 Rather than an impediment to free
markets, antitrust's philosophy is grounded in promoting
competitive markets, in enabling entrepreneurs to enter,
competitors to offer their goods and services, and consumers
to choose.
In setting "the moral tone of the market place,"195
antitrust is thus consistent with norms of fairness. While
greed is good when it spurs initiative and innovation, greed
is just as easily condemned when it spurs theft, fraud, or
violence. The attainment of material prosperity by unfairly
disadvantaging others has long been censored." 6 The vices
194

Id.

at 717-18.

9 Smith, Electrical Conspiracy (PartI), supra note 33, at 132, 134.
'
Thomas More, for example, noted how a sheep cartel fueled by the
"wicked greed of a few men" caused greater evil. As wool prices escalated,
poorer people who ordinarily made cloth out of it could not afford to buy it
and therefore were unemployed and reduced to idleness and crime.
THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA 23-25 (Yale Univ. Press 2001). Unless the evils of
monopolies and oligopolies were remedied, warned More's traveler in
UTOPIA, "it is pointless for you to boast of the justice administered in the
punishment of thieves, a justice which is specious rather than either just
or expedient." Id. at 25. In ancient Greece, corn dealers convicted of
fixing prices were sentenced to death. Lambros E. Kotsiris, An Antitrust
Case in Ancient Greek Law, 22 INT'L LAW. 451, 454 (1988). In the POLITICS,
Aristotle recounts how a man of Sicily bought up the iron from the iron
mines; afterwards, when the merchants from their various markets came
to buy, he was the only seller, and without increasing the price much, he
earned a 200 percent profit. When Dionysius, the ruler of Syracuse, heard
of the Sicilian's industry, he told the Sicilian to leave Syracuse, for the
Sicilian had discovered a way of making money which was injurious to
Dionysius' interests. Thus, Aristotle wrote that statesmen "are often in
want of financial resources and in need of more ways of gaining them."
ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 31 (Ernest Barker trans., Oxford U.
Press 1958).
See also Spencer Weber Waller, The Incoherence of
Punishment in Antitrust, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 207, 215 (2003) (collecting
these and other historical examples of where hardcore antitrust offenses
were viewed as morally offensive and worthy of punishment). According to
a populist interpretation, the American colonies opposed monopolies,
which the English sovereign bestowed to varying degrees. William L.
Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. CHI.
L. REv. 221, 226 (1956). The Kings' and Queens' monopoly grants led to
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of greed and stinginess were not only a deficiency in giving,
but also an "excess in taking," by taking anything from
anybody, such as usury.'97 Not only do price fixers steal
their denunciation as a "nest of wasps-a swarm of vermin which have
overcrept the land." Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 47 (1872),
(quoting Sir John Culpeper, Speech in Long Parliament). For antitrust's
historical roots in English common law see generally William Letwin, The
English Common Law Concerning Monopolies, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 355
(1954); Donald Dewey, The Common-Law Background of Antitrust Policy,
41 VA. L. REV. 759 (1955).
117 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS supra note 168, at 64.
According
to one religious interpretation, "the motive of the monopoly is, as a rule,
not merely lacking in reasonableness, but positively unjust; for its
ultimate aim is not simply to acquire the patronage that now goes to its
rivals, but in addition to raise prices to the consumer after its rivals have
been eliminated." See NEW ADVENT ROMAN CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA,
available at http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10497b.htm (discussing
monopoly). Thus,
While monopoly is not necessarily unjust, and while any
particular monopoly may be free from unjust practices,
experience shows that the power to commit injustice which
is included in monopoly cannot be unreservedly entrusted
to the average human being or group of human beings.
Consequently, it is the duty of public authority to prevent
the existence of unnecessary monopolies, and to exercise
such supervision over necessary monopolies as to render
impossible monopolistic injustice, whether against the
independent business man through unjust methods, or the
consumer through unjust prices.
Id. Similarly, the "Torah gives clear requirement for honest business
practices." Esa Mangeloja, Economic Utopia of the Torah (May 14, 2004)
(quoting Lev. 25:14), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/wpalwuwpmh/
0405004.html#provider. Under the Talmud, "a business company that
wishes to behave ethically should not use its monopolistic powers to
overcharge customers or under pay employees." Id. In 2 Samuel 12:1-6,
Nathan related to David about two men in one city (one rich with many
flocks and herds, the other poor with nothing, except one little ewe lamb,
which he had bought and nourished up. When a traveler came, the rich
man spared his own flock, but took the poor man's lamb. David's anger
was greatly kindled, and he told Nathan, that "[As] the LORD liveth, the
man that hath done this [thing] shall surely die: And he shall restore the
lamb fourfold, because he did this thing, and because he had no pity.").
Monopoly is also unlawful in Islam as the prophet Muhammad "preached
that 'It is difficult for a man laden with riches to climb the steep path that
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•money from consumers, as one defense counsel stated, but
the challenged action "erodes the personal integrity of the
individuals involved in the lying, cheating and cover-ups
required to engage in conduct long known to be illegal."19 8
The philosophers' and moralists' dim view on this lust for
profits is not unique.
Other surveys suggest moral
opprobrium toward antitrust violations. In the Department
of Justice's 1985 survey of crime severity, the respondents
deemed the "hard-core" antitrust crime' 9 9 a more serious
crime than someone "armed with a lead pipe, rob[bing] a

victim of $1,000. No physical harm occurs. "200

Another

survey, conducted in 2000, also reflected society's changing
perception of the seriousness of white-collar crime.2 ' Many
respondents indicated that white-collar crime can be as
serious, or more serious, than certain types of street crimes.
The fact that the white-collar crimes were non-violent or did
not result in physical injury did not undermine their
seriousness: more than twice as many respondents considered the embezzler as the more serious criminal compared

leads to bliss.' He did not proh'bit or discourage the acquisition of wealth
but insisted that it be lawfully acquired by honest means and that a
portion of it would go to the poor. He advised his followers, 'To give the
laborer his wages before his perspiration dried up.'" University of
Southern California, USC-MSA Compendium of Muslim Texts,
http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/prophet/prophetdescription.ht
ml. For an application of Buddhist principles to economics, see E. F.
SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL, ECONOMICS AS IF PEOPLE MATTERED

(Harper & Row 1973).
19 Tefft W. Smith, Comments for the Antitrust Modernization
Commission Hearing on Criminal Antitrust Remedies, Nov. 3, 2005, at 4,
available
at
http://www.amc.gov/commission_hearings/criminal_
remedies.htm.
199 See Marvin Wolfgang et al., NATIONAL SURVEY OF CRIME SEVERITY
viii (U.S. Government Printing Office 1985) (describing the antitrust
violation as "[sleveral large companies illegally fix[ing] the retail prices of
their products.")
200 Id.
20 Rebovich et al., supra note 160, at 6.
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to the street thief (fifty-six percent compared to twenty-seven
percent).2 °2
On the other hand, the authors of a 1995 survey
concluded that its respondents did not sentence "antitrust
cases as harshly as might have been anticipated. Overall,
the sentences were very short: rarely more than four years
for crimes involving very large losses to the general public.
In addition, neither the defendant's role nor the amount of
the loss made much of a difference."2 03 However, this might
reflect the pre-conceived notions of the surveyors. The
respondents' median sentence for price-fixing was 1.22 years,
higher than the existing Sentencing Guidelines baseline for
antitrust offenders, and at the high end of the current ten to
sixteen months baseline for antitrust offenders (before other
mitigating or aggravating factors are taken into account).
While the Sentencing Guidelines provide a one-level increase
for bid rigging which increases the average sentence to
twelve to eighteen months, the median sentence in the
survey for bid rigging was three years.2 4 On the other hand,
202

Id.

at 7. The question posed was "Which is more serious: a 'street'

thief or embezzler who steals $100?" The remaining respondents (17%)
responded that they were equally serious.
203 U.S. Sentencing Commission, A National Sample Survey of Public
Opinion on Sentencing FederalCrimes 106 (Oct. 1995).
2"4 Id., at 105. The vignette for the survey involved being convicted "of
conspiring with other companies to fix prices for soft drinks" and "of
agreeing with competitors to rig bids for government contracts in order to
control the market and guarantee higher profits for the companies
involved." The Report concluded it was "not obvious" why respondents
gave longer sentences to bid rigging. Id. at 106. Another interesting
finding was the regional differences in the mean sentences for antitrust
and other violations, which could not be explained by any demographic
compositions. Id. at 133. The highest mean sentence for antitrust
violations was 5.6 years from those surveyed in the East North Central
region (consisting of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin) and
the lowest was 2.9 years from those surveyed in the Mountain region (New
Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, Utah, Nebraska, Wyoming, Idaho and
Montana). Also, the mean sentences in New England (3.7 years) and MidAtlantic states (New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey) (3.2 years)
were lower than West South Central region of Texas, Oklahoma,
Arkansas, and Louisiana (5.3 years). Id. at 134.
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contrary to optimal deterrence theory, the amount of money
the public was overcharged (which ranged between $500,000
and $15 million) did not impact the median sentence. °5
In addition to public perceptions, one should also examine
the moral quality of the act itself. As a legal principle, an
antitrust crime occurs under Section 1 of the Sherman Act
when the competitors reach an agreement to engage in hardcore cartel behavior-it does not matter if the cartel
members actually raised prices, harmed consumers, or were
otherwise unsuccessful. 20 6
In the lysine price-fixing
conspiracy, the lysine executives were secretly videotaped as
they joked around a conference table that the empty seat
was for the industry's largest customer; another joked that
the empty chair was for the FBI, and another executive
added that the remaining chairs were for the FTC.
Following this banter, the executives launched into the
details of their price-fixing scheme for lysine. In another
videotape, the president of ADM tells his competitor that
ADM's slogan, which "penetrated the whole company," was:
"Our competitors are our friends. Our customers are the
enemy."20 7 If one watches these videotapes, one may get the
impression that this is nothing more than "theft by welldressed thieves." 20 This comports with one's moral intuition
Id. at 106.
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59
(1940) (holding that "conspiracies under the Sherman Act are not
dependent on any overt act other than the act of conspiring" and that a
violation can be established even if conspirators did not have the means to
accomplish their objectives); United States v. Gravely, 840 F.2d 1156, 1161
n.6 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that a Sherman Act violation may be
established even if a conspiracy is unsuccessful); see also United States v.
American Airlines, 743 F.2d 1114 n.1 (5th Cir. 1984) (showing that
attempts to conspire can be prosecuted under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act as well).
207 Scott D. Hammond, Dir. of Criminal Enforcement, Dep't of Justice,
Antitrust Div., Speech before International Law Congress 2001: The Fly
On the Wall Has Been Bugged-Catching an International Cartel in the
Act 4 (May 15, 2001), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/8280.htm.
208 Remarks by Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, Dep't of
Justice, Antitrust Div., Remarks at the Spring Meeting of the A.B.A.
Antitrust Section (Apr. 6, 2000), 1230 PLI/Corp 407, 411 (Feb. 2001).
205

206
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that the executives to a cartel have chosen as their objective
to defraud consumers by charging them more. It is the
agreement upon this objective that renders the act immoral,
and not necessarily the degree to which they ultimately
succeed or fail.
3. Social Harmfulness of Hard-Core Cartels
Some religions view the circumstances, including the
consequences, of the act as secondary elements in
determining its morality.2 "9 The Sentencing Guidelines
likewise treat the circumstances surrounding certain
criminal acts as mitigating factors, which may increase or
diminish the degree of the act's wrongfulness (for example,
the amount stolen) or the defendant's culpability (such as
whether the defendant abused a position of trust), but which
do not alter the act's illegality. For acts which are inherently
immoral, the circumstances generally do not transform the
acts' moral quality, as "they can make neither good nor right
an action that is in itself evil."21°
Similarly, because the act of conspiring provides the
requisite illegality, antitrust prosecutors need not, and
typically do not, establish the net harm caused by hard-core
cartels. Thus, the extent to which such cartels harm society
is unknown. However, simply because the impact of a cartel
on its victims is not typically alleged, does not mean that
victims are not impacted. The economic studies, as collected
by Connor and Lande, show significant overcharges
attributable to cartels.21' The overcharge percentages found
in the studies may even be conservative as they do not
include the deadweight welfare loss associated with cartels,
and other economic and non-economic harms.

209

See, e.g., ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC

1, ch. 1, art. 4 (1997),
http://www.catholicculture.org/docs/catechism/cat-view.cfm?recnum=4963.
CHURCH FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA §
210

See id.

Connor & Lande, supra note 3, at 535; see also OECD Cartel
Report, supra note 35, at 2, 9 (finding from more limited survey of 14 cases
median markup between 15 and 20%).
211
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Many
prosecutors
can
provide
anecdotes
that
demonstrate how cartels have harmed consumers.
For
example, one Department of Justice prosecutor described
how defendants' bid rigging in real estate nisi and
foreclosure auctions cheated the victims, who are generally
the poor, deceased's heirs, incompetent persons or minors.212
In a nisi auction, the homeowner is usually the estate of
someone who is seriously ill or has died without a will.
These public auctions are intended to ensure that the
property is sold at a fair value. According to the United
States' sentencing memorandum, Defendant Eric Adolph
Baer and others agreed to rig the bidding at such public
auctions. In one of their rigged bids, the victim was an
unmarried, retired Washington, D.C. public school teacher.
She became ill and entered a nursing home. To pay for her
expenses, she had to sell her home. Because of her illness,
her court-appointed conservator arranged for the sale
through a nisi proceeding auction. Mr. Baer and his coconspirators rigged the bidding of the retired schoolteacher's
house, and faced with no competition from his conspirators, a
designated conspirator was able to bid only $22,000 for her
house. The conspirators later held a second secret auction,
where one conspirator paid $32,750 for her house, and the
profits were divided among the co-conspirators.
That
conspirator then sold shortly thereafter her house for
$36,500. Meanwhile, the victim, who was cheated over
$10,000, had to begin receiving Medicaid to pay for her
medical care, and her conservator had to pay for her burial
expenses, as she died penniless.2 13
Cartels can even harm organized religions or consumers
purchasing products for the religious holidays.2 14 Ultimately,
212

Government's Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing, filed in United

States v. Baer, Crim. No. 90-0314 (HHG) (D.D.C. Oct. 24, 1990).
213

Id.

214

See e.g., Matzoh Case Ends in Plea, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 26, 1991, at

D4 (reporting the no-contest plea and the $2.8 million fine payment by the
B. Manischewitz Company, the nation's leading matzoh maker, for
conspiring with others to increase the wholesale price on $25 million
worth of Passover matzohs); see generally Press Release, U.S. Dep't of
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cartels adversely impact society's collective interest in fair,
efficient and open markets."'

IV. BENEFITS AND RISKS IF ANTITRUST
VIOLATIONS DEEMED IMMORAL
A. Potential Benefits if Antitrust Violations Deemed
Immoral
The Department of Justice's stated focus is on individual
accountability and treating the business executives in these

Justice, Antitrust Division, Former Broker to the Archdiocese of New York
Pleads Guilty to Fraud, Tax and Obstruction of Justice Charges (Aug. 4,
2006) (announcing the indictment of Joseph DeRusso, Vincent Heintz,
Nanette Melera, and Michael O'Shaugnnessy on charges of fraud, tax, and
obstruction of justice charges. According to the indictment, defendants
used their position as employees and consultants at Institutional
Commodity Services, Inc., the central purchasing agent of the Roman
Catholic Archdiocese of New York, to defraud the archdiocese of more than
$2 million between 1996 and 2004. According to the press release, in
addition to artificially inflating prices for goods and services, defendants
embezzled more than $1 million from the archdiocese through a scheme
where they diverted funds earmarked to buy food for children enrolled in
the archdiocese's schools to companies they secretly owned and controlled.
All four defendants pled guilty.).
215 Green, supra note 167, at 1550; United States v. Alton Box Bd. Co.,
No. 76 CR 199, 1977 WL 1374, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 1977) (quoting
William B. Saxbe, Attorney Gen., Address before Legal Comm. of the
Grocery Mfr. of Am. (Oct. 9, 1974)) (characterizing price fixing as "nothing
more than totalitarian practices and totalitarian disdain for our
democratic way of life"); Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust:
Other than Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L.
REV. 1191, 1995 (1977) (arguing that more competition, an interest
referenced in the Sherman Act's legislative history, reduces prices,
increases the availability of goods, and will also mean "less accumulation
of wealth from capitalized monopoly positions"). See generally United
States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945)
(observing that in enacting the Sherman Act, Congress was not
necessarily actuated only by economic motives. It is possible, because of
its indirect social or moral effect, to prefer a system of small producers,
each dependent for his success upon his own skill and character, to one in
which the great mass of those engaged must accept the direction of a few.).
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hard-core cartels as criminals."'6 But contrary to the optimal
deterrence theory's singular dimension of human behavior
(citizens obey the law when the legal punishments exceed
the gains), citizens may comply with the law because of their
own moral beliefs, peer pressure, or fear of social
disapproval.2 17 Indeed, as discussed below, these social
factors can be quite effective in supplementing the law's
deterrent effects.
Consequently, highlighting the moral
content of antitrust crimes may have several attendant
benefits in generally deterring individuals from engaging in
cartel behavior.
1. Educational Benefits
Criminal convictions may represent "a condemnation by
society of certain conduct in a way that the imposition of a
civil penalty cannot.""
Even if they do not fully internalize
these norms, citizens at a minimum learn through the
criminal laws, and the type of sentence imposed, of the
contours of that community's morality." 9 But an additional
rationale for supplementing law with morality is that the
"legal rules may not reflect certain information that is
relevant to achieving socially desirable outcomes, whereas
moral rules can reflect such information." 0 That may be the
case with antitrust.
Prosecutors generally view antitrust's per se illegality
rule as a blessing, as it spares them from proving market
effects.2"2' But the per se rule can also suckle from antitrust
216
217

2005 Hammond AMC Testimony, supra note 41, at 103.
See Green, supra note 167, at 1591-93 (collecting recent studies

that seek to determine to what extent people obey law voluntarily).
218 OECD Cartel Sanction Report, supra note 44, at 18.
219 Coffee, supra note 146, at 223; Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence,
Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 383 (1997)
(recognizing that form and severity of punishment can express
community's moral condemnation).
220 Shavell, supra note 44, at 413.
221 United States v. Realty Multi List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1362-63
(5th Cir. 1980) ("The per se rule is the trump card of antitrust law. When
an antitrust plaintiff successfully plays it, he need only tally his score.").
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its moral outrage. 2 Neither the indictment nor the criminal
information typically expound on the moral component of the
defendants' behavior or on the net harm to consumers.
Instead, the legal documents set out, in a professional,
workmanlike fashion, the necessary legal and factual
allegations. The Department of Justice's press release may
contain some additional information, including a short quote
from the Attorney General or Assistant Attorney General
condemning cartels. 23 But invariably the Department of
Justice's one- to two-page press release is truncated to
perhaps a one- to two-paragraph column in a newspaper's
business page. Given that the overwhelming majority of
antitrust defendants plead guilty or nolo contendere,2 24 and
222

The Sentencing Guidelines

do not mitigate this unintended

consequence of the per se rule, since criminal fines are calculated off a
baseline of commerce. U.S.S.G. § 2R1.1.3(d)(1).
223 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Division,
Former
New
York
Hospital
Employee
and
a
Manhattan
Telecommunications Company Plead Guilty to Bid Rigging and Related
Charges (Sept. 29, 2006) ("The Antitrust Division will hold accountable
those who attempt to undermine open and competitive bidding processes,"
said Thomas 0. Barnett, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Department's Antitrust Division. "Today's sentences demonstrate that
commitment."),
available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/pressreleases/2006/218677.htm; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust
Division, Former Commercial Refrigeration Company Manager Indicted
on Rigging Bids on Contracts to Safeway Grocery Stores in Arizona (Sept.
26, 2006) ("The Antitrust Division is committed to prosecuting those who
damage the integrity of the free market by conspiring to rig bids"),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2006/
218611.htm; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Division, StoltNielsen S.A. Indicted on Customer Allocation, Price Fixing, and Bid
Rigging Charges For Its Role in an International Parcel Tanker Shipping
Cartel (Sept. 6, 2006) ("The indictment charges Stolt-Nielsen and its
executives with serious antitrust crimes-- price fixing, customer allocation,
and bid rigging," said Thomas 0. Barnett, Assistant Attorney General in
charge of the Department's Antitrust Division. "Cracking down on
international cartels is the Antitrust Division's top priority and the
Division will continue its efforts to aggressively pursue such illegal
activity."), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases/
2006/218199.htm.
224 For example, 29 of 32 defendants indicted for antitrust offenses
pled guilty during the 12-month period ending Sept. 30, 2005. Statistics
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the follow-up private class-action antitrust lawsuits are
settled, little, if any, of the incriminating evidence ever
comes to light. Other than a few notable antitrust trials,
such as the Department of Justice's civil monopoly case
against Microsoft, most of the Department's civil and
criminal antitrust prosecutions get little, if any, press."' As
the head of the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division
said in 1954, and which holds true today,
Our cases are concluded, our decrees are entered, our
fines are paid, and that is pretty much the end of the
matter so far as the world is concerned. The ultimate
effectiveness of particular cases is not advertised,
is
226
seldom ascertained, and never catalogued.
The current head of the Antitrust Division stressed the
importance for enforcers to publicize their anti-cartel efforts:
Over time, publicizing enforcement efforts can even
change the norm of what is acceptable or tolerated in
the marketplace. A chief difficulty faced by any
enforcement program-antitrust or otherwise-is the
tendency of deviant behavior, left unchecked, to
become the norm. If criminal activity is presented as
inevitable, some will simply accept it as a cost of
doing business and a few will even seek to
participate, seeing an opportunity for a share of
anticompetitive gains. Aggressive enforcement comDiv., Office of Judges Programs, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, 2005
JudicialBusiness: Annual Report of the DirectorLeonidas Ralph Mecham,

Table D-4 (Defendants Disposed of, by Type of Disposition and Major
Offense), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2005/appendices/
d4.pdf.
221 See Sandra S. Evans & Richard J. Lundman, Newspaper Coverage
of Corporate Price-Fixing, 21 CRIMINOLOGY 529 (1983) (noting that the

press coverage of the 1970's folding-carton antitrust cases was similar to
the 1960's heavy electrical antitrust cases in that the newspapers failed to
provide frequent, prominent, and criminally-oriented coverage of the pricefixing cases. Very few individuals or corporations were identified in
newspaper articles describing the sentencing, and few articles that
described the sentencing indicated that the individuals were guilty of
criminal acts.).
226

1954 Barnes Speech, supranote 34.
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bined with appropriate publicity helps break this
cycle, reminding market participants that they do
not have to tolerate the criminals in their midst. If
publicity is particularly effective, it can lead both to
more complaints and to complaints that are more
actionable, as cartel victims and amnesty applicants
learn to give enforcers the specific information
necessary to make a case. And finally, let us not
forget the reality
that
criminal
anti-cartel
enforcement is a government function, and government resources are always scarce.
Antitrust
enforcers should not be shy about publicizing the fact
that anti-cartel enforcement is, on a dollar-for-dollar
basis, among the best uses of law enforcement
resources from the standpoint of consumer welfare.227
Consequently, one inexpensive mechanism for the
enforcement agencies is to publicize the moral wrongfulness
of the act itself as well as the social harm and to provide
examples from specific victims to "rekindle in the public a
sense of the immorality of the defendants' acts."228 The
OECD recently complemented the Canadian competition
authority's media strategy, which includes emphasizing in
the news releases the harm caused by the cartels on
consumers as well as the penalties involved.229 A recent
Canadian media analysis "showed the positive result of this
active strategy as the number of media reports dealing
227 Thomas 0. Barnett, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Speech at 11th Annual Competition Law &
Policy Workshop, European Union Institute: Seven Steps to Better Cartel
Enforcement, (June 2, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
speeches/216453.htm; see also OECD 3rd Report, supra note 32, at 18
(raising public awareness of harm caused by cartels important part of
nation's enforcement efforts).
228 Harry V. Ball & Lawrence M. Friedman, The Use of Criminal
Sanctions in the Enforcement of Economic Legislation:A Sociological View,
17 STAN. L. REV. 197, 222 (1965); see also OECD Cartel Report, supra note
35, at 5, 6 (noting that an important step in enhancing anti-cartel
enforcement is "improving public knowledge about the nature of this
conduct and the harm that it causes [which] would bolster popular support
for more effective action against it.").
229 OECD 3rd Report, supra note 32, at 19.
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annually with criminal enforcement activities is substantial
and increasing."23 °
Besides publicizing these concrete
examples, the federal antitrust agencies may also want to
conduct more empirical economic work on the net harm of
cartels.
2. Internalizing the Moral Norm
A second benefit of supplementing antitrust crimes with
morality is the internalization of the moral norm, which
reduces policing costs.23 ' Criminal law and punishments
may serve as "moral lesson[s]" designed to "inspire the public
with sentiments of aversion towards those pernicious habits
and dispositions with which the offence appears to be
connected; and thereby to inculcate the opposite beneficial
habits and dispositions."23 2
The utility of the business
executives internalizing such moral norms is critical, as the
Department of Justice "cannot hope to monitor the
competitive behavior of every business entity in our economy
any more than the Internal Revenue Service can monitor
effectively every taxpayer."23 3 Ultimately, the Department of
Justice must hope that corporate executives internalize the
prohibition against price fixing and refrain from
communicating pricing and other commercially sensitive
matters with their competitors.
230
231

Id.
Shavell, supra note 44, at 403; Harold G. Grasmick & Donald E.

Green, Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval and Internalization as
Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 71 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 325 (1980).

Some have argued that this internalized self-monitoring process
"represents an important constraint on individual maximizing behavior
that needs to be incorporated in economic models of individual action."
Gary M. Anderson & Robert D. Tollison, Morality and Monopoly: The
ConstitutionalPolitical Economy of Religious Rules, 12 CATO J. 373, 375
(1992) (citing DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1986); David Levy,
Rational Choice and Morality: Economics and Classical Philosophy,
HISTORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 14 (1982); VICTOR VANBERG, MORALITY AND
ECONOMICS: DE MORIBus EST DISPUTANDUM (1988)).
232 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALs

n.1 (Prometheus Books 1988).
233

Baker & Reeves, supra note 64, at 620.
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One may wonder whether business executives already
refrain from impermissible anti-competitive communications. Many do, but cartel behavior still persists. A moral
message may serve as an additional counterweight to
corporate pressures to increase profitability. As companies
are a composite of executives, seldom will the corporate
message be harmonious. Ethical transgressions in organizations, according to several studies, are attributable to
many factors, including "unclear standards, pressure to
perform, and intolerance of criticism."23 4 For example, after
being involved in over a dozen antitrust cases in the 1940s,
General Electric disseminated in the 1950s its written policy
that employees must "conform strictly to the antitrust
laws."235
But GE executives were under tremendous
corporate pressure to meet their departments' financial
goals. Each year, these managers had to budget for more
profit as a percent of net sales as well as a larger percentage
of available business. 236
These "reach" goals were
unattainable, according to some mid-level GE executives,
absent collusion. If they failed to meet these "reach" goals,
the GE executives could expect to be fired. As one GE
executive rationalized, collusion may have been illegal "but it
wasn't unethical."2 37
An additional critical variable may be whether a person's
38
co-workers or peers are engaged in the illegal behavior.
234

Muel

Kaptein

et

al.,

Demonstrating Ethical Leadership by

Measuring Ethics: A Survey of U.S. Public Servants, 7 PUBLIC INTEGRITY
299, 305 (2005); studies cited supra note 154.
235 Smith, Electrical Conspiracy(PartI), supra note 33, at 135.
236 Id. at 172.
237 Id.
at 135. But after serving time in prison, a former general
manager and vice president of GE observed that "realizing the taint of a
jail sentence is enough to put some fea2 into people, and then once fear is
in people then they start looking at the moral values a little bit on whether
or not [price fixing] makes any sense." Baker & Reeves, supra note 64, at
622 (quoting Administered Prices: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. 16790 (1961)).
2" Grasmick & Green, supra note 231, at 329; Dan M. Kahan, supra
note 219, at 354-55 (stating that individuals' decisions to commit crimes
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For example, in the Department of Justice's NASDAQ
antitrust case, an accepted business norm among the
NASDAQ market-makers was not to trade for certain stocks
in odd-eighth increments (such as quoting a bid or ask price
for that stock at $10 1/8 or $10 3/8) but only in even-eighth
increments (such as $10 1/4 or $10 1/2).239 This quoting
convention, according the Department of Justice's civil
complaint, had the effect of increasing the spread and the
After reaching this
NASDAQ market-makers' profits.
common understanding to adhere to this quoting convention,
the defendants, which included all the leading Wall Street
investment firms, allegedly used peer pressure to enforce it.
According to the Department of Justice's complaint, Wall
Street executives made it known throughout the industry
that it was "unethical" or "unprofessional" for a market
maker to "break the spread" by using odd-eighth quotes in
stocks with dealer spreads of 3/4s of a point or greater and
accused market makers who did so of "making a Chinese
market."2 40 This peer pressure also included coercing noncomplying market makers to adhere to the common
understanding. Such coercive tactics included, among other
things, making telephone calls to market makers who had
violated the quoting convention or narrowed the inside
are responsive to decisions of other individuals and not just the price of
the crime).
239 See Complaint, United States v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 169
1:96cv05313), available at
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (No.
F.R.D.
532
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/fO7O0/O740.htm. As alleged in the civil
complaint, from at least as early as 1989 through 1996, a common
understanding arose among the defendants and other Nasdaq marketmakers concerning, among other things, the manner in which bids and
asks would be displayed on Nasdaq. Under this quoting convention,
stocks with a dealer spread of 3/4 point or greater were quoted in eveneighths (quarters). Under the quoting convention, market makers use
odd-eighth fractions in their bid and ask prices only if they first narrow
their dealer spread in the stock in question to less than 3/4 of a point. The
defendants entered into a consent decree with the Department of Justice,
and later in 1998 settled a private class-action complaint for over one
billion dollars, which is one of the larger settlements in the history of the
Sherman Act.
41.
240 Id. at
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spread, or refusing or threatening to refuse to deal with
traders and firms that violated the quoting convention.24 '
Consequently, unlike white collar criminals who can
weigh, and switch between, the legitimate earnings and
illegitimate gains (such as through insider trading), an
executive engaging in price fixing may have higher switching
costs. The antitrust violator, after all, colludes with the
other major companies in that industry. To refrain from this
illegal behavior, she may not only have to leave her employer
but the relevant market altogether.
Interestingly, an empirical analysis of successfully
prosecuted cartels between 1910 and 1972 showed that
cartels where a trade association facilitated collusion had
nearly four times the number of participants as when no
trade association was involved.242 Thus, peer pressure and
fear of social disapproval may outweigh the threat of any
legal punishment (especially if the illegal action is
considered morally neutral).
Moreover, company executives may have different
perspectives. Corporate higher-ups, as in one study, might
view the price-fixing as "isolated incidents of human
weakness tempted by the prevailing low morals in a few
isolated industry subcultures." 24 3 In contrast, the mid-level
managers closer to those convicted for price-fixing may
attribute the blame to the conflicting company goals or moral
gray zones where "[tihe need to survive conflicts with the

241

242

Id.
Where trade associations were involved, the mean number of

colluding firms was 33.6, and the median was 14 firms; in cases involving
price-fixing cartels (without a trade association involved), the mean was
8.3 firms and the median was 6 firms. Arthur G. Fraas & Douglas F.
Greer, Market Structure & Price Collusion: An Empirical Analysis, 26 J.
INDUS. ECON. 21, 36, 41 (1977); see also OECD Cartel Report, supra note
35, at 7 (one characteristic that recurred repeatedly in a survey of 119
cases prosecuted by 15 OECD member countries between 1996 and 2000
was the existence of an industry trade association that provided the
opportunity for conspirators to meet and agree).
24 Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, Executive Apologies for Price Fixing: Role
Biased Perceptions of Causality, 24 AcAD. MGMT. J. 192, 195 (1981).
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drive to be super clean."2 44 The lower-level executives
engaged in the price-fixing might offer several justifications:
they are only seeking a "fair" profit, their customers are
unethical in lying about the low prices charged by the other
competitors, and with the excess capacity, eventually the
ruinous competition will lead to a far worse outcome of plant
closings and layoffs.24 5 With such competing norms (deciding
to bid rig to prevent layoffs during the Christmas holidays),
the illegality of the actions of hard-core cartels becomes more
relative and less absolute. But if the individuals face not
only the risk of incarceration, but also the attendant
deterrents of moral guilt and social disapproval, this may
raise the ante on the competing norm.
3. Potential to Reduce Enforcement Costs
Although developing a moral norm and educating society
about it may have high fixed costs, once that moral norm is
internalized, self-policing reduces enforcement costs. Given
the difficulty in detecting hard-core cartel behavior,
internalization of the moral standard and the concomitant
guilt when breaching the standard would apply even when
the government is not looking. It can also reduce the
likelihood of false positives and negatives since, absent selfdeception, "a person will naturally know what he did and
why."2 46 In contrast, imprisonment as the primary deterrent
for morally-neutral behavior entails not only the costs in
24

Id. at 196 (quoting other executives who made similar justifications

by noting the power of big buyers, the drive to stay alive, or the belief that
they were not engaging in this behavior for their own behalf but for the
betterment of the company); Andrew Hopkins, Controlling Corporate
Deviance, 18 CRIMINOLOGY 198, 201 (1981) (noting that some corporate
cultures shelter top executives from bad news).
245 When the criminal law "earns a reputation as a reliable statement
of what the community perceives as condemnable and not condemnable,
people are more likely to defer to its commands as morally authoritative,
at least in borderline cases where the propriety of certain conduct, or the
degree of its impropriety, is unsettled or ambiguous." Paul H. Robinson,
The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert, 76 B.U.L. REv.
201, 212 (1996).
24 Shavell, supra note 44, at 404.
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incarcerating these executives, but the lost productivity.
Guilt, which does not entail such administrative expenses, is
not only "a socially cheaper form of sanction than
imprisonment" but is also immediate.2 47
4. Shaming and Praise
A fourth benefit of supplementing antitrust crimes with
morality is the fear of informal sanctions from peers and
social disapproval generally.2 48 Shaming, "the process by
which citizens publicly and self-consciously draw attention to
the bad dispositions or actions of an offender, as a way of
punishing him for having those dispositions or engaging in
those actions,"249 has long been a tool to encourage or deter
behavior. Julius Caesar, for example, shamed his mutinous
soldiers with only one word.2 50 Disgruntled consumers can
now use the Internet to shame corporations.25 ' Under the
Sentencing Guidelines, a corporate offender can be ordered
"at its expense and in the format and media specified by the
court, to publicize the nature of the offense committed, the
fact of conviction, the nature of the punishment imposed, and
the steps that will be taken to prevent the recurrence of
similar offenses."25 2 Similarly, although more empirical work
is required, "much anecdotal evidence suggests that people
sacrifice substantial amounts of money to reward or punish

247

Id. at 405.

248

See, e.g., Grasmick & Green, supra note 231, at 328; Kahan, supra

note 219, at 384; Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar
Criminals: A Proposalfor Reform of the FederalSentencing Guidelines,42
J.L. & ECON. 365 (1999); David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law,
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811 (2001).
249
250

Kahan & Posner, supranote 248, at 368.
Julius Caesar quelled an army's mutiny by calling the disobedient

soldiers "quirites,"meaning citizens. TAcITUS, THE ANNALS 1.42 25 (Modern
Library 2003).
2'1 Kim Hart, Angry Customers Use Web to Shame Firms, WASH. POST,
July 5, 2006, at D1.
252 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8D1.4 (2006).
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kind or unkind behavior."2 53 Thus, shaming is nicely aligned
with a traditional view of criminal law, as it clearly
communicates society's moral opprobrium toward certain
conduct.2 54 Earlier studies have found support for shaming,
finding that social factors such as "morality, peer
involvement and threat of social disapproval were the main
factors influencing choices in terms of compliance with the
law."2 55 Absent a threat of being exposed as an offender to
one's peers who would then impose informal sanctions, the
threat of legal punishment by itself may be ineffective. 6
One interesting study of Norwegian commercial
fishermen illustrates how shaming can be an effective
deterrent.
Under the optimal deterrence theory, the
fishermen should have been frequently violating the
regulations limiting the total amount that could be
harvested from a certain fish stock given their high economic
incentives to cheat and the low risk of being detected by
enforcement authorities.25 7
These fishermen, however,
generally complied with the government regulations, not
because of any fear of the legal sanctions, but because of a
moral obligation to obey the law and to maintain their
standing in their community of about 390 inhabitants.
253

Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and

Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1281, 1283 (1993).
25
Shaming is also consistent with general deterrence. To effectively
shame, the courts and antitrust enforcers would want to widely
publicize-especially to the defendants' industry peers-the nature of the
defendants' criminal act, its net harm, and the punishment.
25 See Stig S. Gezelius, Do Norms Count? State Regulation and
Compliance in a Norwegian FishingCommunity, 45 AcTA SOCIOLOGICA 305

(2002) (citing TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); Nehemia
Friedland et al., Some Determinantsof the Violation of Rules, 3 J. APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL. 103 (1973); Grasmick & Green, supra note 231; Robert F.
Meier & Weldon T. Johnson, Deterrence as Social Control: The Legal and
Extralegal Production of Conformity, 42 AM. Soc. REV. 292 (1977);
Raymond Paternoster et al., Perceived Risk and Social Control: Do
Sanctions Really Deter, 17 LAw & Soc'Y. REV. 457 (1983); Matthew
Silberman, Toward a Theory of CriminalDeterrence, 41 AM. Soc. REV. 442
(1976)).
26 Grasmick & Green, supra note 231, at 329.
257 Gezelius, supra note 255, at
308.

No. 3:4431

MORALITY AND ANTITRUST

Abiding the law, according to the study's author, was an
important part of the Norwegian ideal of the good citizen.258
The one exception was when this moral obligation clashed
with another moral norm, namely the right to secure an
income "good enough to stay in business and to make a
reasonable living of it."259 The law could be occasionally
violated without provoking widespread condemnation within
the community when trumped by this more fundamental
moral norm (such as a fisherman's needs to provide for his
family during a particular economic hardship).'
But illegal
fishing for the purpose of maximizing profits was met with
"severe social degradation and potentially also exclusion."2 61
Shaming, however, may not represent the elixir for
deterring all criminal offenses.
First, unlike a small
Norwegian fishing village where "social transparency is
high" and a "fisherman's professional behavior and qualities
affect his general standing in the community as a matter of
course, "262 some may question the power of morality, peer
involvement, and the threat of social disapproval in the
United States, where citizens may be indifferent to those
who live several cul-de-sacs or apartment buildings away.2 63
Second, absent any moral outrage over the criminalized act
(or its social harm), shaming would likely be ineffectiveakin to publishing on the Internet the names of all
individuals caught speeding on a federal highway.
If
indiscriminately applied to both morally-neutral and morally

262

Id. at 308-09.
Id. at 309.
Id.
Id. at 310.
Id. at 307.

26

One study concerned the rate office workers paid for bagels under

2_8

259
260

261

an honor system, by leaving the amount owed in a box. The data showed
that smaller offices with a few dozen employees paid three to five percent
more than an office with a few hundred employees. STEVEN D. LEVIT &
STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS 48 (2005); see also Ernst Fehr &
Simon Gachter, Reciprocity and Economics: The Economic Implications of
Homo Reciprocans, 42 EUR. ECON. REV. 845, 854-57 (1998) (arguing that
reciprocity provides "a key mechanism for the enforcement of social
norms," which in turn shape human behavior).
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reprehensible conduct, shaming may also desensitize the
public.26 4 Third, clumsy attempts to shame may backfire and
arouse pity or sympathy for the wrongdoer.26 5 Fourth, the
effectiveness of shaming might vary depending on the ease
with which consumers and other stakeholders can discipline
a corporate offender. Where the corporation's crimes directly
harm its customers, employees, suppliers or other
stakeholders, the reputational costs, as reflected by the
incremental decline in share price beyond the anticipated
monetary fines and damages, can be quite large.2 66 In other
instances where the harm is indirect, such as environmental
offenses, the company's stock price may not reflect such
reputational losses, perhaps because those directly harmed
24

See Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture and American Criminal

Law, 89 MIcH. L. REV. 1880, 1930 (1991) (contending that the overuse of
shaming lessens its effectiveness as a deterrent).
265 For example, the convicted price fixers in Judge Renfrew's
experiment gave speeches to the business and legal community on their
crimes. Instead of eliciting outrage, the defendants frequently elicited
sympathy from audience members responding to the judge's survey. Many
audience members believed that these price fixers were ignorant, wellintentioned business executives who had unwittingly fallen into the trap of
a vague law, a conclusion inconsistent with the defendants' own
admissions of unlawful conduct before the court. As Judge Renfrew
admitted, to the extent his court-ordered speeches "created a false
impression of the defendants' conduct and the character of the antitrust
laws, they were counterproductive." Renfrew, supra note 34, at 599-600.
The prosecution of one company under Australia's Trade Practices Act had
a positive effect on sales (fifteen percent increase), which management
attributed to the favorable publicity their product received during the
prosecution. Hopkins, supra note 244, at 211. Although the sample size
was small (nineteen companies), Hopkins found the absence of any
discernible consumer reaction against the prosecuted companies as one
the more striking findings of his study. Despite the lack of consumer
reaction, Hopkins found that the real mechanism of deterrence was the
fear of loss of reputation of the individual managers, who "felt personally
stigmatized by any imputation that the company had acted unethically or
illegally." Id. at 212.
26
The decline in the stock price of publicly-held companies might
reflect not only the anticipated monetary penalty but reputational costs as
well.
Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Reputational Penalties for
Environmental Violations: Empirical Evidence, 48 J.L. & ECON. 653, 655

(2005).
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(the citizens living near the defendant's plant) are not the
company's customers, employees, or suppliers.26 7 Some pricefixers consequently might be more difficult to discipline by
withholding purchases.2 8 Suppose hypothetically that the
nation's yeast suppliers colluded. Although a key ingredient
for bread and other baking products, yeast typically
represents a small cost component for bread manufacturers,
which in turn sell their bread to consumers under their own
or private labels. While the public may express moral
disapproval toward the yeast manufacturers, it is unlikely
that consumers will stop purchasing bread at the local
supermarket (and if they did, they would punish the
innocent flour producers as well as bread producers).
Similarly, because yeast is a critical ingredient with no ready
substitutes, the bread bakers, absent new entry or vertical
integration, would have to continue doing business with the
yeast manufacturers post-conviction.
But even in these situations where the public cannot
directly punish the antitrust offender, the court or
competition officials should employ shaming. After all,
individuals, not corporations, meet in hotel rooms to fix
prices, punish defections, and ultimately cooperate in an
investigation, and criminal antitrust enforcement needs to
personalize the crime to effectively deter future pricefixing.269 A Canadian antitrust official, for example, observed
267

Id.

While some antitrust offenders are household names, some of the
top offenders (in terms of amount of fines) involve unfamiliar foreign or
domestic companies producing unfamiliar products such as graphite
electrodes, sorbates, parcel tanking shipping, sodium gluconate, and
commercial explosives. It may be difficult to shame these foreign
executives, when their countries do not view price-fixing as immoral (or
even illegal).
269 As one antitrust defense counsel said, "There should be certainty
that the right people will be persistently prosecuted and sent to jail." Tefft
W. Smith, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Comments for the Antitrust
Modernization Commission Hearing on Criminal Antitrust Remedies 11
(Nov. 3, 2005), available at http://www.amc.gov/commissionhearings/
criminal-remedies.htm. He recommended that the jail sentence be the
headline, and the corporate fine be the by-line. Id. at 23. The Department
268
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that the "negative publicity surrounding a conviction as well
as wavering consumer confidence can act as deterrents and
may have a greater impact than criminal penalties alone."2 7 °
Business executives may be "essentially motivated by the
desire to achieve a positive image by winning acceptance or
status in the eyes of others."27 1
Currently, given the high percentage of settlements,
corporations and their top executives often skirt such
shaming. As one antitrust commentator noted, "Any stigma
of the criminal prosecution that filters through to the
unidentified and unindicted responsible corporate officers
272
may be so diluted as to be ineffectual as a deterrent."
Although the Department of Justice has been active in
highlighting the prosecutions of these hard-core cartels
through speeches and press releases, there is always room
for improvement. As the former head of the Department of
Justice's Antitrust Division said, "Until those who commit
antitrust crimes are dealt with as if they were truly
criminals, other business persons and the public will not
regard them as criminals, and we shall have lost the social
stigma that is so much a part of general deterrence." 273 No
doubt creative shaming techniques exist, especially with the
Internet. To the extent consistent with its legal and ethical
obligations,27 4 the Department of Justice could shame

of Justice official also stressed individual accountability and the
importance of jail sentences, which is borne out by the record number of
months antitrust offenders have been incarcerated. 2005 Hammond AMC
Testimony, supra note 41, at 55.
270 OECD Cartel Sanction Report, supra note 44, at 49.
One
unidentified antitrust agency in the ICN survey noted that besides
monetary penalties, damage to reputation may deter cartel activity. ICN
Report, supra note 15, at 54. Another unidentified agency also implied
that press coverage may constitute an effective penalty. Id.
27 Dennis H. Wrong, The Oversocialized Conception of Men in Modern
Sociology, 26 AM. Soc. REV. 183, 185 (1961).
272 Kramer, Comment, supra note 61, at 539-40.
27 Baker Speech, supranote 119, at 534.
274 Such shaming sanctions may be reviewed on appeal under a
standard of judicial discretion, as to whether the shaming condition
violates the fundamental goal of probation-rehabilitation of the offender.
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corporate antitrust offenders with a "Hall of Shame" on its
Internet site that includes the mug shots of the convicted
executives, fuller descriptions of their role in defrauding
customers, and testimonials by victims of how they were
harmed.
An antitrust commentator once suggested
converting a famous hotel in Washington, D.C. into a prison
with glass floors and ceilings, where the public could inspect
the antitrust violators along with other white-collar
criminals, "converse with them or jeer at them as they
pleased."275
For corporations convicted of antitrust crimes, the
Department of Justice may recommend, under the
Sentencing Guidelines, that the corporate offenders at their
expense publicize the antitrust violation and their steps to
prevent the recurrence of similar offenses.2 76 Depending on
its heavy-handedness, this court-ordered self-criticism could
run afoul of First Amendment principles or otherwise be
ineffectual.277 The Department of Justice, however, could
identify in its press release and on the Department's

In addition, the shaming element could be challenged as "cruel and
unusual punishment" under the Eighth Amendment. Ryan J. Huschka,
Comment, Sorry For The Jackass Sentence: A Critical Analysis Of The
Constitutionality Of Contemporary Shaming Punishments, 54 U. KAN. L.
REV. 803 (2006); Aaron S. Book, Note, Shame On You: An Analysis Of
Modern Shame Punishment As An Alternative To Incarceration,40 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 653 (1999).
275 Victor H. Kramer, Jail Sentences for Price Fixers? Yes, But What
Kind of Jail and How Long?, 46 ANTITRUST L.J. 534, 536 (1977). Near the
speaker button outside the rooms, Kramer proposed that the history of
each criminal's offense be related. Id. at 536. Kramer argued that the
"sentence should be calculated to subject the defendant to maximum
exposure for his crime for the shortest possible period of time that will
have the deterrent effect." Id. at 535.
276 Sentencing Guidelines for the United States Courts, 18 U.S.C.S.
Appx. § 8D1.4(a) (2006).
277 For example, Judge Renfrew's sentence, which required the
antitrust defendants to make an oral presentation to business and civic
court-ordered speeches about their crimes, offended some. One attorney
said the court-ordered speeches "smack[ed] too much of the self-criticism
demanded of 'sinners' by Red China and other doctrinaire Communist
nations." Renfrew, supra note 34, at 609.
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Internet site the board of directors and executives who
directly managed the price-fixers, publicize how the company
profited during this period (including the bonuses and
compensation paid to these corporate executives), and
identify all of the company's earlier convictions.278
But aside from shaming, another strong behavioral
motivator is praise. In reading of late both child rearing and
dog obedience books, I was struck by a consistent theme
throughout, namely, the use of praise, rather than
punishment (or the threat thereof).27 9 Optimal deterrence
theory is premised solely on avoidance of costly punishment,
which has proven ineffectual by itself to develop positive
habits in either children or puppies. Why should corporate
278

Some shareholder

activists, for example, effectively

employed

shaming by naming the corporate directors in their advertisements in the
WALL STREET JOURNAL. Skeel, supra note 248, at 1847-48. Moreover, a
publicly-held company convicted of a federal crime could be required to
prominently disclose who was involved in the decision-making process
with respect to that crime, what were their justifications for these actions,
if supervisors failed to discover the crime, what were the reasons for their
failure, how are they being held accountable for any derelictions, and the
company's efforts to prevent recurrence of such criminal offenses. See
Lawrence E. Mitchell & Theresa A. Gabaldon, If I Only Had a Heart: Or,
How Can We Identify a Corporate Morality, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1645, 1656
(2002) (demanding corporations to disclose decision-making process could
help ensure greater individual accountability and moral responsibility).
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission considers many of these
factors when determining its enforcement responses, by asking inter alia
(i) what compliance procedures were already in place to prevent the
misconduct, (ii) did senior management participate in, or turn a blind eye
toward, obvious indicia of misconduct, (iii) did the company immediately
stop the misconduct, (iv) what actions did the company take against
culpable individuals, and (v) did the company adopt and ensure
enforcement of new and more effective internal controls and procedures
designed to prevent a recurrence of the misconduct. Barry W. Rashkover,
Reforming CorporationsThrough Prosecution: Perspectives from an SEC
Enforcement Lawyer, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 535, 539-40 (2004).
279 See, e.g., THE MONKS OF NEW SKETE, HOW TO BE YOUR DOG'S BEST
FRIEND (Little Brown 1978); T. BERRY BRAZELTON & JOSHUA D. SPARROW,
TOUCHPOINTS THREE TO Six (Da Capo Press 2001); AMERICAN ACADEMY OF
PEDIATRICS, CARING FOR YOUR SCHOOL-AGE CHILD: AGES

Schor ed.-in-chief Bantam 1999).

5 TO 12 (Edward L.
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executives be any different?
Studies have found that
individuals exposed to information that emphasized moral
duty and praise outperformed those exposed solely to
monetary incentives8 ° or information emphasizing the
possible penalties.28 1 Executives may quickly adapt once
exposed to their peers' attitudes.2 82 Instead of shaming, the
government can praise corporations that effectively instill in
their employees the moral norms that oppose hard-core
cartels. Such praiseworthy behavior may arise if a company
refuses an invitation to collude and promptly reports it to the
antitrust enforcers. 8 3

280

Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 153, at 578-80 (discussing a study

involving high school students during Israel's donation days, whereby
students solely given speech of public benefits collected more money than
group given speech but also financial incentives).
281 One study involving citizens preparing their income tax statements
attempted to determine the effect of sanction threats and to compare them
with appeals to conscience. Richard D. Schwartz & Sonya Orleans, On
Legal Sanctions, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 274, 296-99 (1967). For the "sanctiontreated" group, the emphasis was on the severity of possible jail sentences
and the likelihood that tax violators would be apprehended.
The
"conscience" group was exposed to questions "accentuating moral reasons
for compliance with tax law." Id. at 287. The conscience appeal, overall,
had a stronger effect on income reported than did the threat of sanctions.
The study's results gave some evidence that although the threat of
punishment can increase compliance (particularly among the wealthiest
respondents), appeals to conscience (particularly among the collegeeducated respondents) can be a more effective instrument than sanction
threat for securing compliance.
282 Kahan, supra note 219, at 359 (citing experimental and empirical
data).
21 Some may question the motives of companies that implicate their
competitors (given the strategic advantage in having the competitors
mired in costly and time-consuming litigation). But the accuser's motive is
less significant than its veracity. No doubt a risk of false positives exist,
which may be tempered somewhat by 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) (2001)
(federal crime to "knowingly and willfully" make "any materially false,
fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation"). Alternatively, the
government could highlight effective corporate compliance programs in
speeches or on the Internet (but even here it may be embarrassing if that
company shortly thereafter is convicted of a serious federal or state crime).
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B. Potential Risks if Antitrust Violations Deemed
Immoral
The first risk of antitrust violations being deemed
immoral is the defensibility of antitrust exemptions for cartel
behavior. As the ICN noted, "Virtually every jurisdiction has
exemptions from anti-cartel laws, either in connection with
regulation of an industry or because legislative choice has
been made not to apply antitrust laws to certain conduct or
industries."284

The Department of Justice Manual cites

agriculture," 5

export

2"
285

activities,"'

insurance,"'

labor,"'

ICN Report, supra note 15, at 13.
See 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2005) (permitting, among other things,

operation of agricultural or horticultural mutual assistance organizations
when such organizations do not have capital stock or not conducted for
profit); Capper-Volstead Agricultural Producers' Associations Act, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 291-292 (2005) (allowing persons engaged in the production of
agricultural products to act together for purpose of "collectively processing,
preparing for market, handling, and marketing" their products and
permits cooperatives to have "market agencies in common"); CapperVolstead Cooperative Marketing Act of 1926, 7 U.S.C. § 455 (2005)
(authorizing agricultural producers and associations to acquire and
exchange past, present, and prospective pricing, production, and
marketing data); Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 7 U.S.C.
§ 608 (2005) (providing U.S. Secretary of Agriculture authority to enter
into (i) marketing agreements with producers and processors of
agricultural commodities and (ii) marketing orders, except for milk, that
control amount of an agricultural product reaching the market and thus
serve to enhance the price).
286 Export Trading Company Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-21 (2005)
(limited antitrust immunity for export trade, export trade activities and
methods of operation specified in certificate of review issued by Secretary
of Commerce with Attorney General's concurrence); Webb-Pomerene
Export Trade Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-64 (2005) (antitrust immunity for
formation and operation of associations of otherwise competing businesses
to engage in collective export sales; immunity does not extend to actions
that have an anticompetitive effect within United States or that injure
domestic competitors of members of export associations).
287 McCarran-Ferguson Insurance Regulation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 10111015 (2005) (exempting from antitrust laws "business of insurance" to the
extent "regulated by state law").
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defense

preparedness,

290

newspapers,291

professional sports, 29 2 small business joint ventures, 293 and

288

15 U.S.C. § 17 (2005) (providing that labor of human being is not a

commodity or article of commerce and that the Act permits labor
organizations to carry out their legitimate objectives); 29 U.S.C. § 52
(2005) (immunizing collective activity by employees relating to dispute
concerning terms or conditions of employment); Norris-LaGuardia Act of
1932, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-110, 113-115 (2005) (providing that U.S. courts do
not have jurisdiction to issue restraining orders or injunctions against
certain union activities on the basis that such activities constitute
unlawful combination or conspiracy under antitrust laws).
289 Fishermen's Collective Marketing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 521-522 (2005)
(permitting persons engaged in the fishing industry as fishermen to act
together for purpose of catching, producing, preparing for market,
processing, handling and marketing their products).
290 Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2158 (2006)
(providing that the President or his delegate, in conjunction with Attorney
General, may approve voluntary agreements among various industry
groups for development of preparedness programs to meet potential
national emergencies. Persons participating in such an agreement are
immunized from the operation of antitrust laws with respect to good faith
activities undertaken to fulfill their responsibilities under agreement).
291 Newspaper Preservation Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1804
(2006) (granting limited exemption for joint operating arrangements
between newspapers to share production facilities and combine
commercial operations, provided that newspapers retain separate editorial
and reporting staffs, determine their editorial policies independently, and
so long as one newspaper party to the joint venture is classified as failing).
292 Sports
Broadcasting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1295 (2006)
(exempting, with some limitations, agreements among professional
football, baseball, basketball, and hockey teams to negotiate jointly,
through their leagues, for the sale of television rights).
29 Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 638-640 (2006) (Small Business
Administration may, after consultation with Attorney General and Chair
of FTC, and with Attorney General's prior written approval, approve any
agreement between small business firms providing for a joint program of
research and development if Administrator finds that such program will
strengthen free enterprise system and national economy. To the extent
President has delegated his authority under § 640, the Department of
Justice may also be asked to approve, on Attorney General's behalf,
proposed voluntary agreements or programs among small business
concerns to further objectives of Small Business Act found to be in the
public interest as contributing to national defense).
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local governments2 94 as enjoying limited or general immunity
from the federal antitrust laws. One benefit of morallyneutral regulations is their mutability: such regulations can
be readily altered to reflect these detailed nuances,
exceptions and clarifications.2 95 If the moral wrongfulness
and social harms from hard-core cartels are widely
publicized, it will be harder to justify such antitrust
exemptions for special interest groups. A Commissioner of
the current Antitrust Modernization Commission poignantly
raised this very issue:
[O]ne difficulty I have with the level of criminal jail
terms and fines is because so much of commerce is
price-fixed every day... under various immunities and
exemptions, and... if you're out in Iowa and one guy's
a farm and the other guy is a farm implement guy
and they both are good price fixers, one goes to jail
and the other has a big dinner in his honor. He's on
the cover of the farm journals, the man of the year. I
have always thought that the one byproduct of that is
that people don't in this country view price fixing as
evil as they should because so many of their
neighbors do it under immunities and exemptions....
How do you reconcile the ever increasing demand for
higher fines and higher sentences with the free pass
to so much of the price fixing that goes on under the
immunities and exemptions?2 96

Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (2006)
(providing antitrust immunity for local government officials and
employees thereof acting in an official capacity with respect to actions
brought under 15 U.S.C. § 15 for damages, fees or costs. The Act provides
similar immunity for claims directed at a person, as that term is defined in
15 U.S.C. § 12, based on official action directed by local government).
299 Shavell, supra note 44, at 401.
296 Donald G. Kempf, Jr., Commissioner, Statement at the Antitrust
Modernization Commission Public Hearing, 81-2 (Nov. 3, 2005), available
at
http://www.amc.gov/commission hearings/criminalremedies.htm.
Judge Parsons similarly raised this discrepancy in explaining his
reluctance to sentence incarceration for all of the antitrust defendants in
United States v. Alton Box Board Co., No. 76 CR 199, 1977 WL 1374, at *6
(N.D. Ill. March 4, 1977). A related point is when an immunity for a
294
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Likewise, some of the participants in the notorious
electrical equipment cartels in the 1960s reported that "they
first experienced price fixing when they served as industry
representatives in federal price-control programs during
World War I. " 297
A second risk is that for moral norms to be effective, they
must be simple and unequivocal, e.g., "thou shall not"
prohibitions. This renders competition policy, with its many
permutations, immunities, and exceptions, an unsuitable
candidate.
Indeed, the fact that so many antitrust
immunities exist suggests its amorality, since it presumably
should be difficult to carve out immunities for immoral acts,
such as murder, theft, or torture.
It may be easy to proclaim "Thou Shall Not Price-Fix,"
but what is price-fixing?
In some highly concentrated
industries, competitors need not expressly collude to reach a
supracompetitive price. If the competitors fall short of
expressly agreeing and arrive at such a supracompetitive
price, through other facilitating devices, is such coordinated
behavior immoral, even if lawful?29 8 Likewise, competitors
regularly agree upon prices within a joint venture where
they also to varying degrees integrate resources and share
risks. If prices increase after the joint venture's formation,
does its morality depend on the participants' intent or the
degree of integration?
A critic may wonder whether it is the means (the illicit
agreement) or the ends (supracompetitive price, deadweight
loss, etc.) that render the act immoral. If it is the means,
how
does
the
moralist
reconcile
morally-neutral
anticompetitive actions that pose greater harm?
For
particular industry is lost, does the activity automatically become
immoral?
297 Ball & Friedman, supra note 228, at 221 (citing Smith, Electrical
Conspiracy (PartI), supra note 33, at 132, 136).
298 Short of specifically agreeing to fix prices, for example, competitors
may collude by signaling their intentions to each another by announcing in
advance a price increase, to see whether the other competitors will follow.
This may or may not violate the antitrust laws. See Maurice E. Stucke,
Evaluating the Risks of Increased Price Transparency, 19 ANTITRUST 81
(Spring 2005).
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example, if it is deemed immoral for two competitors to fix
prices, is it immoral if these two competitors merged solely to
raise prices? 299 Suppose one company, after unsuccessfully
attempting to collude with its competitor, acquires that
competitor, closes its plant, fires its workers, and raises
prices. Would that be any less immoral than the price-fixers
given the anticompetitive means and end? Aside from hardcore cartels, many legal activities may lead to supracompetitive prices, such as high tariffs on imported goods or
other regulatory barriers. Competitors with an evil intent
can petition the government for such protectionist measures,
which would result in supracompetitive pricing. Conversely,
what if the means were immoral, but the end was socially
beneficial? The government may want to discourage the
output of certain harmful activities, such as smoking. Would
price fixing in such industries be immoral, where the result
would be less output and fewer deaths? 0 0 Consequently,
9 See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 576 (1966)
(describing the defendant's monopoly that was perfected through its
acquisition of its significant competitors' controlling interests). In the EU,
unlike the United States, the European Court of Justice found that a firm
can abuse its dominant position where it has an administrative monopoly
and charges services fees which are disproportionate to the economic value
See Societd Civile Agricole du Centre
of the service provided.
d'Insdmination de la Crespelle v Cooperative d'Elevage et d'Ins~mination
Artificielle du Ddpartement de la Mayenne, Case C-323/93, 1994 ECR I5077, available at http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga-doc?smartapi!
This is still
celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numdoc=693J0323.
applied today. See also European Commission, European Policy and the
Consumer 4 (2004), available at http://europa.eu.intcomm/competition/
publications/consumer-en.pdf (noting that company can abuse its
dominant position by charging unreasonably high prices, which may
exploit customers).
300 In FTC v. Swedish Match, Judge Hogan juxtaposed the
government's efforts to block a merger in the chewing tobacco industry on
the theory that prices would likely increase post-merger, with the
government's attempt to stem the consumption of tobacco by increasing
the prices through taxes, regulating advertising, and decreasing the
amount of retail shelf-space devoted to this product. 131 F. Supp. 2d 151,
153 n.1 (D.D.C. 2000). The court appreciated the FTC's explanation that
consumption would not likely decline post-merger, but that consumers
would only pay more. Thus, the court saw no health benefits in permitting
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where does one draw the line between immoral and moral
anticompetitive conduct, and is the morality contingent on
the means (the agreement to collude), the end (the
supracompetitive price), or both? How principled would that
line be, given that the net harm from such "moral" conduct
may at times exceed the net harm from the immoral cartel?
A third criticism is whether antitrust can shoulder the
ethics of the marketplace. 01' Since the 1980s, antitrust's per
se liability standard is being applied to fewer practices. 2
the acquisition, and ultimately on antitrust principles, preliminarily
enjoined the transaction. Id.
301 Critics could cite Brooke Group for the proposition that the
antitrust laws do not create a federal law of unfair competition or purport
to afford remedies for all torts committed by or against persons engaged in
interstate commerce.
509 U.S. at 225 (discussing Section 2 of the
Sherman Act); see also Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821, 826 (1945) ("That
Act does not purport to afford remedies for all torts committed by or
against persons in interstate commerce."); Byars v. Bluff City News Co.,
609 F.2d 843, 855 (6th Cir. 1979) ("Even the use of unfair business
practices as part of the termination may not invoke sanction under the
antitrust laws."); Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 575 F.2d 564,
571 (5th Cir. 1978) ("Dealings between a manufacturer and its agents may
be arbitrary, unfair, or lacking in good business judgment, but, without
more, they will not violate the Act."); Merkle Press Inc. v. Merkle, 519 F.
Supp. 50, 54 (D. Md. 1981) ("Courts must be circumspect in converting
ordinary business torts into violations of the antitrust laws. To do so
would be to 'create a federal common law of unfair competition' which was
not the intent of the antitrust laws."); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Hoff & Thames,
Inc., 511 F. Supp. 1060, 1067 (S.D. Miss. 1981) (quoting Scranton
Construction v. Litton Industries Leasing Corp., 494 F.2d 778, 783 (5th
Cir. 1974)) (Sherman Act not "a panacea for all business affronts which
seem to fit nowhere else"); B&B Oil & Chem. Co. v. Franklin Oil Corp.,
293 F. Supp. 1313, 1317 (E.D. Mich. 1968) ("But the antitrust acts do not
purport to formulate a code of business morality. They are not tablets of
stone for the conduct of business generally."). But these cases assert the
unremarkable proposition that what is immoral may not necessarily be
anticompetitive. These cases do not address the issue here of whether a
per se illegal antitrust crime is immoral.
302 Most recently in State Oil Co. v. Khan, the Court in eliminating its
per se ban on vertical restraints on maximum price, described its role "in
recognizing and adapting to changed circumstances and the lessons of
accumulated experience." 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997). The Court may also have
the opportunity in its 2006-2007 term to reconsider the per se ban on
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Antitrust has moved away from criminal laws' absolute
commands of "moral propaganda" to a softer-edge pricing
standard, 30 3 namely the fact-intensive rule of reason
standard, which recognizes the difficulty of predicting ex ante
the likely competitive effects of many business activities.
The ethics of many business professions, such as law and
medicine, are largely governed by burgeoning regulations,
not the antitrust laws. 30 4 Given the contraction of antitrust's
per se rule and the growth of other laws, regulations, and
codes for various industry participants, critics could argue
that antitrust would be a poor vehicle to educate lawyers,
doctors, and other professionals of which practices are
ethical or unethical.3 0 5 Granted some business practices that
are allocatively inefficient may be construed as immoral, but
antitrust should not veer toward these normative judgments
of morality. If notions of morality were added to the courts'
and enforcers' review, the outcome could become so
uncertain and unpredictable as to chill many legitimate procertain vertical restraints on minimum price. Leegin Creative Leather
Prod., Inc. v. PSKS Inc., No. 04-41243, 171 Fed.Appx. 464, 2006 WL
690946 (5th Cir. Mar. 20, 2006), mandate stayed by (pendingpetition for
cert.), 2006 WL 2466835 (U.S. Aug 28, 2006), petition for cert. filed, 75
USLW 3207 (U.S. Oct. 4, 2006)(No. 06-480). At the 2006 American Bar
Association's Spring Antitrust Meeting, some panelists questioned, after
Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink., Inc., 126 U.S. 1281, 1292
(2006), the remaining vitality of what is left of the per se illegality to tying
arrangements. As the D.C. Circuit concluded, the Court has backed away
from fixed categories (like per se illegal v. rule of reason) toward a
continuum between per se illegality and rule of reason, depending on each
case's circumstances, details and the logic of the restraint. Polygram
Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
303 See Coffee, supra note 146, at 225-28 (discussing prohibiting versus
pricing standard).
' As the Court noted, other laws, for example, "'unfair competition'
laws, business tort laws, or regulatory laws, provide remedies for various
'competitive practices thought to be offensive to proper standards of
business morality.'" NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 137
(1998) (quoting 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw 1651d, at 78
(1996)).
305 See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 272
(7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.) (doubting that an antitrust case is the proper
forum for deciding questions of legal ethics).
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competitive business activities.
As entrenched special
interest groups spin their own moral version of events,
antitrust
enforcement
will
become
unprincipled.
Consequently, for these critics, antitrust's focus should
remain on allocative efficiency, even if it may, at times,
coextend with moral norms. Although the antitrust laws are
often touted as the Magna Carta of the free market system,
they are nonetheless simply laws, not constitutional
provisions. It should be left to Congress, the state legislatures, and the courts, as they have done in the past, to
craft the moral or ethical norms for the many diverse
industries and professions, rather than using the unwieldy
antitrust laws. °6
C.

Implications if Morality is Ignored

After weighing the benefits and risks of deeming hardcore cartel violations as immoral, one could simply opt for
the current course of avoiding the issue. But that raises
several risks.
1. Questions about Criminalizing Antitrust
Violations
Absent any moral basis for its criminality, a continuing
policy dispute will be whether antitrust violations should be
3 07
criminalized.
If antitrust crimes are indeed morally
neutral, then prosecuting them criminally should be the last
resort for deterrence. If corporate executives are indeed
rational profit maximizers and the harm from an antitrust

" Indeed, a profession's canon of ethics (for example, in prohibiting
competitive bidding) could be deemed moral to its members, but
nonetheless violate the Sherman Act. National Soc'y of Professional
Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
307 One popular antitrust treatise identifies as a "basic policy dispute
about antitrust law ...
the appropriateness of criminal sanctions." PHILLIP
E. AREEDA & HERBERT J. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW e I 303b3 at 31 (2d
ed. 2000). The authors recognized, however, that the Sherman Act's
criminal provisions are unlikely to be eliminated. Id.
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violation is solely pecuniary,"' then arguably a monetary
penalty coupled with other civil penalties and damages
should deter such undesired behavior. Not surprisingly,
some strong proponents of the optimal deterrence theory see
little, if any, utility in incarcerating antitrust violators. 0 9
Richard Posner, for example, downplays the stigma from a
criminal conviction as an additional deterrent, since a
"rational person is influenced by his decision whether to
engage in criminal activity by the probability of punishment
as well as by the magnitude of the punishment imposed if it
is imposed."31 0
Fines, unlike incarceration, are simply
another wealth transfer that "only negligibly reduces the
" ' In
aggregate wealth of society."31
addition, criminal
prosecution involves additional costs, given (i) the involvement of the grand jury; (ii) the constitutional safeguards for
the defendants, such as a higher evidentiary proof (which
308

Moreover, unlike other kinds of thefts, there is a low possibility

that the cartel members' conduct would instill fear in its victims or the
public generally. R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 65-71 (1974).
But while not instilling fear, such rampant antitrust violations may cause
consumers to lose confidence in the market system.
"o Cohen & Scheffman, supra note 47, at 342-43.
If antitrust
violations were deemed morally-neutral, even those who do not subscribe
to optimal deterrence theory may find imprisonment unnecessary for
antitrust offenders, under the Model Penal Code factors, given (i) the
nominal risk that during the period of a suspended sentence or probation
the defendant will commit another crime, (ii) that the defendant likely
does not need correctional treatment, (iii) a lesser sentence would not
depreciate the seriousness of this morally-neutral crime, (iv) the
defendant's employer has compensated or will compensate the victims for
their antitrust damages, (v) the defendant had no history of prior criminal
activity and has led a law-abiding life before committing the present
antitrust offense, (vi) the character and attitudes of the defendant indicate
that he is unlikely to commit another crime, (vii) the defendant is
particularly likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment, and
(viii) given the hardship already borne by a criminal conviction,
imprisonment would entail excessive hardship to himself or his
dependents. Model Penal Code § 7.01.
"' POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 29, at 271; United States v.
Alton Box Board, No. 76 CR 199, 1977 WL 1374, at *20 (N.D. Ill. March 4,
1977) (individual defendants citing Posner).
311 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 29, at 270.
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presumably involves incremental costs to obtain), and risk of
the guilty going free (or never indicted) because of this
incremental cost; (iii) the trial and sentencing (requiring a
jury, probation officers, etc.); and (iv) costs of incarceration,
which include lost productivity, and costs on defendant's
family members.
Some argue that the threat of incarceration is necessary
to deter those executives who are too poor to pay the
optimally deterring fine.3 12 But such inability to pay, for
Posner, is simply a "detail," since it is unimportant if the
individual executives are joined as defendants.3 "3 Rather, the
profit-maximizing firms will take measures to deter their
employees from further violating the antitrust laws. 14 As
these adherents note, Congress found that the enforcement
objectives of the Federal Trade Commission, which similarly
investigates antitrust violations, could be accomplished

312

See, e.g., Mark A. Cohen, Theories of Punishment and Empirical

Trends in Corporate Criminal Sanctions, 17 MANAGERIAL & DECISION
ECONOMICS 399, 400 (1996) (under "pure economic efficiency view, the only
time incarceration is required is when the offender cannot pay the optimal
fine"). But, if the court concludes under the Sentencing Guidelines that
the individual defendant cannot pay the entire fine, it should impose
community service in lieu of a portion of the fine, which should be "equally
as burdensome as a fine." U.S.S.G. § 2R1.1, comment (n.2).
3 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 29, at 271.
314 Id.
This is in accord with optimal deterrence theory. Cohen &
Scheffinan, supra note 47, at 400. Moreover, "it does not matter who
imposes the penalty-all sources of externally imposed sanctions are
essentially 'fungible.'" Id. at 405. It would not matter whether the
Department of Justice extracted the penalty through a criminal fine
versus a private class action. In one study, the authors found that neither
imprisonment (given that over eighty-five percent of those convicted at
that time did not serve jail time) nor monetary penalties posed a credible
threat to colluding firms, and hypothesized that the real deterrent effect at
that time came from the increased likelihood of a private monetary award
of trebled damages to those injured customers. Michael Kent Block, et al.,
The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust, 89 J. POL. ECON. 429, 440 (1981). A
successful government price-fixing action lowers the hurdle for a private
class action, which provided, at that time, the more significant financial
penalty. Id. at 442-43.
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solely through civil proceedings. 15
Even for the most
aggressive utilitarian, the optimal prison term should be
shorter, rather than longer, as "after a relatively short time
the marginal cost to society of additional prison time likely
would exceed the gains from additional deterrence."31
Moreover, as a convicted felon, the antitrust offender will
lose certain rights and privileges. 1 7
As antitrust violators are sentenced to longer prison
terms, and as Congress continues to increase criminal
sanctions, critics will question ever louder this expenditure
of tax dollars (not to mention the increasing social costs of
these executives toiling away behind bars when they could
be maximizing profits in the corporate world) on the criminal
convictions and incarceration of these morally blameless
executives when a less costly civil penalty (and/or shorter
incarceration) would suffice.

2. Overcriminalization
Some utilitarians may argue that a crime "is anything
which the legislature chooses to say it is,"31 and this
legislative choice is justified when the threat of

315

JOSEPH

W. BURNS, A

STUDY

OF

THE ANTITRUST

LAWS,

THEIR

110 (1958).
OECD Cartel Sanction Report, supra note 44, at 8; see also Ehrlich,

ADMINISTRATION, INTERPRETATION, AND EFFECT
316

supra note 46, at 62 ("many studies find that increasing the risk of
imprisonment for most crime categories has a significantly larger
deterrent effect in elasticity terms than increasing the length of
imprisonment, especially for violent crimes, and that the magnitude of the
elasticities is less than 1").
317 Although the federal law generally prohibits federal felons from
obtaining, receiving, transporting, or possessing firearms, which covers
both handguns and rifles, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(f)(1), 921(a)(3) (1994),
antitrust offenses, for some reason, are exempt from this federal ban. See
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(A) (1994). For an overview of rights lost by a

convicted felon, see ABA

STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE

§ 14-1.4 (3rd ed.

1999).
318 Hart (Aims of Criminal Law), supra note 186, at 432 (discussing
Supreme Court's decisions in Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218
U.S. 57, 67-69 (1910) and United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488, 497-98
(1911)).
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imprisonment more effectively deters such antitrust violations than civil remedies alone. But others will respond
that criminalizing such morally-neutral conduct will have
several adverse consequences. First, the criminal law "is not
merely a device for promoting particular economic and social
ends" but is "directed to the moral standards of society."3 19
As Henry Hart and others have argued, criminal sanctions
cannot be justified unless accompanied by the judgment of
community condemnation. One could view this on moral
grounds-that society should not impose its "heavy artillery"
on morally-neutral conduct, but only conduct that deviates
from societal norms and is sufficiently harmful or offensive
320
in itself to warrant the curtailment of individual liberties.
Indeed, the Sentencing Commission in establishing its
sentencing guidelines must factor "the community view of
the gravity of the offense" and the "public concern generated
by the offense."321
A second concern is that criminalizing morally-neutral
behavior will undermine the effectiveness of deterring
immoral conduct. 2
The thinking is that criminalizing
behavior has several attendant benefits.
Criminal law
serves an important educational and socializing function,
whereby society decrees which behavior is immoral and,
based on its punishment, the degree of its immorality. 2 3
These educational benefits, including the "moral gradation of
punishment," are lost if morally-neutral crimes are equally
or more severely punished than immoral offenses. 4
Moreover, absent a moral component, it will be harder to

Burns, supra note 315, at 112 (quoting unidentified federal judge).
.20Francis A. Allen, The Morality of Means: Three Problems in
319

CriminalSanctions, 42 U. PITT.L. REV. 737, 738 (1981).
321

28 U.S.C. §§ 994(c)(4)-(5).

322
323

See, e.g., Kadish, supra note 22, at 446.
Coffee, supranote 146, at 193-94.

324

H. L. A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 36-37 (1963). It may

have other adverse effects. For example, if the "offender will be executed
for a minor assault and for a murder, there is no marginal deterrence to
murder." George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J.
POLITICAL ECONOMY 526, 527 (1970).
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internalize such legal norms, which have many permutations
and exceptions.
In criminalizing many morally-neutral activities, the
moral stigma of a criminal conviction diminishes as well. 25
If we "tend to view the criminal as a person who violates
laws which we cannot see ourselves violating," then we all
eventually may be deemed criminals by violating numerous
morally-neutral statutes. 2 6 In lessening the stigma associated with criminal behavior, such over-criminalization
weakens the restraints of peer pressure and fear of social
disapproval. Essentially, criminal law begins to lose its
moral legitimacy.3 27 For example, suppose to curb speeding
along a desert highway (which has a low risk of detection),
the state criminalizes this offense with a steep penalty (ten
Similarly, other morally-neutral
year imprisonment).
activities are criminalized to varying degrees. Faced with a
menu of criminalized morally-neutral and immoral conduct,
citizens, rather than obeying all of these prohibitions, begin
to pick and choose, depending upon the competing norm, and
The
unilaterally determine what is indeed immoral.
internalization of the moral norm is diminished, as people no
325 Kadish, supra note 22, at 445; Hart (Aims of the Criminal Law),
supra note 186, at 418 n.42.
.26Ball & Friedman, supra note 228, at 217. For example, one

respondent to Judge Renfrew's survey confessed that at one time, he and
the other people at his dining table admitted (during the defendant's
speech) that they all may have unwittingly engaged in anticompetitive
practices, and with the "body of law growing at an alarming rate ...two
honest businessmen can break the law without knowing it." Renfrew,
supra note 32, at 604. Thus, if one respondent's friends had been caught in
the act, and received a criminal sentence, the respondent would have
considered it "a gross miscarriage of justice." Id. (This reaction might
have arisen from defendants' distorted characterizations of their activities,
but it nonetheless represents one public relations' response by an antitrust
defendant. Also, currently, unlike the 1950s and 1960s, the Department of
Justice prosecutes criminally hard-core cartels, a discrete subset of all
antitrust violations.)
327 Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-CivilDistinction and the Utility of
Desert, 76 B.U. L. REV. 202 (1996); Allen, supra note 320, at 738; Kadish,
supra note 22, at 425-26; HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
SANCTION

359 (1968).
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longer feel guilt or fear of shame. Instead, speeding along
the highway, citizens will brake when they spot a police
cruiser, but resume speeding once they are safely past.
Some criticize this concern of overcriminalization, since it
fails to account for criminal law's educational function. 2 8
Society can eventually accept actions previously viewed as
morally-neutral as immoral, as we have done with environmental, civil rights, and money laundering laws. But here
the prospect is that courts, antitrust enforcers, and antitrust
scholars will stubbornly refuse to discuss antitrust's
morality, thereby hampering its natural evolution toward
immorality.
3. Ineffectiveness
Any criminal policy that focuses solely on the optimal
price to deter crime, and ignores other social factors (such as
It is
moral norms), is likely to remain ineffectual.3 29
therefore likely that Congress will further increase the
Sherman Act's criminal fines and prison sentences in the
quest for that elusive level of optimal deterrence. Absent a
moral basis, even the most fervent utilitarian will question
the utility of incarcerating these executives for years (and
perhaps eventually decades). A more pressing concern is the
issue of prosecutor, jury, or judge nullification, which has
thwarted antitrust prosecution for decades. 3" As discussed
below, this nullification has impeded current attempts in

328
329

See Coffee, supra note 146, at 200.
Kahan, supra note 219, at 361.

A classic example of such jury nullification is British law in the
eighteenth century which had approximately 200 capital offenses,
including stealing goods valued at a specific amount from a specific locale
(such as items valued at five shillings stolen from a shop). Schwartz &
Orleans, supra note 279, at 277-78. Juries responded by specifying a lower
value for the goods (even though there was sworn testimony to the
contrary) to place it below the threshold for a capital offense. By 1861,
Parliament had abolished the death penalty for all but four offenses, in
part because of pressure from commercial interests, "whose avowed
purpose was to secure reliable enforcement of property laws by making
their penalties more acceptable to juries." Id. at 278.
330
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other nations to criminalize (or increase the criminal
sanctions against) hard-core cartels or to prosecute cartels
under existing laws. Even if the defendant pleads nolo
contendere (or is found guilty), judges, as they did preSentencing Guidelines, may reject optimal deterrence theory
and sentence the individual defendant lightly. 31
4. Morality of Overdeterrence
Moral issues are raised even if the antitrust offenders
receive a severe sentence. Suppose, for example, lengthy
prison sentences are indeed inflicted for speeding along the
desert highway (given the offense's low probability of
detection at current enforcement expenditures). What moral
issues would arise if an offender is now punished with
twenty years of hard labor for speeding, not because the
severity is proportional to the particular offense's gravityeither in terms of social harm or the wrongfulness of the act
itself-but because this represents to the legislator an
efficient means to deter speeding in general?3.2 The focus is
no longer on the reprehensibility of the individual
defendant's acts, but on the utility of using to the maximum
advantage that particular defendant in generally deterring
the crime.
Likewise, even if antitrust policymakers avoid these
moral issues, defense lawyers and others will question
incarcerating business executives for a morally-neutral
offense, based solely on an empirically untested economic

331 After United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), which rendered
the Sentencing Guidelines effectively advisory, the district court, if it
determines that a Guidelines sentence does not meet the purpose of
sentencing, may impose a non-Guidelines sentence. Written Statement of
the U.S. Sentencing Commission before the Antitrust Modernization
Commission, Nov. 3, 2005, at 8. For examples of the courts' discomfort in
sentencing antitrust offenders to jail for the purposes of general
deterrence, see Renfrew, supra note 34; United States v. Alton Box Board
Co., No. 76-CR-199, 1977 WL 1374, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 1977).
332 Johannes Andenaes, The Morality of Deterrence, 37 U.
CHI. L. REV.
649 (1970).
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theory of optimal deterrence.3 3 Even if one accepts general
deterrence, one will eventually ask to what degree society
should bear on an individual defendant's shoulders the
"impossibility of monitoring all the businesses in the
country, and the difficulty of detecting and proving criminal
violations of the antitrust laws." 334 How much should an
individual's liberty be sacrificed to promote general
deterrence? This is simply a variation of the age-old moral
issue of whether the condemnation of an innocent person can
be justified as a legitimate means of saving a nation. 35 Are
moderate monetary penalties, when coupled with more
active enforcement, "more acceptable to the moral
sentiments than harsh penalties with only sporadic
enforcement?"3 36 Some have questioned "the justice and
wisdom of imposing a stigma of moral blame in the absence
37
of blameworthiness in the actor."
One proponent of stiffer antitrust penalties suggested
that high penalties would reduce the cost of policing such
behavior.3
While the authors jokingly suggested public
executions for antitrust violations, such executions had an
immediate impact on pricing in the affected industry in
another country. Nonetheless, as the ICN correctly pointed
out, a key issue is "just how far deterrence should go." 3 9
This is especially troubling if criminal penalties for antitrust
violations have no moral footing and the defendant could
conceivably face ten years behind bars based on a potentially
flawed economic theory.

" For one example of such criticisms, see The Joint Response of the
Individual Defendants To "Government's Sentencing Memorandum"
available at Alton Box Board, 1977 WL 1374, at *16-23.
' 1977 Department of Justice Guidelines for Sentencing Recommendations, supra note 69, at 552.
...CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 209, at §1, ch. 1,
art. 4.
336 Andenaes, Morality, supra note 332, at 655; see also Kahan, supra
note 219, at 382.
17 Kadish, supra note 22, at 442; see also Hart, supra note 186, at
422.
33 See Block & Sidak, supra note 117, at 1132.
331ICN Report, supra note 15, at 63.
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5. Public Confidence in the Integrity of Political,
Economic, and Government Institutions
On the other hand, suppose that criminal law retains its
educative function, and many in society deem certain hardcore antitrust violations, based on the severe criminal
sanctions, as indeed immoral. If the next generation of
antitrust officials and judges, however, treat such antitrust
violations as though they were morally neutral (perhaps
focusing more on corporate fines and less on individual
accountability), then this too may have adverse consequences. The public may view the antitrust offenders as
getting off easy; they may believe that "there is an inherent
bias in the administration of justice" in favor of these whitecollar criminals. 4 °
6. Ability to Convince Other Nations to Prosecute
Hard-Core Cartels
Since the Sherman Act's inception, many federal judges
have treated antitrust offenders as respectable executives
who posed no danger to society. One antitrust commentator
in the 1950s opined that these price-fixers "are leaders in
their respective communities and men of unquestioned
personal integrity whose careers are clear of any taint of
moral turpitude."341

Indeed, the strictures of the Sherman

340 Baker Speech, supra note 119, at 531. As Baker noted,

"Crimes by

corporations and businessmen 'establish an example which tends to erode
the moral base of the law and provide an opportunity for other kinds of
offenders to rationalize their misconduct.'" Id. at 532 (quoting United
States v. Bengimina, 1971 Trade Cases 73,474 at 89,926 (W.D.Mo. 1971)
(quoting The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the
Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Crime and its Impact: An
Assessment (1967))). Likewise, Judge Renfrew noted that an unidentified
"able and well-known district judge" wrote him to disagree with his light
sentence for antitrust offenders. The unidentified judge wrote that he
would be unable to sleep nights if "[the unidentified judge] continued to
imprison blacks for nonviolent felony offenses, as is often necessary, and
put white 'white collar' offenders on the street." Renfrew, supra note 34, at
613.
34 Kramer, Comment, supra note 61, at 536.
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Act "run counter to the normal pattern of behavior of the
majority of businessmen" and criminalize otherwise "normal"
conduct. 2 Prodded by the Department of Justice, Congress,
and the Sentencing Guidelines, courts have been sentencing
antitrust criminals to longer prison sentences. Although the
Department of Justice is dedicated to criminally prosecuting
these cartels, prosecutors in other countries might find
cartels a low priority compared to violent or immoral
crimes,"' given (i) cartels' perceived victimless or amorphous
effects; (ii) the fact that individuals rarely enrich themselves;
and (iii) the prevailing business norm.
Despite the great strides in global antitrust enforcement,3 4 few other countries have matched the United States
in criminalizing price-fixing and other hard-core antitrust
offenses. In only a minority of countries is cartel conduct
considered a crime punishable by imprisonment as well as by
fines. 45 As the ICN found, the most widespread penalty
provided for impermissible cartels are fines imposed on the
corporate cartel members. 6 As of 1998, less than half of the
OECD countries permitted the imposition of administrative
or other fines on natural persons for cartel conduct. 47
Although
thirteen
surveyed
countries
theoretically

342

Id.

OECD Cartel Sanction Report, supra note 44, at 22.
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development's 2005
now identifies over 100 nations
and supranational competition authorities (e.g., the EC) that deal with
restrictive business practices.
U.N. Conference on Trade and
Development, Jan. 12, 2005, Directory of Competition Authorities, U.N.
Doc. TD/B/COM.2/CLP/49 (Jan. 12, 2005) (prepared by UNCTAD
secretariat), available at
http://rO.unctad.org/en/subsites/cpolicy/docs/
c2clpd49_en.pdf.
...OECD Cartel Sanction Report, supra note 44, at 15 (quoting Org.
for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev. [OECD], Second Report by the
Competition Committee on Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels,
DAFFE/COMP (2003)2).
346 ICN Report, supra note 15, at 58.
311 OECD Cartel Sanction Report, supra note 44, at 15 (quoting
OECD, Second Report by the Competition Committee on Effective Action
Against Hard Core Cartels,DAFFE/COMP (2003)2).
DIRECTORY OF COMPETITION AUTHORITIES

542
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authorized fines against individuals, between 1998 and 2000
only four countries actually imposed them 8' and only two
imposed jail sentences. 4 9
Very few corporate executives in other nations were
actually imprisoned for antitrust offenses. An ICN survey of
the United States and eighteen other jurisdictions found over
one hundred companies fined annually in all cartel cases
brought between 2001 and 2003.110 In two of these three
years, the number of fines to corporations substantially
exceeded the number of fines to individuals 3 5 1 and fines to
individuals
occurred
more
frequently
than
actual
imprisonment. 5 2 Six of the nineteen countries did not report
any antitrust prosecutions at all for this three-year period.353
Several countries, including Switzerland, have questioned
criminal sanctions against individuals as an effective
deterrent for an antitrust violation if the crime is not viewed
as morally repugnant. 54 Among possible explanations cited

"

Id. (Australia, Canada, Germany, and United States).

349 Id. (United States & Canada); see also ICN Report, supra note
15,

at 66 (in nineteen country survey, only two of eight countries, which, in
theory, provide for imprisonment, have actually put it into practice; one of
the two only started convicting individuals in 2003, but suspended the
execution of all the sentences). For an update on other countries' efforts to
increase sanction for hard-core cartels, see OECD, Hard-Core Cartels:
Third Report on the Implementation of the 1998 Recommendation 8-12
(2005).
350 ICN Report, supra note 15, at 56.
The countries surveyed were
Australia, Brazil, Canada, European Union, France, Germany, Hungary,
Ireland, Japan, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States and Venezuela. Id.
179
companies were fined in 2001, 145 in 2002, and 174 in 2003. Id.
311 Id.
A total of 51 individuals were fined in 2001, 330 in 2002, and
63 in 2003.
352 Id. A total of 21 individuals were imprisoned in 2001, 11 in 2002,
and 30 in 2003. Although the survey does not break out the numbers by
country, the United States incarcerated forty-five individuals during these
three fiscal years (which ends in September rather than December), so one
can roughly estimate that the United States accounted for over 70% of
incarcerations.
353 Id.

31 OECD Cartel Sanction Report, supra note 44, at 88.
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by OECD as to why other countries are reluctant to provide
for sanctions against individuals is that criminal sanctions
are not compatible with the nation's values and social norms,
that imprisonment imposes significant costs on society, and
that non-criminal sanctions would be more effective and
criminal enforcement might decrease the level of enforcement. 55 Such foreign countries also view cartels as not
sufficiently reprehensible to justify criminal penalties. 5 6
Even where other foreign nations have criminal statutes
against such hard-core cartels, competition authorities may
still face, as the United States experienced for many decades,
either prosecutorial, jury or judge nullification. Chinese
Taipei introduced criminal sanctions in 1992 (including jail
terms up to three years) but faced broad resistance within its
business community, by "academics, the judicial system and
the FTC itself." 57 Likewise, Mexico competition authorities
found it difficult to persuade prosecutors to pursue such
hard-core cartel cases as "[there was a lack of awareness in
society that cartels were a reprehensible conduct." 358
With the globalization of business, other nations'
antitrust laws (or lack thereof) play an increasingly
important role. Even if one accepted the optimal deterrence
theory, it is necessary to encourage these other countries to
increase their penalties for such hard-core cartel behavior.
355Id. at 21.
356

Id.

35'Id. at 106.
358

Id.

at 111.

In addition to persuading other nations' competition

authorities to prosecute hard-core cartels, the Department of Justice and
FTC also seek to dissuade state and local government officials from
sanctioning such cartel behavior. At times, state or municipal agencies
may prohibit or restrict pro-competitive activities, under the implied
immunity of the state action doctrine. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341,
350-51 (1943); FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 631 (1992). At
times, the agency that promulgates the regulation is under the control of
the industry participants it seeks to regulate, and may justify its
anticompetitive actions as promoting the community's safety or welfare. If
the state's anticompetitive aim is blended with a public-welfare aim, state
legislators can more readily claim that their consumer protection measure
trumps a morally-neutral antitrust regulation.
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Given the varying degrees of due process afforded defendants
in other nations, it may not necessarily be desirable that
other countries criminalize antitrust violations. But absent
any moral underpinnings, many other countries may not
even prosecute these violations civilly. Moreover, in other
nations where antitrust violations are tolerated, or not
actively prosecuted, executives in those nations may have
3 59
little incentive to refrain from price fixing.
7. Irrelevancy
As Ball and Friedman commented, when the moral
outrage that sets the criminal statute into motion subsides,
the statute loses its vitality. 6 ° Absent a showing of the
moral wrongfulness of cartels and their social harms, the
antitrust laws become an easier pifiata for those questioning
antitrust's utility. With so many other issues vying for the
citizens' attention, antitrust can easily slip into irrelevancya historical artifact. The Department of Justice will continue
to aggressively prosecute hard-core cartels (which will
continue to thrive in the global moral ambivalence); a few
may be mentioned in the press but then are quickly
forgotten.
V. CONCLUSION
It is clear that no economic sanction by itself can
effectively deter hard-core cartels. Society must maximize
the effectiveness of all available criminal and civil sanctions
and remedies. The Department of Justice's Corporate

...Speaking personally "as someone inside a corporation," the
Antitrust Modernization Commission Commissioner stated that "it is
much harder to incentivize individuals in far-flung countries when they
have no personal exposure and no - quite frankly, there's no impact of any
price fixing that they may do. . . ." Criminal Remedies: Public Hearing
before Antitrust Modernization Commission, at 100 (Nov. 3, 2005)

(statement of Debra A. Valentine, Commissioner), available at
http://www.amc.gov/commission-hearings/pdf/051103_CriminalRemedies
_Transcript~reform%20.pdf.
3' Ball & Friedman, supranote 228, at 222.
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Leniency Program is laudable in providing greater incentives
for being first in confessing one's antitrust crime in exchange
for criminal amnesty and reduced civil damages. It has been
praised as "unquestionably, the single greatest investigative
tool available to anti-cartel enforcers."3 1 But in a wellfunctioning antitrust enforcement program, amnesty (or
even moral norms) should be the last-rather than the
first-weapon to deter cartels. After all, a leniency program
comes into play only after (i) market conditions enabled
competitors to collude, (ii) the conspirators actually
conspired to the detriment of consumers, and (iii) one cartel
member concluded that the likelihood of detection and
penalties outweigh the supracompetitive profits from the
expected remainder of the cartel. Consumers should not
have to rely on the company's moral beneficence in avoiding
such cartel behavior or the enlightened criminal seeking
absolution through the leniency program. Such business
executives are "free to practice the prerogatives of business
statesmanship only to the extent that they are free from the
compulsions of competition."3 62 Instead, consumers expect
from a free market system that competitors be compelled to
provide the highest quality products at the lowest prices, not
because of any kindness or sympathy, but in their quest for
survival.
The optimal regulator in the marketplace is
neither moral norms nor criminal sanctions, but sheer
competition.
Consequently, the primary anti-cartel weapon must be
the effective global enforcement of competition policies. This
includes each nation enforcing its merger policies to
minimize the likelihood of companies either tacitly or
expressly colluding in the first instance, eliminating special
interest immunities and anticompetitive policies which serve
361

Scott D. Hammond, Dir. of Criminal Enforcement, Antitrust Div.,

U.S. Dep't of Justice, Detecting And Deterring Cartel Activity Through An
Effective Leniency Program, Speech before Int'l Workshop on Cartels
(Nov. 21-22, 2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/
9928.htm.
362 Ben W. Lewis, Economics by Admonition, 49 AM. ECON. REV. 384,
390 (1959).
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only parochial interests and no greater societal benefit, and
neither granting monopolies, sheltering them from competition, nor permitting their anticompetitive conduct. It
makes no economic sense for any nation's courts, competition
officials, or antitrust scholars to tout cartels as the supreme
evil of antitrust law, but to be dismissive of other civil
antitrust violations, such as anticompetitive mergers and
anticompetitive behavior by monopolists."' When the market
fails and collusion occurs, then competition authorities must
advocate competition not only by prosecuting the cartel, but
by exposing to the public its wrongfulness and net harm.
Hopefully, these moral lessons will kindle sentiments of
aversion in the public towards these hard-core cartels.
Although antitrust scholars, policymakers, enforcers, and
courts have divorced morality from antitrust, given the

...A monopolist's anticompetitive practices may impose far greater
economic harm in a particular industry than a would-be cartel in that
industry.
As the former AAG in the Eisenhower Administration
commented:
An enforcement program built around a lackadaisical
government enforcement eliminates much of the deterrent
values found in private treble damage suits.
What
monopolist would fear his victim, when the victim could
not afford to prove the monopolist's treble damage liability
other than by means of a litigated government judgment?
What defendant could plead a Sherman Act defense to a
case brought against it by a monopolist whose secret illegal
operations had not been called to public attention by a
government prosecution? What deterrent effect would be
found in a government prosecution did not expose the roots
of a monopolist's power?

1954 Barnes Speech, supra note 34; see also MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE
662-64 (1990) (noting that leniency
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toward mergers and monopolies in several countries, including the United
States, has become counterproductive); Michael E. Porter, Competition
and Antitrust: A Productivity-Based Approach 1-2 (May 30, 2002),
available at http://www.isc.hbs.edu/053002antitrust.pdf
(noting his
conviction that "open competition, stimulated by strict antitrust
enforcement, is essential not only to national prosperity, but to the health
of companies themselves"); HARVARD UNIV. & WORLD ECON. FORUM,
GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2000 (2000).
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escalation of criminal penalties for antitrust offenses and the
infirmities of optimal deterrence theory, it is time to bring
morality into the debate.
One may remain dubious of
morality having any role in antitrust policy; but for better or
worse, antitrust may be all that remains to embody the
general rules of competition and to describe what is fair or
inequitable. The federal antitrust laws may indeed be a poor
legal principle to shoulder such moral issues. Perhaps the
problems that arrive at the antitrust enforcers' door
represent greater moral issues in society. After vividly
describing the GE & Westinghouse's notorious electrical
equipment cartels, a 1961 Fortune magazine article aptly
concluded with the following observation:
The problem for American business does not start
and stop with the scofflaws of the electrical industry
or with antitrust. Much was made of the fact that
G.E. operated under a system of disjointed authority,
and this was one reason it got into trouble. A more
significant factor, the disjointment of morals, is
something for American executives to think about in
all aspects of their relations with their companies,
each other, and the community."
But only in addressing the immorality or amorality of
antitrust crimes does one reach these greater issues.

" Smith, Electrical Conspiracy (PartII), supra note 31, at 161, 224.

